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This dissertation is organized as a three paper thesis on the effects of ownership structure on 
human resource systems and outcomes in franchise businesses. Using qualitative field research 
and quantitative establishment-level survey and matched performance data from a large hotel 
company, I examine how and why differences between franchise and company forms of 
ownership shape: 1) the management of human resource systems across ownership forms, paying 
particular attention to the role of intra- and inter-firm relationships between franchisors and their 
units; 2) the specific human resource practices adopted across franchise and company operations; 
and 3) the relationship between human resource practices, and employee and organizational 
outcomes across ownership forms. I find significant differences in the management and types of 
human resource systems adopted across franchise and company forms of ownership. I also find 
that differences in human resource systems across ownership forms influence employee 
organizational citizenship behaviors and customer satisfaction, but ownership form also has 
independent and offsetting effects on both of these outcomes. The results suggest that while 
franchise and company operations are in many ways similar, their human resource systems and 
performance outcomes are different.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OUR BUSINESS, YOUR EMPLOYEES: THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN 
RESOURCE SYSTEMS IN FRANCHISE BUSINESSES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the growth and significance of franchising in today’s economy, we know very little 
about how human resource systems are managed in franchised operations, especially compared 
to similar company-owned and managed operations in franchise businesses.  This study 
examines the management practices of franchise businesses in one of the most highly franchised 
industries in the U.S., the hotel industry, exploring the ways in which human resource systems 
are managed across ownership forms and paying particular attention to the level of corporate 
(franchisor) involvement in the management of these systems.  The results of a matched-pair 
case study comparison of a franchisee-owned hotel and a company-managed hotel operating 
under the same parent company reveal significant differences in the management of human 
resource systems across ownership forms.  While corporate provides franchisees with methods of 
operation and ongoing support, this does not extend to matters of employment.  With the 
exception of training, human resource practices are decentralized to, and at the discretion of, the 
franchisee.  In contrast, corporate has a high level of involvement in all aspects of the company-
managed hotel’s human resource system.  Three potential explanations, and their implications, 
for the observed differences in the management of human resource systems across franchised 
and company operations are outlined: 1) franchisor fears over potential liability for the actions of 
its franchisees; 2) the classification of employment decisions as “tactical” rather than “strategic” 
in nature; and 3) the entrepreneurial nature of franchised operations.  The study concludes with 
suggestions for future research. 
Keywords: franchise businesses; human resource systems; ownership form. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The last three decades have witnessed an explosion in new forms of economic 
organization both in the United States (US) and abroad.  One such form has been that of 
franchising.  Today, one in every 10 US businesses is franchised (US Census Bureau 2010).  
Moreover, franchise businesses have directly and indirectly contributed $2.1 trillion to the US 
economy, accounting for 9% of all private sector output1.  Franchise businesses are also a 
significant source of employment, directly and indirectly generating more than 17 million jobs 
and encompassing 11.8% of the US private sector workforce (IFA 2013).  For many firms, the 
franchise form of business ownership represents a viable alternative to the traditional, 
hierarchical company form.  Firms in a multitude of industries have begun to operate franchised 
units alongside their existing company units in an effort to expand more quickly and efficiently.  
Yet, we know very little about how human resource (HR) systems are managed under this new 
ownership form, especially compared to the traditional company ownership form.  In particular, 
while we know that franchisors provide franchisees with a product/service, trademark and 
methods of operation2, just how far do these methods extend?  Does this include HR strategies 
and practices?  How are human resource systems managed across franchised and company units 
in franchise businesses?  Moreover, how much involvement does corporate (the franchisor) have 
in the management of these systems? 
 Building on resource-scarcity theories and agency theories, researchers have given 
considerable attention to why firms choose to own or franchise units (e.g. Oxenfeldt and Kelly 
1969; Caves and Murphy 1976; Rubin 1978; Brickley and Dark 1987) and the performance 
consequences of franchising (Michael 2000; Kosova, Lafontaine and Perrigot 2010).  Little 
attention, however, has been given to how franchise businesses and more specifically, their 
                                                 
1 “Franchise businesses” refer to all businesses that are part of a franchise system. This includes both franchisee-
owned and franchisor/company-owned or managed establishments.  
2 This definition of franchising represents the business format form of franchising as opposed to product/trademark 
franchising in which the franchisor grants a license to the franchisee to use their trademark or sell their products but 
with little guidance as to the methods of operation (Alon 2006).  Since business format franchising accounts for the 
majority of growth, employment and output in franchising (IFA 2013), it will be the focus of this study. 
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human resource systems, are managed.  Although some studies have examined how company 
and franchised units are managed in franchise businesses, they have primarily focused on 
operational issues (Bradach 1998; Birkeland 2002), largely ignoring issues of work organization 
and the management of employees within and across those units.  The few studies that have 
looked at employment have focused on differences in human resource practices between 
franchised operations and similar independent operations (Cappelli and Hamori 2008) or have 
compared franchised units to comparable company units on a narrow range of practices (Krueger 
1991; Ji and Weil 2009; Freedman and Kosova 2010) or actors (Castrogiovanni and Kidwell 
2010).  Nevertheless, these studies do not examine how human resource systems are actually 
managed in franchise businesses and instead, attribute similarities and differences in practices 
across ownership forms to assumptions of how human resource systems are managed and/or 
differences in incentives3.  For example, Cappelli and Hamori (2008) demonstrate that franchise 
operations have more sophisticated systems of employment than non-franchise operations and 
attribute this, in large part, to standardized franchise operating procedures:  “If the essence of 
franchise management is to identify effective management practices, then standardize and 
distribute them across franchise outlets, it is not obvious why franchise operations would not also 
include high performance work practices in their portfolio” (149).  Here, the authors assume that 
human resource practices are part and parcel of the franchise system provided to franchisees.  In 
contrast, studies which have compared human resource practices in franchised operations to 
similar company operations, such as those by Krueger (1991) and Freedman and Kosova (2001) 
on employee compensation and that by Ji and Weil (2009) on labor standards compliance, have 
found differences in practices across ownership forms and attribute these differences to 
comparative ownership incentives.  In these studies, the authors assume that human resource 
                                                 
3 An exception here is Truss (2004) who examines inter-firm relationships and the management of human resources 
in product-based car distribution franchises in the UK. Although not the focus here, Truss’ findings offer an 
interesting contrast to the findings of this study in a business format franchise and different institutional context. 
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practices are not dictated by the franchisor or that franchisees, at the very least, have some 
discretion with regards to matters of employment.   
 Evidently, we still lack a clear understanding of how human resource systems are 
managed across franchised and company forms of ownership.  Understanding this is important 
not only because a growing number of workers now find themselves employed by franchise 
businesses but also because previous research indicates that HR strategies and practices affect 
organizational performance (Combs et al 2006).  In particular, research has shown that HR 
practices affect employee outcomes, such as turnover, and that these outcomes, in turn, affect 
organizational outcomes including but not limited to customer satisfaction and financial 
performance.  Accordingly, differences in the management of human resource systems across 
franchise and company units may lead to differences in employee outcomes and ultimately, 
organizational outcomes. And since franchise units and company units are replicated, 
operationally indistinguishable operations that share a common brand name, the effects can be 
far reaching. Thus, understanding how human resource systems are managed across franchised 
and company units in franchise businesses can provide us with a better understanding of factors 
which may affect the success and long-term viability of both individual units and the larger 
organizations to which those units belong.  This is especially important when we take into 
account the role of franchise businesses as drivers of economic growth and the fact that as many 
as three fourths of new franchise systems die within 10 years of establishment (Shane 1996).   
 In this paper, I examine how franchise businesses manage their human resource systems 
in one of the most highly franchised industries in the US, the hotel industry, paying particular 
attention to the level of corporate involvement in these systems.  Using a matched-pair case 
study comparison of a franchisee-owned hotel and a company-managed hotel operating under the 
same parent company, I find significant differences in the management of human resource 
systems across ownership forms.  While corporate has a high level of involvement in all aspects 
of the company-managed hotel’s human resource system, they take a much more hands-off 
approach to the human resource system of the franchisee-owned hotel, with most human 
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resource practices, apart from training, decentralized to, and at the discretion of, the franchisee. 
Three potential explanations, and their implications, for the observed differences are outlined. 
 
FRANCHISE BUSINESSES 
Company Units vs. Franchised Units 
 Franchise businesses are typically made up of both franchised units and company units. 
Company units can either be company-owned and operated or company-managed.  Company-
owned operations are those that the company not only manages but also has an ownership 
interest in.  Company-managed operations are those that the company manages but does not 
own.  In these operations, the company contracts with the owners to manage the business on their 
behalf, using the company’s brand-name, in exchange for management fees.  Owners retain legal 
and financial responsibility and receive the profits from the business (minus management fees) 
but are not involved in day-to-day operations and in most cases, have contractually agreed not to 
interfere with the company’s management of the business (Guilding 2003; Freedman and Kosova 
2010).  In this way, company-managed units are very similar to company-owned units in that the 
company assumes full management control over operations.   
Franchising represents an alternative to traditional company forms of ownership.  In 
exchange for an upfront lump sum payment and annual royalty fees (typically a % of gross 
revenues), a company (franchisor) grants an individual (franchisee) the right to sell its product or 
service using its brand-name and business system (Shane 1996; Alon 2006).  The latter typically 
includes methods of operation and ongoing support and guidance.  The franchisee is responsible 
for day-to-day operations and receives the profits from the business (minus royalties).   
In contrast to company arrangements then, which are characterized by employment 
contracts with company personnel, an internal system of rewards for managers in the form of 
salaries and bonuses, and authoritative hierarchical top-down influence, franchise arrangements 
are characterized by business contracts between the franchisee and the franchisor, an external 
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system of rewards in the form of profits, and a negotiated partnership between an independent 
entrepreneur and a larger organization (Bradach 1998). 
 Nevertheless, there is some debate over the extent to which franchise arrangements are 
actually different from company arrangements and some have even gone as far as to argue that 
franchisees are akin to managers of what are, in effect, “subsidiaries” of the company.  We 
examine these arguments and the nature of the franchise relationship next.  
 
The Franchise Relationship 
 The franchise relationship can be characterized as one of both legal independence and 
economic interdependence.  On the one hand, the franchisor and the franchisee are legally 
independent entities and franchise agreements often classify franchisees as “independent 
contractors” that are responsible for the management and operation of their own businesses.  
This implies that franchisees have a high degree of autonomy and discretion.  On the other hand, 
the franchisee and the franchisor are partners.  The franchisee adopts the franchisor’s brand-
name and the franchisor provides the franchisee with managerial assistance, training, advertising 
assistance, operating procedures and site selection (Rubin 1978).  Moreover, both the franchisee 
and the franchisor have a vested interest in the success of the franchised operation.  The 
franchisee has invested financial capital and benefits from the profits of the operation.  The 
franchisor has invested intellectual capital, in the form of its name and trademarks, and benefits 
from ongoing royalties, which are based on the franchised operation’s revenues.   
 There is some question, however, as to the equality of this “partnership”.  To be sure, the 
franchisor has extensive contractual control over the franchisee and the franchise agreement 
typically includes strict provisions regarding the use of trademarks, operating procedures and 
record-keeping (Ji and Weil 2009).  The franchisor also places limits on the franchisee’s ability 
to sell the operation and retains the unilateral right to terminate the franchise agreement 
(Brickley and Dark 1987).  So how does the franchise relationship play out in reality?  How 
much independence do franchisees actually have? 
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 In his analysis of the McDonald’s franchise system, Royle (2000) argues that given their 
lack of autonomy as well as the company’s extensive control over most aspects of operations and 
the ease with which the company can terminate the franchise contract, franchisees are just as 
restricted as company managers and as a result, “the relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee is arguably one that is closer to the employee and employer relationship” (53).  In 
contrast, there is some evidence that franchisees may have more autonomy than otherwise 
believed.  For example, while Stanworth (1995) found little formal independence in the franchise 
relationship in his analysis of franchise contracts and described the formal relations between the 
franchisor and franchisee as “dependently-one sided” (165), he also argues that franchisees have 
some degree of operational independence which is not reflected in formal contracts.  Using 
questionnaire responses of franchisees and franchisors, he indicates that franchisees believed that 
they had control over hours of operation, employment of staff, staff wage levels, service quality 
standards, bookkeeping and local advertising while franchisors only had control over the 
product/service mix and pricing.  It is worth noting however that the franchisors in his study 
were not in complete agreement with franchisee responses.  Specifically, while franchisors 
agreed that they have primary responsibility for the product service mix and pricing and that 
franchisees had primary responsibility for hours of operation, staff wage levels and bookkeeping, 
franchisors did not agree that franchisees had primary discretion over the employment of staff, 
service quality standards and local advertising.  Hunt (1972) found similar results regarding 
franchisee beliefs of independence in a survey of 1000 franchisees, with franchisees claiming 
control over key operating areas such as hours of operation, bookkeeping, local advertising, 
pricing, standards of cleanliness and the number of employees.  However, Hunt also concluded 
that franchisors exert significant control over franchisees through franchise agreements that 
include specific procedures for operating the business and that “many franchise agreements 
provide powerful evidence that they are one-sided contracts of adhesion rather than balanced, 
negotiated agreements” (38).  Finally, in his study of five restaurant chains, Bradach (1998) 
argues that while franchisees have discretion over tactical decisions, such as pricing, suppliers 
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(though suppliers had to be preapproved by the franchisor), the deployment of labor and local 
marketing, they did not have the ability to make strategic decisions – decisions that had the 
potential to affect the uniformity of the product or service being provided.   
 As these studies demonstrate, it is not clear how much independence franchisees actually 
have in their operations.  Perhaps more importantly, for the purposes of this study, it is not at all 
evident how much discretion franchisees have over their human resource systems and what the 
role of the franchisor is in the management of these systems.  For example, while Royle (2000) 
notes that franchisees have more control with regards to matters of employment than managers 
of company-owned operations, he also demonstrates that the company (McDonald’s) maintains 
considerable influence over staffing, training and labor costs in its franchised operations.  
Similarly, while Stanworth (1995) provides evidence that franchisees believe that they have 
significant control over the employment and compensation of staff in their operations, the 
franchisors in his study did not completely agree.  Moreover, while both Hunt (1972) and 
Bradach (1998) indicate that franchisees seem to have discretion over staffing in franchised 
operations, they do not examine or discuss the degree to which franchisees have discretion over 
other elements of the employment system such as training, compensation and performance 
management.   
 Accordingly, this paper aims to examine how human resource systems are managed in 
both franchisee-owned and company-managed operations, paying particular attention to the 
discretion of franchisees and the level of corporate involvement in the management of these 
systems.   
METHODS 
Research Setting 
 The focus of this study is a single industry, namely the hotel industry.  The hotel industry 
provides an ideal context for examining how human resource systems are managed across 
ownership forms for a number of reasons. First, franchising is not only prevalent in the hotel 
industry but is expected to grow in importance in the industry in the years to come (Michael 
  
9 
 
2000).  In 2005, franchise businesses made up 29.8% of jobs, 28.6% of payroll and 25.3% of 
establishments in the lodging industry and produced over $48.0 billion in output (IFA 2005).  
Moreover, nearly two-thirds of branded hotels in the US are franchised (Diaz-Bernardo 2010).  
Second, the hotel industry shares many characteristics with other service industries engaging in 
franchising and can thus provide us with insights as to how franchise businesses in these other 
industries likely manage their human resource systems as well. Similar to many other service 
industries, the hotel industry is a low-skilled, labor intensive service industry, uses business-
format franchising rather than product/trademark franchising and continues to operate franchised 
units alongside company units in plural form organizations, with franchisee-owned 
establishments outnumbering franchisor or company-owned establishments (IFA 2005).  Finally, 
focusing on a single industry not only provides an in-depth understanding of how franchising 
takes place in the industry but more importantly, allows us to control for any between-industry 
differences that may exist in the operation and management of company and franchised 
operations.   
 
Research Design 
This study utilizes an inductive qualitative case study approach.  In particular, a matched-
pair case study design is utilized in which two hotels – one franchisee-owned and one company-
managed – are compared.  A number of factors contribute to making these two hotels a 
“matched” pair.  First, both hotels belong to the same parent organization4.  The parent 
organization is a large global hospitality company that owns, manages and franchises a portfolio 
of brand-name hotels in a wide range of market segments including luxury, full service, select 
service, limited service, extended stay and time share.  Second, they are both upscale, full-
service hotels that cater to leisure and convention customer markets and operate within the same 
city, a major business, convention and urban tourist market ranking among the top travel markets 
                                                 
4 In order to protect the identities of the case study hotels, the names of the parent organization, the hotels and the 
respondents as well as detailed data on the city in which they operate are not provided here. Any other information 
which would make it possible to identify the hotels has also been removed to preserve confidentiality. 
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nationwide.  Third, they are both classified as 3 Diamond hotels under the AAA Diamond Rating 
System.  These ratings represent a combination of the overall level of quality, facilities and 
services offered by a property and a 3 Diamond rating is given to hotels that “appeal to the 
traveler with comprehensive needs. Properties are multifaceted with a distinguished style, 
including marked upgrades in the quality of physical attributes, amenities, and level of comfort 
provided” (AAA 2010).  Finally, both hotels belong to the same rewards category in their parent 
organization’s customer loyalty program.  According to the parent organization’s website, hotels 
are arranged into reward categories based on the location and type of hotel.  The fact that the two 
case study hotels have been placed in the same rewards category seems to indicate that the parent 
organization assigns equivalent value to these two hotels – yet another reason why these hotels 
can be considered matched.  Table 1.1 provides a summary of these characteristics. 
 
Table 1.1: Characteristics of the Two Case Study Hotels 
 
 Franchisee-Owned Hotel Company-Managed Hotel
Parent Organization Hotel Company A Hotel Company A 
Brand Chain I Chain II 
Market Segment Full Service Full Service 
AAA Diamond Rating 3 Diamond 3 Diamond 
Customer Segment Convention, Leisure Convention, Leisure 
Market/Location City A – Major tourist, 
business, convention 
market 
City A – Major tourist, 
business, convention 
market 
Parent Organization 
Customer Rewards 
Program Category 
6 6 
Total Guest Rooms ~250 Rooms ~1500 Rooms 
Total Employment ~140 employees ~800 employees 
Age (Year Opened) 2006 1984; Renovated in 2007 
Unionized? No Yes  
 
 
 As can be seen in Table 1.1, there are also noteworthy differences between these two 
hotels aside from their ownership form.  To begin with, the hotels operate under different brand-
name chains and thus, between-brand differences or brand specific effects cannot be controlled 
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for.  Nevertheless, given that both hotels operate in the same market segment, cater to the same 
customer markets, operate in the same city and appear to be valued similarly by the parent 
company, there is no reason to believe that between-brand differences exist in how franchised 
and company units are managed or that any such brand specific effects would be significant 
enough to make these hotels “unmatched”.    
 Three other differences are worth mentioning here: size, age and unionization.  The 
hotels differ significantly with regards to size, measured in terms of total guest rooms, with the 
company-managed case study hotel approximately six times the size of the franchisee-owned 
case study hotel.  When measured in terms of total employment, the company-managed hotel is 
still over five times larger than the franchisee-owned hotel, with a total of 800 employees 
compared to only 140 employees in the latter.  The two hotels also differ in age, calculated based 
on the year of hotel opening. The franchisee-owned unit is a relatively new hotel while the 
company-managed unit is a much older, though recently renovated, hotel.  Last, while the 
company-managed hotel is unionized, the franchisee-owned hotel is not.  All three factors – size, 
age and union status – have the potential to affect work organization and the use of certain 
employment practices.  Indeed, past research has shown that larger firms have more resources 
and are thus more likely to employ “sophisticated” HR practices than smaller firms (Jackson and 
Schuler 1995).  Research has also shown a positive relationship between firm size and the 
formality of HR practices (Cardon and Stevens 2004; Kotey and Slade 2005).  Similarly, 
research has indicated that older firms are likely to have more organized and mature HR systems 
(Kaufman 2010).  A union effect on employment practices has also been documented, with the 
strongest effects being noted for compensation, working conditions and job security (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984; Lawler and Mohrman 1987; Zuberi 2006) 5. Notwithstanding these 
documented effects however, the differences in size, age and union status between the two case 
                                                 
5 It is worth nothing that one study in the US hotel industry found that union effects come from union density in the 
cities in which firms operate rather than actual union presence in a given workplace (Bernhardt, Dresser and Hatton 
2003). 
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study hotels are not likely to be important here as the purpose of this study is not to compare 
human resource practices or job quality per se but rather, to examine how the nature of 
operations and in particular, the ownership structure of the two hotels affects the management of 
human resource systems.  That is, while firm size, age and union status may affect what human 
resource systems look like, in terms of the specific practices used, they are much less likely to 
affect how firms manage their human resource systems across ownership forms and in particular, 
the extent of corporate involvement in the management of these systems.   
 
Data Collection 
 Data for this study was collected in the spring and summer of 2010.  The research 
methodology was primarily qualitative and data was gathered through interviews and the 
examination of both organizational and publicly available archival documents.   
 In-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted on-site at the two hotels with a wide 
range of managerial employees as these individuals are responsible for implementing human 
resource practices and most able to ascertain corporate’s role in day-to-day operations.  In order 
to ensure comparability across cases, a common semi-structured interview guide was used for 
each respondent.  Open-ended questions were used to elicit respondents’ views of how, and why, 
the ownership structure of their hotel affected the way they managed their human resource 
systems.  Probing questions were used to establish details, particularly regarding the nature of 
operations and specific elements of the human resource system in each hotel.  Follow-up 
interviews, where necessary, were conducted by telephone.  In total, over 20 interviews were 
conducted.  This included interviews with the General Manager (GM) and HR directors and 
managers as well as various departmental directors in the two case study hotels.  I also 
interviewed several other informants without direct connections to the case study hotels. These 
included industry professionals at industry roundtables and conferences, a franchisee of two 
express location quick-service restaurants located in the company-managed case study hotel and 
a Director of HR for a company-managed hotel in an adjacent city operating under the same 
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parent organization as the two case study hotels and in the same brand-name chain as the 
company-managed case study hotel.  These interviews served to expand my understanding of 
how franchise and company-managed units operate and manage their human resource systems.  
Moreover, the interview with the Director of HR at the second company-managed hotel helped 
to validate my findings from the company-managed case study hotel6.   
 In addition to these interviews, archival material was also collected.  This included 
employee handbooks, corporate, prospective franchisee and property-level brochures, hotel chain 
fact sheets and Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDDs)7 for both hotels.  In addition, a 
corporate quality assurance inspection checklist was obtained for the franchisee-owned hotel and 
recruitment material and the current collective bargaining agreement were obtained for the 
company-managed hotel.   
 
Data Analysis 
Consistent with previous inductive research (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), the data 
was analyzed by first building individual case studies and then comparing across the cases to 
uncover similarities and differences in the management of the two hotels.  In each case, the focus 
was on gaining an in-depth understanding of the nature of operations and how the human 
resource system was managed in that particular hotel.  Using the interviews and archival 
material, a detailed case study was written for each hotel.  This was an iterative process in which 
the data was revisited and follow-up interviews were conducted to clarify or elaborate important 
aspects of operations and human resource systems as they emerged within each case.  Once these 
                                                 
6 This hotel is located in the same county as the two case study hotels. Like the company-managed hotel, it was built 
in the 1980s, has recently been renovated and is unionized but is relatively smaller with just under 500 rooms.   
7 A FDD, formerly referred to as a Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC), is a legal document that must be 
provided by the franchisor to a prospective franchisee under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Franchise Rule 
(FTC Franchise Rule Compliance Guide 2008).  It is a detailed document intended to help prospective franchisees 
make an educated decision about purchasing the franchise.  It has a total of 23 sections and outlines all aspects of the 
franchise system, including information about the licensor and any parents, predecessors and affiliates, the business 
experience of key personnel, litigation involving the business or any of its officers, owners, directors or executives, 
any bankruptcy of its directors or officers, initial investment costs and fees, franchisee and franchisor obligations, 
copyrights and trademarks and the current status of franchised and company outlets.  It also includes franchisee 
earnings claims, franchisor financial statements and parts of, or in some cases an entire copy of, a standard Franchise 
License Agreement (FLA).  
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case studies were complete, a cross-case search for patterns was conducted.  Using the tactics 
suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), the two case study hotels were juxtaposed against one another in 
order to determine the similarities and differences between them.   
 The results of this analysis follow.  The next two sections present the individual case 
study write-ups.  This is followed by a discussion of the cross-case analysis and a set of 
preliminary explanations for the observed patterns across the two case study hotels.  But first, I 
define the term “human resource system” and how it is being measured in this study.   
 
Human Resource System Defined 
 The term “human resource system” has been defined in a multitude of ways.  Jackson and 
Schuler (1995) define a human resource system as the practices, policies and philosophies that 
“attract, develop, motivate, and retain employees who ensure the effective functioning and 
survival of the organization and its members” (238).  Osterman (1987) defines a human resource 
system as different hiring, training, promotion and turnover patterns and identifies four systems 
or “subsystems” which characterize most firms: industrial, salaried, craft, and secondary.  Delery 
and Doty (1996) conceptualize a human resource system as the combination of seven “strategic” 
human resource practices and identify two main systems: market-type and internal.   
 Despite varying definitions of the term “human resource system”, common to all is the 
presence of human resource practices that fit together with a coherent logic.  Following these 
definitions, this study focuses on five broadly defined categories of human resource practices: 
staffing, training, compensation, performance management, and employee relations.  These 
categories were chosen as they represent significant aspects of most human resource systems, 
both in and outside of the hotel industry, and have the potential to affect firm performance 
(Delery and Shaw 2001).   
 The first category, staffing, includes recruitment, selection and hiring practices, job 
definition, the scheduling and deployment of labor and the level of job security provided to 
employees.  The second category, training, refers to formal and informal practices of orienting, 
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socializing, training and developing employees.  The third category, compensation, refers to all 
forms of pay provided to employees and includes both direct financial payments in the form of 
wages, salaries, merit increases, bonuses, commissions and tips and indirect financial payments 
or benefits. The fourth category, performance management, includes formal and informal means 
of appraising employee performance and promotion practices.  The fifth and final category, 
employee relations, refers to those practices having to do with the management of the employer-
employee relationship and includes communication programs, discipline procedures, methods of 
conflict and grievance resolution, and relationships with trade unions, where they exist. 
 
CASE I: FRANCHISEE-OWNED HOTEL 
The Chain 
 The franchisee-owned case study hotel belongs to an upscale, full service hotel chain 
established in the late 1980s.  The hotel chain began franchising the same year it was established.  
Although the chain has some units located in international markets and has plans for continued 
domestic and international expansion, most of its current units are located in the United States.  
Of its 200+ total operating units, 77% are franchised while 23% are company-owned or 
managed.   
  The Average Room Rate (ARR; also referred to as the Average Daily Rate or ADR) for 
all hotels in this chain, franchised and company-owned or managed, over the last 3 years has 
been between $115 and $130 per night.  The average occupancy for all hotels in this chain over 
the same period has been between 65-70%.  As measures of this hotel chain’s performance 
relative to others in their competitive set, the average Occupancy Index for all hotels in this chain 
ranged from 104 to 107 from 2007 to 2009 and the average RevPAR Index for all hotels in this 
chain ranged from 105 to 1078. 
                                                 
8 The Occupancy Index measures a hotel’s share of the segment’s demand where demand is defined as the number 
of room nights sold in a given period.  An Occupancy Index of 100 indicates that the hotel is receiving a fair share 
of the segment’s demand while an index above 100 indicates that the hotel is receiving more than its fair share of 
demand.  The RevPAR index measures a hotel’s fair market share of their segment’s revenue per available room 
  
16 
 
Franchising in the Chain 
 The total investment required to open a newly constructed 250 room franchised hotel in 
this chain, excluding real property, ranges from $34 to $57 million, including a one-time initial 
franchise fee of $75 000.  The monthly royalty fee is 5% of gross room revenue and the monthly 
program (advertising) fee is 4% of gross room revenue.  A typical franchise term is 
approximately 20 years with the potential to re-license for an additional 5-10 years depending on 
factors such as the age and physical condition of the hotel, market conditions and the hotel’s past 
performance.   
 The most important qualifications for prospective franchisees in this chain are their 
financial net worth, general business experience and specific industry experience.  The franchisor 
does, however, allow for passive ownership wherein franchisees may choose not be involved in 
the day-to-day operations of the hotel.  That said, any General Manager (GM), including any 
owner who intends to act as a GM, or third-party management company chosen by franchisee-
owners to manage the hotel property must be approved by the franchisor.  Approval is based, in 
part, on the proposed manager’s prior experience and performance managing similar hotel(s).  
Following approval, the GM or any third party management company appointed by the 
franchisee must undergo training and gain corporate certification prior to the hotel’s opening.  
Such training is intended to familiarize the GM with corporate policies, standards, operating 
systems and management values and philosophies.  Specific topics include brand management, 
marketing, customer measures and quality assurance, technology and leadership.  The Director 
of Sales must also undergo an orientation to the franchisor’s sales and marketing programs and 
both the GM and the Director of Sales are required to attend an annual brand conference held by 
the hotel chain. 
 In addition to the training provided to the GM and Director of Sales, the franchisor 
provides the franchisee with a business system to operate the hotel.  This includes the licensed 
                                                                                                                                                             
(RevPAR; calculated as Total Room Revenue/Number of Available Rooms or alternatively, Occupancy Rate * 
Average Room Rate).  An index above 100 indicates that the hotel is capturing more than its fair market share.  
  
17 
 
brand and marks, a central reservation system, advertising and marketing materials, training 
programs and materials, and standards and specifications for the construction, furnishing, 
operation, appearance and service of the hotel.  The system also includes programs for inspecting 
the hotel, such as bi-annual quality assurance inspections and guest surveys.  While the 
franchisor provides the hotel with ongoing support and guidance through a regional director who 
communicates primarily with the GM, the franchisee and any franchisee-appointed management 
team are solely responsible for the overall management and operation of the hotel.  
 
The Franchisee-Owned Case Study Hotel 
 The franchisee-owned case study hotel opened in 2006 in a major tourist and convention 
market.  The hotel is owned by three individuals who have formed a limited liability company 
(LLC) and managed by an experienced GM.  It is an all-suite hotel with over 250 rooms and 
ample meeting and event space.  On-site amenities include a 24-hour self-service business 
center, a state-of-the art fitness center, a video arcade and a heated rooftop pool.  A leased out 
gift shop carrying souvenirs, jewelry, clothing and sundries is also located inside the hotel.  In 
addition to room service, the hotel has three in-house food and beverage outlets – a full-service 
restaurant with a dining room and outdoor patio, a lounge and a café.   
 The ARR for this hotel is $130 per night.  It has been awarded a AAA Diamond Rating 
of 3 Diamonds (on a scale of 1-5; 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest).  The hotel caters to 
group business, namely meetings and conventions, and leisure travelers, typically families on 
vacation, with an estimated 70% of the hotel’s clientele falling into the latter category. 
 Like most hotels, the franchisee-owned case study hotel is organized into several 
departments by function (see Figure 1.1 for the hotel’s organizational structure).  Departments 
fall into two main categories: administrative (i.e. accounting – property controller, sales & 
marketing, human resources) and operations (i.e. housekeeping, front office, food & beverage 
and engineering).  The GM is the chief executive of the hotel and is responsible for the overall 
operation of the establishment on a day-to-day basis.  As shown in Figure 1.1, the GM reports to 
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both the franchisor (corporate) and the hotel owners.  By appointing the GM, the owners have 
given the GM the right to act on their behalf and communicate with the franchisor.  At the same 
time however, the GM remains accountable to the owners and is in constant contact with them.  
The organization is relatively flat and the GM has a wide span of control, with all departmental 
directors reporting directly to him.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Organizational Structure of the Franchisee-Owned Hotel 
 
Human Resource System 
 The hotel employs approximately 140 workers, of whom 20 are exempt supervisory 
personnel and 120 are hourly.  Of the 120 nonsupervisory workers, 80 are full-time, 20 are part-
time and 20 are on-call.  The majority of nonsupervisory personnel are employed in operations – 
specifically housekeeping, front office and food & beverage.  The 20 part-time employees are 
primarily in the food & beverage department and the 20 on-call workers are all in banquets. 
 Given that the nonsupervisory, hourly employees make up the majority of the hotel’s 
workforce (over 85%), they will be the focus of this discussion.  Although these employees can 
be differentiated by department or level of guest interaction, for example front-of-house, 
interactive workers such as those in the front office and restaurants vs. back-of-house, non-
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interactive workers commonly found in housekeeping and the kitchen, no such distinctions are 
made here.  While some human resource practices, such as wage rates or the specific form that 
training programs take, are likely to vary across employee groups, and there is some evidence 
from interviews with managers that differences exist in the level of autonomy provided to front-
of-house and back-of-house workers9, interviews with managers also reveal that most human 
resource practices, and especially those reviewed here, are applied consistently to all frontline 
workers, regardless of their actual department or level of guest interaction.  Moreover, since the 
primary purpose of this discussion is to understand how the human resource system is managed 
in this hotel and the extent of corporate involvement in the management of this system, it is 
general practices that are of greatest interest here.  Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, the 
practices examined below are common to all nonsupervisory employees in this hotel. 
 The following outlines the staffing, training, compensation, performance management 
and employee relations practices of the franchisee-owned hotel.  The picture that emerges is one 
in which corporate takes a hands-off approach to the management of human resource systems in 
its franchised units.  With the exception of training practices, all other practices appear to have 
been decentralized to, and are at the discretion of, the franchisee and property-level management.   
Staffing. Given the smaller size of the hotel and the recent economic downturn, 
recruitment for the hotel is down.  At the time of my interviews, the hotel had two job openings 
and according to the Director of HR, this was “unusual”.  As for recruitment methods, the hotel 
does not use or have access to the parent company’s online career site to post job openings or 
recruit employees.  Instead, sources of recruitment tend to be informal and the hotel relies on 
walk-ins and unsolicited resumes, submitted either in person or via email, and employee referrals 
and word-of-mouth to fill entry-level frontline positions.  On occasion, the hotel uses online 
                                                 
9 Here, managers mentioned the importance of “empowering” front-of-house workers, such as front desk staff, to 
make decisions given their high level of guest contact.  As one director put it, “we want them to take charge and 
satisfy the guest at that very moment”.  In contrast, low levels of guest contact and language barriers (as hotels, 
including this one, often rely on non-English speaking staff – especially in housekeeping) are cited as reasons for 
giving back-of-house workers, such as room attendants, relatively less discretion.      
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career sites, such as CareerBuilder.com and Hcareers.com, and recruits at the college level, 
particularly for front office positions.   
 The hotel utilizes streamlined selection processes.  No prescreening takes place and all 
applications and resumes received are distributed by HR to the appropriate department head.  
The department head then reviews the application forms and resumes and calls an interview with 
the applicant if they feel the application or resume warrants it.  Once interviews have been 
conducted, the department head passes their top 2 candidates on to HR who verifies each 
applicant’s information and conducts reference checks.  After all information has been verified 
and department heads make their final hiring decision, the GM signs off on every new hire.  
Corporate is not involved in any part of the selection process.   
 The hotel uses lean staffing practices and scheduling is done on the basis of actual and 
predicted occupancy levels.  Seniority is not a factor in employee scheduling for either regular 
shifts or overtime, which is mandatory.  While the hotel has always practiced lean staffing in an 
effort to control labor costs, lower occupancy levels and average daily rates brought about by 
recent economic events have resulted in an increased emphasis on minimizing the number of 
staff needed to run the hotel on a day-to-day basis.  Although the hotel has not engaged in 
layoffs, they have reduced staff through attrition and many of the frontline employees in the 
hotel have experienced a reduction in work hours.   
 Cross-training, in which employees are trained across positions, is also a common 
practice in this hotel.  Managers cited two primary reasons for cross-training. The first is related 
to lean staffing.  By training employees in a variety of jobs, employees can be transferred to 
positions on an “as-needed” basis, reducing the need to hire additional staff to fill openings.  
Moreover, rather than reduce work hours significantly or layoff employees altogether, employees 
can be transferred from positions where there may little work available to positions and even 
departments where more work is available.  This practice is perhaps best summarized by the 
GM: 
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There’s a lot of multi-tasking that you can do in the hotel business that you might not be 
able to do in an assembly line, or automotive or somewhere else. A desk clerk can be a 
bellman, a bellman can be a PBX operator, any number of people can clean rooms or wait 
on tables and so we’ve encouraged our employees to learn different departments so they 
can move into different departments [as needed].  
 
The second reason for cross-training is employee development.  Cross-training, both within and 
across departments, provides employees with new skills and can lead to greater opportunities for 
mobility.  This is especially true when one considers the limited opportunities for mobility in 
some departments, such as housekeeping, compared to others.  Nevertheless, lateral movement 
or cross-training across departments is much lower than cross-training within departments in the 
hotel.  One reason for this is the difficulty in controlling overtime hours when an individual 
simultaneously works in two departments.  Another factor preventing across-department training, 
particularly cross-training from housekeeping to other departments, is the English language 
problem plaguing housekeeping staff, mentioned earlier.  Since room attendants often do not 
speak English, and those that do typically transfer early on to other departments, cross-training 
employees in the housekeeping department is limited.  One department where cross-training is 
used extensively in this hotel however is the food & beverage department.  Here, employees 
have been trained in multiple positions – for example, host, barista, food server, room service – 
and cross-training has been a primary factor in determining work hours in the department, with 
those receiving cross-training “pulling more hours” than others.    
  Related to, and perhaps even a partial byproduct of, cross-training is loose job definitions 
for most frontline staff in the hotel.  Since employees are encouraged to learn and move into 
different positions as necessary, they may find themselves performing very different tasks over 
time.  In addition, job descriptions are developed at the property level, without input from 
corporate, and jobs are defined broadly, encompassing many tasks and in some cases, tasks of 
more than one traditional position.  For example, front desk clerks also perform the tasks of 
private bank exchange (PBX) operators, managing the switchboard and telephone calls in the 
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hotel. Likewise, room service order takers also perform the tasks of servers/food runners, 
delivering food and beverages to guest rooms. 
 Finally, frontline employees in the hotel have low job security.  Employees are 
considered to be “at-will” and neither employment nor hours are guaranteed to workers.  Once 
hired, employees do not sign an employment contract.  Instead, they receive a copy of the 
employee handbook and are asked to sign a document which acknowledges their receipt of the 
handbook, knowledge of their status as at-will employees and their agreement to binding 
arbitration of any employment related dispute.  The handbook is created at the property level and 
without input from corporate.  It outlines the terms and conditions of employment as well as each 
employee’s rights, duties, responsibilities and obligations.   
 In general, corporate does not have a role in the staffing practices at this hotel and the 
deployment of labor is at the full discretion of property-level management. 
Training. Upon hiring, all frontline employees undergo formal training.  For the most 
part, training programs for new employees are provided, and required, by corporate.  This 
includes orientation training, brand promise service skills training, and job skills certification.  
For those employees in the front office department and particularly front desk, additional training 
is provided on the hotel’s computer systems and guest service programs.  Orientation training 
involves 4-8 hours of classroom training and includes an introduction to the parent company’s 
portfolio of brands, the hotel property itself and all applicable personnel and operations policies 
and procedures in the hotel.  Brand promise training involves 4-6 hours of classroom training and 
is centered on guest service. It is a structured program that is focused on brand standards and 
takes employees through each department’s role in servicing the guest.  Job skills certification 
involves 40-120 hours of classroom (on-the-job) training and includes everything having to do 
with the employee’s particular job – specific tasks, safety measures and rules for guest 
engagement. 
 While training is tailored to the specific property, there is otherwise very little 
customization in the training programs.  The franchisee-owners of this hotel do not take part in 
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or have an influence on training programs in the hotel.  Corporate provides the hotel with all of 
the materials necessary to conduct training, including training manuals, videos and job aids, and 
those responsible for training employees must participate in, and gain certification from, a 
corporately provided “Train the Trainer” program before they are allowed to run the training 
programs.  Moreover, training is strictly monitored by corporate.  The hotel is required to keep a 
record of all training dates and results and these records are reviewed during quality assurance 
inspections, which are conducted by corporate twice a year.    
 There are no additional training or development programs provided by the hotel for 
frontline employees, with the exception of cross-training discussed earlier, and those mandated 
by law.  While corporate mandates ongoing training in the form of daily pre-shifts, or “huddles”, 
the use of these huddles is not enforced.  In fact, the daily huddles are used in this hotel as a 
mechanism for communicating operational information to employees rather than as a tool for 
daily training, as intended by corporate.   
Compensation. Although this hotel is not unionized, the major hotels and the hotel’s 
main competitors in the area are unionized and this has exerted some influence on the wage and 
benefit levels provided to employees.  While the hotel does not pay union wages, they aim to pay 
their employees at the 75th percentile of their competitive set (i.e. comparable hotels competing 
in the same labor market).  Information about the wage and benefit levels of competitors are 
obtained from WageWatch, an online compensation and benefits survey.   
 The hotel currently pays its entry-level frontline staff slightly above the minimum wage, 
with a starting wage of $8.50-$9.00/hour, depending on experience.  Tipped employees, 
employees who regularly receive more than $30 a month in tips, are paid at the minimum wage 
as state law does not allow tip credit.  While annual increases are not guaranteed, merit increases 
typically range from 3-5% per annum.  Given the state of the economy however, the hotel has 
been under a wage freeze for the past two years and employees have not received any pay 
increases. 
  
24 
 
 The hotel provides a range of benefits to regular full-time employees.  This includes a 
401(k) plan, a group health insurance plan for employees and their eligible dependents and Paid 
Time Off (PTO).  PTO takes the place of traditional vacation, sick and holiday pay benefits.  
Full-time frontline employees begin to accrue PTO benefits for all regular and PTO hours 
worked or used after 90 days of service and the accrual rate is based on length of service (i.e. the 
yearly accrual rate hours for an employee with service of 90 days – 1 year: 120 hours, 2-4 years: 
160 hours, 5-14 years: 200 hours, 15+years: 240 hours). 
 While the hotel believes that their wage rates are competitive, benefits is an area where 
management feels that they are not meeting their competition and this is largely due to 
franchisee-owner influence given the high costs involved in providing certain benefits: 
 
There are three areas of this hotel that are not competitive and we’ve discussed it since 
we opened the hotel…where the owners basically made the decision that no, we’re not 
going there and those areas are the 401(k) employer match, which I know we’re not 
competitive, offering the employees an employee meal free everyday and picking up a 
percentage of dependent coverage in healthcare. We pick up a percentage for the 
employee but we do not pick up the dependents. Those are three major areas where we 
are not competitive. (Director of HR) 
 
 As is evident in the above quote, decisions over compensation practices are made by 
property-level management in consultation with the owners.  Corporate does not have a role in 
these decisions. 
Performance Management. The hotel has formal performance appraisals in the form of 
annual performance evaluations.  These evaluations are developed at the property level and are 
intended to provide employees with an understanding of how well they are performing their 
assigned job duties, whether they have any performance problems and to set future performance 
goals.  They also serve as the basis for merit increases.  However, these performance evaluations 
are inconsistently used and enforced.  Although the hotel has a stated policy of annual 
performance evaluations, not all managers conduct them and the hotel has not consistently 
enforced their use.  This is especially true in recent years.  With a wage freeze over the last two 
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years and an inability to give merit increases, managers have refrained from giving employees 
any formal appraisals of their work.  The Director of HR summarized the use of performance 
evaluations in the hotel as follows: 
 
Well performance reviews should be given every year…We’re kind of a little bit lax 
about that because no one is getting increases and even though increases aren’t 
guaranteed, the managers feel a little hesitant about giving a great performance review 
and then not giving an increase.  I still have the feeling that people want to know how 
they’re doing but what I can say?  Right now, I’d say that it’s not being enforced at all.  
 
 As for promotions, the hotel has a policy of promoting from within whenever possible.  
Promotions and transfers are based primarily on competence and the most important factors 
considered are past performance, qualifications, potential, and job experience.  Seniority is not a 
deciding factor in promotions or transfers but may be considered in cases where two or more 
employees are deemed to be equally competent for the job.   
 That being said, there are limited opportunities for mobility, both vertical and lateral.  For 
the most part, promotion and transfer opportunities are dictated by attrition.  What’s more, 
promotions and transfers are limited by organizational/ property boundaries.  That is, despite the 
fact that the hotel belongs to a chain of like-branded hotels, promotions and transfers are limited 
to what is available in this particular establishment.  As one director in the hotel noted, “when 
you’re a franchised property, we have to look at what we have right here.”  Employees of this 
hotel cannot be promoted or transferred to positions in other hotels in the chain and in this way, 
the hotel very much resembles an independent operation.    
Employee Relations. As mentioned above, the hotel is not unionized.  While the hotel 
itself does not have any experience with the union and has never experienced any organizing 
attempts, the hotel tends to model its practices after larger (often company-operated) hotels in the 
area, which are unionized10.  As a result, the hotel has indirectly experienced union influence 
                                                 
10 This type of “modeling” occurs in a number of ways. For example, managers in the hotel obtain information on 
practices in other hotels not only from benchmarking reports and surveys but also through direct and constant 
(informal) communication with their counterparts at these hotels.   
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with regards to its human resource practices.  The most significant example of this is with 
regards to compensation, as discussed earlier.    
In general, employee involvement in the hotel is informal and limited.  Most 
communication is downward, from management to employees, and takes place through daily 
huddles, discussed above, quarterly all-team member meetings and quarterly newsletters.  
Upward communication, from employees to management, takes place through the hotel’s “open 
door policy” in which employees are encouraged to bring suggestions for improvement and 
issues of concern to the attention of managers in the hotel.  There is also an opportunity for 
employees to get involved in a more formal way by joining the hotel’s joint management-
employee brand standards committee.  This committee is mandated from corporate as part of the 
hotel chain’s commitment to total service quality.  The committee meets once a month and is 
responsible for monitoring and improving the hotel’s progress in meeting brand standards.  
However, membership in this committee is completely voluntary and while every frontline 
employee is invited to attend meetings, most do not.   
 Although employees are considered to be at-will and can be terminated with or without 
notice, as previously discussed, the hotel has developed a formal progressive discipline 
procedure to give employees an opportunity to correct performance-related problems.  This 
typically begins with some form of verbal counseling and is followed by written warnings before 
an employee is suspended and/or terminated. 
 Last, the hotel has established formal methods of conflict and grievance resolution.  In 
addition to the hotel’s “open door policy”, the hotel has instituted mandatory binding arbitration 
to resolve employment-related disputes. This includes disputes related to compensation, 
wrongful termination, discrimination or harassment and violations of public policy.  Arbitration 
can be initiated at the request of either employees or management and an arbitrator is chosen by 
mutual agreement.  Each party is responsible for paying their own attorney fees, where 
applicable, but the employer pays for the cost of the arbitrator and all other incidental costs that 
would not be incurred in a court proceeding.   
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  In general, corporate has a limited role in employee relations at the hotel.  While 
corporate mandates some communication programs, such as quarterly all-employee meetings and 
the quarterly newsletter, they do not monitor or enforce their use.  Moreover, corporate does not 
involve itself with the labor relations of any of its franchised hotels, unionized or not.   
 
CASE II: COMPANY-MANAGED HOTEL 
The Chain 
 The company-managed hotel belongs to an upscale, full service hotel chain first 
established by the parent organization in the 1920s.  The hotel chain began franchising in the late 
1960s.  The chain has a number of units located in international markets and has plans for 
continued domestic and international expansion.  Of its 500+ total operating units, 44% are 
franchised while 56% are company-owned or managed.   
 The average room rate for all hotels in this chain, franchised and company-owned or 
managed, over the last 3 years has been between $140 and $160 per night.  The average 
occupancy for all hotels in this chain over the same period has been between 65-75%.  As 
measures of this hotel chain’s performance relative to others in their competitive set, the average 
Occupancy Index for all hotels in this chain in 2009 was 104 and the average RevPAR Index for 
all hotels in this chain in 2009 was 109. 
 
The Company-Managed Case Study Hotel 
 The company-managed case study hotel opened in 1984 in a major tourist and convention 
market and was renovated in 2007.  The hotel is owned by a diversified real estate development 
company and managed by corporate.  It has over 1500 rooms and 100 000 square feet of meeting 
and event space.  On-site amenities include a full-service business center, a heated outdoor pool 
and a full-service spa and fitness center with state-of-the art equipment, group exercise classes 
and an indoor pool.  Two leased out gift and souvenir shops and a leased out clothing store are 
also located inside the hotel.  In addition to room service, the hotel has four in-house food and 
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beverage outlets – a full-service restaurant, a lounge, a coffee shop and during the summer 
months, a poolside bar and gazebo.  The hotel also has a food court with 3 subcontracted 
franchised quick-service restaurants.    
 The ARR for this hotel is $150 per night.  It has been awarded a AAA Diamond Rating 
of 3 Diamonds.  The hotel caters to leisure travelers and conventioneers.  While managers 
estimate that group (convention) business makes up anywhere from 50 to 80% of the hotel’s 
current clientele, they also noted that the hotel was increasingly targeting the leisure market.  
Steps the hotel had recently taken to do this include adding different menu items and a “Kids Eat 
Free” program as well as offering children’s activities and childcare services onsite and 
providing family-friendly guest-room amenities, such as mini-fridges, free of charge. 
 The company-managed case study hotel is organized into several departments (See 
Figure 1.2 for the hotel’s organizational structure).  There are two main operating divisions in 
this hotel: Rooms and Food & Beverage and all of the non-administrative departments fall into 
one of these two divisions.  The Rooms Division is made up of front office (i.e. reservations, 
front desk/guest service agents), guest services (i.e. bell desk, concierge and lobby 
representatives) and housekeeping (i.e. room attendants).  Property operations (general 
maintenance) and security, while administrative, are also located in this division.  The Food & 
Beverage Division is made up of room service, outlets, culinary and banquets & catering.  The 
GM is responsible for the overall operation of the hotel and reports directly to corporate11. The 
Food and Beverage Division and all administrative departments, with the exception of property 
operations and security, report directly to him.  The Executive Assistant Manager is the assistant 
general manager and assists the GM with all aspects of the hotel operations.  All departments in 
the Rooms Division report directly to her. 
                                                 
11 The GM does not directly report to the owners of the hotel.  While corporate consults with the owners, as a 
company-managed hotel, corporate retains full management control of the hotel. 
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Figure 1.2: Organizational Structure of the Company-Managed Hotel 
 
 
Human Resource System 
 The hotel employs approximately 800 workers, of whom 200 are managerial and 
administrative personnel and 600 are hourly, nonsupervisory personnel.  The majority of 
nonsupervisory personnel are employed in operations – specifically housekeeping, front office, 
guest services and food & beverage and most of the frontline employees in these departments are 
unionized. 
 Given that the majority of hotel employees (75%) are hourly employees, and in order to 
facilitate comparison with the franchisee-owned case study hotel, the focus of this discussion 
will be frontline, nonsupervisory staff.  Again, for the reasons stated above, no distinctions are 
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made here between employees in different departments or with differing levels of guest 
interaction.  Unless otherwise stated, the human resource practices reviewed here are common to 
all nonsupervisory employees in this hotel.   
 The following outlines the staffing, training, compensation, performance management 
and employee relations practices of the company-managed hotel12.  The picture that emerges is 
one in which corporate takes a very hands-on approach to the management of human resource 
systems in its company-managed units.  Overall, human resource practices appear to be 
centralized and standardized across company-owned and managed units, with most practices 
mandated or influenced in some way by corporate.  
Staffing. The hotel’s recruitment methods are formal and highly influenced by corporate.  
The hotel places ads, actively recruits at the college level and works with disability-related 
organizations and workforce development agencies.  The hotel also has an Affirmative Action 
Plan that is reviewed annually by corporate and based on the results of this review, the hotel 
engages in targeted recruitment to increase the number of applicants from certain 
underrepresented minority groups.  In addition, the hotel is required to use the parent company’s 
career website to post job openings and receive applications.  While the hotel does accept “walk-
ins” and/or unsolicited resumes, these must be submitted online via the website. Walk-in 
applicants can either use computer kiosks located on hotel premises or submit their applications 
online from home.      
 While attracting and retaining employees has certainly been a key concern facing hotels 
in the past, including this one, managers in this hotel noted that recruitment was no longer a 
problem given the recent economic downturn.  At the time of my interviews, the hotel was 
receiving 200-300 applications a day for less than 30 (mostly frontline) job openings and 
managers frequently commented that these applicants were often overqualified.  As a result, the 
major challenge they now faced was appropriate screening and selection: 
                                                 
12 The discussion will also include some insights and examples from the second company-managed hotel operating 
under the same parent organization and brand name.   
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It’s almost like a bad medicine if I can use that analogy because even though the 
medicine is working right now, when these jobs open up, then you’ve trained people, 
you’ve invested money into training, you’ve given them the company secrets to how this 
thing works and to them it’s just a stepping stone until this analyst job re-opens again in 
the same company. One guy said ‘I went through this in ’91, I was laid off for eleven 
months and I went and did other things and then I went back to work for the same job and 
the same company…I did that for 10 years and here I am all over again looking for that 
but I’m just holding out – I’ll take anything – but I’m just holding out until my job comes 
back.’ So I’m thinking that’s just on a miniscule scale because it’s just one position but if 
you take that and take a macro approach to the industry, that could be devastating to our 
industry, hotels I’m talking about, because all of a sudden you’re going to have people 
leaving and a lot of positions opening. (Director of Food & Beverage) 
 
These comments were echoed by the Director of HR at a second company-managed hotel: 
 
Back in the day, anytime you asked an HR person what their challenges are, it was 
always hiring, recruitment. That’s not really our issue anymore because a) we don’t have 
that many open positions and b) there’s such a large workforce out there of people that 
don’t have jobs. What I’ve found now is that it’s almost like you have way too many 
candidates for jobs…now we’re so overwhelmed…someone who used to be a financial 
analyst is applying for a $10.30 an hour job and you know that you can’t hire that person 
because they’re only going to stay until they find something better so…you have to 
screen people out a lot more.   
 
The hotel’s selection process involves a number of steps and begins with prescreening during the 
online application process.  Job candidates must submit a separate application for each position 
they are applying to and each application includes a set of questions that allow the computer to 
screen out candidates that do not meet “must have” criteria, predetermined by corporate, for 
those positions.  For example, this might include physical or experience-related requirements, 
depending on the job.  Those that do not meet the minimum selection criteria are eliminated and 
the remaining applications are sent to the Employment Manager at the hotel.  The Employment 
Manager then screens all applications, on a first-come, first-served basis, to ensure that each 
candidate meets the minimum requirements for the job and schedules a first interview.  The 
initial interview is structured and behavioral-based and is conducted by the Employment 
Manager.  It is intended to predict future job performance and narrow down the candidates that 
will proceed to the next stage of the selection process.  Candidates who pass the initial interview 
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are then given a second interview with department managers, who are responsible for making the 
final hiring decision.  Once the department managers make their decision, the Employment 
Manager confirms work history and references prior to making an offer.  For some positions, an 
offer is made contingent on a background check, drug test and/or credit check and the results of 
these tests are sent to corporate.  Corporate and the hotel then jointly determine the candidate’s 
eligibility for the position. 
 Two factors affect employee scheduling in the hotel: seniority, given that the hotel is 
unionized, and occupancy.  While seniority affects who is scheduled (i.e. those with higher 
tenure are given preference), occupancy affects how many employees are scheduled13.  This 
includes scheduling for regular shifts as well as overtime, which is mandatory.  Despite the use 
of actual and predicted occupancy rates for setting work schedules however, the hotel does not 
necessarily practice “lean” staffing.  In fact, there is some evidence that the hotel may even 
overstaff in order to ensure proper levels of service.  This is perhaps best exemplified in a quote 
by the Director of Food & Beverage regarding staffing levels in the hotel’s full-service 
restaurant:  
 
If it [the restaurant] was independently-owned, there would be so many things that are 
done differently…We have to have 3 managers – AM, PM and relief. In a privately-
owned restaurant, you might have a manager and an assistant but again then you have to 
have all of your occupancy stages of how to  schedule, staff, your minimum staffing.  If I 
owned this restaurant myself and today I’m going to do 30 covers, I’d probably have two 
servers period but no, we have to schedule more, potentially, because if we get hit from a 
convention that broke next door and we weren’t ready, as a company, as an image that we 
have to protect, as the brand essence – we have to be ready for that.  And it’s very easy, 
it’s OPM – Other People’s Money.  It’s not coming out of my pocket.   
 
 The hotel is characterized by rigid job definitions for most frontline staff.  Corporate 
provides the hotel with job descriptions and specifications for each position in the hotel and 
                                                 
13 The union contract does however specify that once employees have been scheduled for a shift, they must be paid 
for the hours they have been scheduled to work, so they cannot be sent home without pay if occupancy later drops.  
While some employees may voluntarily elect to take the day off if they know it will be slow (e.g. servers, as many 
don’t want to work unless they are making tips), others will choose to work their scheduled hours regardless 
because, as will be discussed later, union benefits are based on the number of hours worked.  The union contract also 
specifies the number of hours/days (work week) that each employee can work. 
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because many of the frontline employees are unionized, the hotel strictly adheres to these job 
definitions.  Such rigid job definitions have, in turn, resulted in limited cross-training in the 
hotel.  To the extent that cross-training does occur, it is restricted by union status – union 
members are only permitted to cross-train in union positions and non-union employees are only 
permitted to cross-train in non-union positions.  Managers in the hotel viewed such rigid job 
definitions and the inability to cross-train employees across union and non-union positions as 
impediments to providing high quality service to guests: 
 
We’ve had instances, I’ll give you an example where a guest was struggling with a 
suitcase unloading the trunk of the car in the front drive and the bellman was busy doing 
something else and one of the valet parkers ran over and helped him with his suitcases, 
loaded them up on a cart. The bellman came over in front of the guest and said ‘Never do 
that again, that’s my job. You’re not allowed to do that.’ How do you think that looked to 
the guest?  (Director of Sales) 
 
Sometimes the service aspect is kind of tied but we just do what we can to  work within 
the limits…Legally, because of the [union] contract, we can’t have a nonunion employee 
assist a union position.  For instance, let’s say the concierge is nonunion and wants to 
learn a new position, they can’t do that even though it would benefit the hotel all around 
because they can assist when  it does get busy, because they are a wealth of knowledge, 
just to have that broad spectrum of what they can do and can’t do, it does kind of hinder 
us a bit because of that. (Director of Front Office) 
 
 Finally, job security for most frontline employees in this hotel is relatively high and this 
is due, in large part, to the union.  On the one hand, employees do not sign an employment 
contract and are not guaranteed work or hours.  Further, an employee handbook is created and 
disseminated by corporate and every hotel employee must sign a receipt and acknowledgement 
of the handbook which states that “employment is at-will and may be terminated with or without 
cause and with or without notice”.  On the other hand however, many frontline employees are 
covered by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which supersedes the corporate 
employee handbook and clearly states that all discipline, including discharge, must be for “just 
cause” only.  Moreover, in the event of a dispute regarding any disciplinary action, such action is 
subject to grievance and/or arbitration.   
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Training. The hotel has a formal training system in place for all line level employees.  
Training programs are developed by corporate and are required for all new hires.  In addition to 
training mandated by law, there are four main training programs implemented by corporate for 
new employees: 1) an interactive multi-media orientation program designed to introduce 
employees to the company, its brands, the hotel property and its policies and procedures, 
including those regarding employment and safety 2) service skills training which is focused on 
customer service and guest engagement 3) job skills certification which is performed mainly on 
the job and typically involves role playing and/or shadowing experienced employees to learn 
specific job skills and tasks and 4) a “reunion” program that takes place 60 days after hiring and 
is intended to assess new employees’ progress and performance to date and set future goals.   
 Combined, the new employee training programs involve 50-140 hours of classroom 
and/or on-the-job training, depending on the position, and corporate provides specific dates by 
which training must take place (i.e. orientation within 14 days of hire, job skills certification 
within 45 days, service skill training within 60 days).  Moreover, these training programs are 
standardized across properties in the chain, with little input and customization at the property 
level.  Corporate provides all of the materials necessary for training (e.g. manuals, videos) and 
trainers undergo training themselves through a formal “Train the Trainer Program” provided by 
corporate because, as one manager put it, “they don’t want you to train any of the wrong stuff or 
put your own insight into things”. 
 While cross-training in the hotel is limited, as previously discussed, the hotel provides 
two primary forms of ongoing training and development for frontline employees: 1) daily pre-
shifts or “huddles” and 2) educational assistance.  Daily huddles are a corporate directive that 
requires every department to have a 10-15 minute meeting with a specific training topic prior to 
the start of every shift and all employees are required to actively engage in these interactive 
huddles.  Corporate provides the hotel with potential training topics/ideas and the Executive 
Committee, which is made up of the GM and department heads, sets the training topic for each 
week to ensure consistency in training across departments.  Educational assistance is a program 
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instituted by corporate which provides employees with tuition reimbursement (90%, up to a 
maximum of $1200 per calendar year) for job-related courses to prepare them for additional job 
responsibilities.  This may include, for example, certification classes for administrative staff or 
English as a second language (ESL) classes for line employees.  This program is open to any 
full-time employee with at least six months of service and is subject to the business demands of 
the hotel, as determined by management.   
Compensation. Since the hotel is unionized, the union has a significant influence on the 
wages and benefits provided to most frontline employees and managers interviewed at both this 
hotel and the second company-managed hotel, which is also unionized, indicated that wages at 
their hotels were some of the highest in their respective competitive sets.   
 Wages for entry-level, non-tipped employees begin at $12.50/hour and wages for entry-
level, tipped employees begin at $8.00/hour (plus tips and gratuities) and as per the most recent 
CBA, employees in non-tipped positions received bi-annual wage increases for the last 3 years.  
Newly-hired employees may be paid at a rate of 75% of the applicable pay scale during the first 
four months of employment and at a rate of 90% of the pay scale during the second three months 
of employment.   
 Employees in this hotel receive a number of benefits and most of these are negotiated by 
the union.  This includes vacation based on years of service (i.e. 1 year of service: 40 hours, 2-5 
years: 80 hours, 6-9 years: 120 hours, 10+ years: 160 hours), paid holidays (8), paid sick leave 
based on hours worked, an employer-matched employee savings plan, a 401(k) savings plan with 
matching employer contributions and an employer-funded health benefit plan for employees and 
their eligible dependents (provided they work at least 90 hours/month)14.  
 Employees also receive a free meal per shift and are entitled to participate in the 
company’s travel program, which provides employees with complimentary and/or discounted 
rates at all owned and managed properties throughout the company. 
                                                 
14 The employer makes contributions to the union’s health benefit fund for each hour worked by a union employee.  
The current rate is $3.56/hour worked. 
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 While the union clearly has an influence on wages and benefits, corporate also has 
considerable influence in setting and managing the hotel’s compensation practices.  Corporate 
not only manages the hotel’s pay and benefits administration through a centralized system but 
also, as will be discussed in more detail later on, plays a significant role in union contract 
negotiations, where wages and benefits are set for most frontline employees.  
Performance Management. The hotel has formal performance appraisals in the form of 
annual performance reviews.  Corporate plays a significant role in the review process, providing 
the competencies and goals for annual reviews.  While the primary purpose of these reviews is to 
evaluate and provide feedback on job performance, managers also noted a second important 
function of the annual review process: career planning and development.  Managers repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of using the annual performance reviews to identify and develop 
employees that have the potential and desire to grow with the company. 
 In line with this, the hotel has a policy of promoting from within whenever possible.  This 
policy is both a corporate policy, stated in the employee handbook, and part of the CBA.  As per 
the CBA, the hotel is required to first post available job openings internally.  Qualified 
employees are allowed to apply for available openings and provided that skill and ability are 
relatively equal among candidates, seniority is used as a determining factor in promotions and 
transfers. 
 There are significant opportunities for mobility, both lateral in the form of transfers and 
vertical in the form of promotions.  What’s more, transfer and promotion opportunities are not 
limited by organizational/property boundaries.  Employees not only have the opportunity to 
transfer or be promoted within this hotel but also to other hotels throughout the company.  
Corporate facilitates this process by communicating company-wide openings to the hotels that it 
either owns or manages and while seniority is not a determining factor in cross-property transfers 
and promotions, experience within the company certainly plays a considerable role.   
 Many managers in this hotel are themselves a product of the hotel’s (and the overall 
company’s) performance management system, either having been developed into the positions 
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they are now in from within this hotel or another hotel in the company.  Moreover, managers 
take great pride in employee development, which they consider to be part of their job. For 
example, the Director of Front Office started off as a front desk agent in the hotel and was 
“groomed” into the position he now holds.  He summarizes the hotel’s performance management 
practices and his role as a manager as follows: 
 
The thing is, we go through a review process and if we see the potential in  somebody, 
we’ll ask them, ‘Hey, what do you want to do with this position?’  We never want to let a 
good person go.  We always want to promote.  For me, that’s what I think my job is – it’s 
not just to run this department, it’s to find that gem or that person who can excel and get 
them into that next level. That’s the biggest reward as a manager and director – to get that 
person and kind of set them out into these other properties so you kind of have some type 
of, I don’t know, I guess a legacy in a way.  My boss [the Executive Assistant Manager] 
has done a phenomenal job of getting these people developed and placing them around 
different hotels. It’s always a good thing to have the people that work for you at different 
hotels and kind of live off of that in a way. 
 
Employee Relations. As previously mentioned, the hotel is unionized.  While the hotel is 
responsible for day-to-day union-management relations and contract administration, corporate is 
highly involved in the labor relations of its owned and managed hotels.  In particular, corporate 
not only has a significant influence on collective bargaining but also, in some cases, the 
unionization process itself.  Corporate appoints an experienced chief negotiator for all contract 
negotiations, sets the upper limit on labor costs and has final say over the terms of agreement.  
Moreover, corporate can decide when to accept (or challenge) union organizing in its non-union 
owned and managed hotels.  This was evident, for example, in the second company-managed 
hotel, where corporate signed a neutrality agreement that assured the union that the company 
would remain neutral in organizing campaigns at a handful of its nonunion hotels in exchange 
for settling outstanding contracts and the union’s promise to “stay away” from certain other 
hotels.  The hotel properties chosen as part of this agreement were at corporate’s sole discretion.  
 Corporate’s involvement in contract negotiations is perhaps nowhere clearer than in 
another example from the second company-managed hotel.  While many of its frontline 
employees were unionized as a result of the company’s neutrality agreement with the union, the 
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engineering department was not unionized.  A different union (one that did not have a neutrality 
agreement with the company) attempted to organize the hotel’s 15 engineers (general 
maintenance employees).  The hotel engaged in an aggressive campaign to “fight off” the union 
and the majority of the employees voted against unionizing.  At the same time however, the hotel 
was in contract negotiations with the union representing its other employees.  The union 
proposed the inclusion of the engineers in the bargaining unit in exchange for concessions and 
against hotel management’s wishes, corporate agreed: 
 
The last night of our last negotiation, they [the union] made us a deal.  They said, ‘we 
won’t make you have a pension plan if you give us the engineers’.  And of course, we 
[hotel management] were like ‘no, no, no, no, no’ and when you work with your 
negotiator, your chief negotiator, who is a great guy, works for [the company], but he’s 
an attorney and you know ultimately, they just want to get it done.  And so we said no, 
the hotel said no, but it was overridden by corporate because if you look at it, it’s a better 
business decision to give up 15 engineers for no pension plan for the other 200 people in 
the unit.  But every day, looking at these engineers where I was like ‘vote no, vote no’ 
but now they’re in the union, it’s tough. (Director of HR, second company- managed 
hotel) 
   
 Employee involvement in the hotel is formal and directed by corporate.  Upward 
communication, from employees to management, takes place not only through a company-wide 
“open door policy” but also through employee surveys and suggestion boxes throughout the 
employee cafeteria.  Downward communication, from management to employees, takes place 
primarily through the daily huddles, discussed earlier, and through all-employee meetings.   
 The hotel has a formal progressive discipline procedure and formal methods of conflict 
and grievance resolution.  Progressive discipline includes a combination of coaching, counseling 
and written warnings prior to suspension or discharge and the collective bargaining agreement 
includes a grievance and arbitration procedure for all disciplinary action and other employment-
related disputes.  This begins with the employee making a complaint to their immediate 
supervisor.  If the issue is not resolved, the complaint is put into writing and the employer 
representative and the union representative attempt to settle the issue.  If the issue is still not 
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satisfactorily resolved, the parties can mutually agree to enter into mediation or either party can 
submit the issue for arbitration. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Cross-Case Analysis 
 How does the management of human resource systems compare across the franchisee-
owned and company-managed hotels examined in this study?  What is the extent of corporate 
involvement in the management of these systems?   
 A comparison of corporate’s involvement across each of the five categories of human 
resource practices reveals significant differences in how human resource systems are managed in 
the two case study hotels.  As shown in Table 1.2, corporate has a “high” level of involvement in 
every aspect of the company-managed hotel’s human resource system, from staffing to employee 
relations.  Corporate provides the company-managed hotel with a centralized recruitment system, 
a formal selection process with clear selection criteria, detailed job descriptions and 
specifications and a standardized handbook outlining employment policies and procedures.  
Corporate also provides the company-managed hotel with a formal training system, which 
includes training programs for new employees and ongoing training and development, and a 
formal system of performance management, which includes performance evaluations with pre-
specified goals and competencies and procedures for internal employee development with 
opportunities for company-wide mobility.  Finally, corporate has a significant influence on the 
company-managed hotel’s compensation practices and employee relations through its 
involvement in labor relations and union contract negotiations and its mandated employee 
communication programs.  Moreover, the consistent use of corporate-mandated practices is 
monitored not only through the GM, who is employed by, and reports directly to, corporate but 
also through other means such as management information systems, regional directors and 
property inspections. 
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Table 1.2: Summary of Human Resource Practices and Corporate Involvement in the Case 
Study Hotels 
 
 Company-Managed Hotel Franchisee-Owned Hotel 
Practices Level of Corporate 
Involvement 
Practices Level of Corporate 
Involvement 
Staffing  Formal/centralized 
recruitment system 
 Formal selection 
process  
 Little cross-training 
or lean staffing 
 Rigid and narrow job 
definitions 
 High job security 
High:  
All staffing practices 
provided or highly 
influenced by 
corporate. 
 Informal sources of 
recruitment 
 Streamlined selection 
process 
 Lean staffing 
 Cross-training 
 Loose and broad job 
definitions 
 Low job security 
Low:  
All staffing practices 
are developed at the 
property level. 
Training  Formal training for 
new employees 
 Ongoing training and 
development through 
daily huddles and 
educational 
assistance 
High:  
Corporate provides 
and monitors all 
training and 
development 
programs. 
 Formal training for 
new employees 
 No ongoing training 
and development 
(aside from cross-
training above) 
High:  
Corporate provides and 
monitors all training 
programs. 
Compensation  Competitive wages 
with bi-annual 
increases 
 Union-negotiated 
benefits: vacation, 
paid holidays, paid 
sick leave, 401(k) 
with employer 
match, and 
employer-funded 
health benefit plan 
 Additional benefits: 
employee meals and 
travel discounts 
High:  
Centralized pay and 
benefit administration. 
Corporate also has 
significant influence 
over compensation 
practices through 
involvement in union 
contract negotiations. 
 Entry-level pay at or 
slightly above 
minimum wage 
 Merit increases 
 Benefits include 
401(k) plan (no 
employer match), 
group health 
insurance plan 
(employer pays % for 
employee coverage 
but not dependents), 
and PTO 
Low:  
Compensation 
practices at the 
discretion of owners 
and property-level 
management. 
Performance 
Management 
 Formal annual 
performance 
appraisals 
 Seniority used as a 
determining factor in 
promotions/ transfers 
 Significant 
opportunities for 
mobility within and 
across properties 
High: 
Competencies and 
goals for annual 
reviews provided by 
corporate and 
corporate facilitates 
employee development 
and mobility. 
 Formal but 
inconsistently used 
annual performance 
appraisals  
 Promotions/transfers 
based on competence 
 Limited opportunities 
for mobility within 
the hotel; no cross-
property mobility 
Low:  
Performance 
management practices 
determined by 
franchisee. Corporate 
has no role in employee 
development and 
mobility. 
Employee 
Relations 
 Corporate appointed 
chief negotiator for 
contract negotiations 
 Corporate mandated 
upward and 
downward 
communication 
programs 
 Formal progressive 
discipline procedures 
 Formal grievance 
and arbitration 
procedure 
High: 
Corporate has final say 
over collective 
bargaining and other 
labor relations 
decisions. All 
employee relations 
practices negotiated in 
CBA or mandated and 
monitored by 
corporate. 
 Indirect union 
influence through 
modeling larger 
unionized hotels 
 Corporate mandated 
downward 
communication 
programs  
 Formal progressive 
discipline procedures 
 Formal methods of 
conflict and grievance 
resolution 
Low:  
Franchisee has 
discretion over the 
structure, content and 
use of all corporate 
mandated 
communication 
programs. All other 
employee relations 
practices determined at 
property level. 
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 In contrast, as shown in Table 1.2, corporate has a “low” level of involvement in every 
aspect of the franchisee-owned hotel’s human resource system, with the exception of training 
practices.  Recruitment and selection processes, job descriptions and specifications and 
employment policies and procedures are all developed at the property level, without input from 
corporate.  Likewise, wages and benefits are set by the franchisee and corporate has minimal 
involvement in the employee relations practices of the franchisee-owned hotel.  Although 
corporate does mandate some employee communication programs, such as quarterly all-
employee meetings and a quarterly newsletter, the structure and content of these programs are at 
the discretion of the franchisee and the management team at the property level and corporate 
does not enforce their use.  Moreover, corporate does not get involved in labor relations at any of 
its franchised units.  Finally, corporate does not have a role in any of the performance 
management practices at the franchisee-owned hotel – the use and content of performance 
reviews as well as the policies and procedures for employee development and promotion are 
determined at, and limited to, the property level.  The only aspect of the franchisee-owned 
hotel’s human resource system that corporate is involved in is training.  Corporate not only 
provides the franchisee-owned hotel with formal training programs but also strictly monitors 
their use through bi-annual quality assurance inspections.  Nevertheless, training programs 
provided by corporate are limited to new employee training and for the most part, corporate 
neither mandates nor monitors ongoing training and development in the franchisee-owned hotel.  
To be sure, while the franchisee-owned hotel is “required” to have daily huddles or pre-shifts, 
and these are intended to be a form of ongoing training for employees, the content of these 
huddles is at the discretion of property-level management and corporate does not oversee their 
use.  This is clearly evident in the franchisee-owned hotel where these huddles are used 
predominantly as a mechanism for communicating daily operational information to employees 
rather than as a tool for training.   
 Another interesting finding regarding the management of human resource systems in the 
franchised and company-managed case study hotels is the clear demarcation of franchisee 
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employees and company employees.  That is, corporate has taken steps to make it apparent that 
employees in the franchisee-owned hotel work for the franchisee, not for the company.  
Prospective employees cannot apply for a job at the franchisee-owned hotel through the 
company’s career website because they are not applying for a job with the company but rather, a 
job with the franchisee.  Unlike in the company-managed hotel, pay and benefits administration 
in the franchisee-owned hotel takes place at the property level and employees receive their 
paychecks directly from the franchisee, not from corporate.  Employees in the franchised hotel 
do not have access to corporate’s system of internal promotion and opportunities for company-
wide mobility because they are not considered to be employees of the company.  Instead, 
employees at the franchisee-owned hotel are limited to openings within the franchisee-owned 
hotel.  If they want to apply for job openings in other like-branded properties or company-owned 
or managed hotels, they must do so as an external applicant and any work experience at the 
franchisee-owned hotel is not counted as experience within the company.  Similarly, corporate 
does not collect any personnel records from its franchised hotels and all employment verification 
(i.e. to verify work history) must be done through the franchisee.  As one manager described it, 
“it’s as if that person has never worked for [the company] before”.    
 These findings raise the question of why.  Why does corporate have such a high degree of 
involvement in the human resource system of its company-managed hotel but not its franchised 
hotel?  Why is there such a clear demarcation of franchisee employees and company employees?  
Furthermore, what, if any, are the potential implications of these management practices for 
employee and organizational outcomes?  
 
Explaining Differences 
 One explanation for the differences we observe between the two case study hotels may be 
concerns over potential liability.  Specifically, in order to avoid direct and/or vicarious liability 
for the actions of franchisees in matters of employment, franchisors may distance themselves 
from their franchisees’ employment decisions (Nixon Peabody 2010).  The company’s hands-off 
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approach to the human resource system and employees of the franchised hotel in this study 
appears to be, at least in part, influenced by legal limits.  Corporate not only has very little, if 
any, involvement in most aspects of the franchisee-owned hotel’s human resource system but 
also makes it very clear in the Franchise License Agreement that the franchisee is “at all times 
solely responsible for the management of the Hotel’s business”.  While no direct statements are 
made about the management of employees, the term “your employees” is repeated throughout 
franchise documents. The practices outlined earlier also reflect steps on the part of the company 
to distinguish franchisee employees from company employees, in line with legal 
recommendations (see, for example, Koch and Dodge 2003).   
 Nevertheless, while these practices may help to protect (though not absolve) the company 
from potential liability, they are also likely to have organizational implications.  First, to the 
extent that fears of potential liability cause the company to distance themselves from franchisees’ 
human resource systems, this may have implications for the long-term viability of franchised 
operations.  A common slogan in the franchising realm, coined by Ray Kroc, the founder of 
McDonald’s Corporation, is: “in business for yourself, not by yourself”.  Implied in this is the 
idea that franchising provides prospective business owners with a successful business concept – 
one that includes established methods of operation and ongoing support.  However, not 
providing these individuals, who may be inexperienced in business in general and in human 
resource management in particular, with effective HR strategies and practices or even guidelines, 
can lead to franchise failure.  This is especially true when we consider the importance of HR for 
the success of franchises and other new ventures (Castrogiovanni and Kidwell 2010).  Franchisee 
inexperience with business and HR has been noted elsewhere (e.g. Royle 2000; Davlin 2007).  It 
was also observed firsthand in the case of the franchisee of two quick-service restaurants 
operating in the food court at the company-managed case study hotel.  The franchisee often 
complained about their lack of knowledge and experience in managing such a large number of 
employees (the two restaurants shared a total staff of about 30, mainly part-time, employees).  
More specifically, this included a lack of knowledge regarding government regulations (i.e. wage 
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and hour laws and sexual harassment – both of which were brought up in conversations with the 
franchisee) as well as other HR issues, such as how to manage performance and discipline 
employees.  Accordingly, while some of the differences we observe between the two case study 
hotels may be explained by the company’s desire to avoid legal liability for the actions of its 
franchisees, it is not clear why the company does not, at the very least, provide the franchisee-
owned hotel with suggestions or information on how they structure their practices in company-
owned and managed hotels.  To be sure, previous court cases regarding franchisor liability 
indicate that this is a legally acceptable practice and in fact, as outlined by Koch and Dodge 
(2003), in one case where the franchisor failed to provide such information to its franchisee, this 
was characterized by the court as “irresponsible” (see Freeman v. Suddle Enters 2001).   
 Second, these practices are also likely to send mixed messages to employees and thus, 
have significant implications for the brand.  Specifically, since employees are considered to be 
employees of the franchisee and not the company, they do not work for the brand, only with the 
brand.  As a result, the company may find it difficult to create brand commitment15 among 
frontline employees who, in service industries like the hotel industry, are primarily responsible 
for service delivery and influencing customer perceptions of the brand.  Moreover, in cases 
where the company’s goals are incongruent with the goals of the franchisee, the actual employer 
for whom these employees work, whose goals are considered to be paramount?  Indeed, this may 
be a strong explanatory factor in understanding why corporate is so highly involved in the 
training practices of the franchisee-owned hotel.  The provision of prescribed training programs, 
including “brand promise training” that focuses on brand standards and service skills, may be an 
attempt on the part of the company to socialize employees, who are central to delivering that 
“brand promise” to customers, with appropriate “premises”16 rather than rely on franchisees to 
                                                 
15 Where employee brand commitment can be defined as “the extent to which employees experience a sense of 
identification and involvement with the brand values of the company they work for” (Kimpakorn and Tocquer 2009: 
532).  
16 The term “premises” is adapted from Simon (1947) and defined by Osterman (1987) as employees’ “information, 
frame of reference, identification with the goals of the organization, and motivation” (56).  It is worth noting here 
the similarity between the terms “premises” and “employee brand commitment”.   
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develop such training as it would be much harder to control and ensure consistency.  This is 
analogous to Osterman’s (1987) explanation for why firms use in-house training for certain 
organizationally central, and in his case managerial, employees.  In addition, since the training 
programs provided by corporate are primarily operational (i.e. intended to familiarize employees 
with corporate standards and develop the skills and knowledge to effectively perform their jobs), 
they are perhaps more legally permissible than other human resource practices or even training 
programs, such as diversity and non-discrimination training (for example, see Miller v. D.F. 
Zees, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 792, 806-07 (D. Or. 1998)).   
 A related, though alternative, explanation for corporate’s limited involvement in the 
human resource system of the franchisee-owned hotel in this study may be the classification of 
“strategic” vs. “tactical” employment decisions.  Bradach (1998) defines “strategic” responses or 
decisions as those that have the ability to affect the uniformity of the chain while “tactical” 
decisions are those that result in variation but do not affect the standards specified by the 
franchisor and/or the degree of consistency across units.  As a result, franchisees are often 
permitted to make tactical decisions and are limited in their ability to make strategic ones.  While 
Bradach is referring to operational decisions in particular and does not pay much attention to 
employment decisions, he classifies the deployment of labor (staffing) as a tactical decision – 
one that is largely at the discretion of the franchisee.  Applied to other elements of the human 
resource system, it may also be the case that the company has classified these decisions – namely 
compensation, performance management and employee relations – in addition to staffing as 
tactical rather than strategic and has thus left these decisions to the franchisee.  In contrast, the 
company may be classifying training programs as strategic, especially given that much of this 
training is focused on brand standards and service skills – factors which are likely to affect the 
uniformity of service provided across units – and as a result, the company plays a much stronger 
role in training decisions and keeps franchisee involvement to a minimum.   
 In so far as this explains, in whole or in part, corporate’s involvement in the management 
of human resource systems in its franchised operations however, there may be implications for 
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both employee and organizational outcomes.  In particular, previous research has shown that a 
host of human resource practices besides training have the ability to affect organizational 
performance.  This includes practices that might be categorized by the company as “tactical”.  As 
summarized by Combs et al (2006), these practices, which are typically referred to as high 
performance work practices (HPWPs), include comprehensive recruitment and selection 
procedures, formal training, incentive compensation and performance management systems, 
flexible work arrangements and employee participation in decision making and are said to not 
only enhance employees’ knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) but also empower and motivate 
employees to leverage those KSAs to achieve organizational objectives (Huselid 1995; Delery 
and Shaw 2001).  This, in turn, affects employee outcomes, such as satisfaction, commitment 
and turnover – all of which have been linked to organizational performance and, especially in the 
case of services, customer-related outcomes such as customer satisfaction and service quality 
perceptions (Dyer and Reeves 1995; Schuler and Jackson 1999; Koys 2001; Batt 2002; Harter, 
Schmidt and Hayes 2002; Hausknecht, Trevor and Howard 2009; Batt and Colvin 2011).  In this 
way, in addition to training decisions, decisions over staffing, compensation, performance 
management and employee relations are likely to affect employee outcomes and in turn, the 
uniformity and quality of service provided to customers (along with other organizational 
outcomes) and may be more “strategic” than first believed.  Consequently, there may be a 
possible misspecification of strategic vs. tactical employment decisions on the part of the 
company and to the extent that this is resulting in a low level of involvement in franchisee 
human resource systems, this may have implications for the success of both franchised units and 
the company as a whole.  The following quote from the GM at the franchisee-owned hotel 
provides some support for the strategic vs. tactical explanation for corporate’s (arguably 
misguided) lack of involvement in the human resource systems of its franchised operations: 
  
Some things that directly affect the guest like the number of times the phone is supposed 
to ring before it is answered to some of the food on the menu and whatnot is absolutely a 
standard that is dictated by the franchise.  Whether you have a bonus program, whether 
you give sick day, whether you give this or that isn’t.  However, you could argue that one 
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is just as important as the other.  So, there is somewhat of a failing in the franchise 
system because you have an opportunity for some cheapskates [franchisees] to kind of 
abuse the system…If someone were to take [all the hotels in the chain] and take those 
properties in the top 15, I bet there’s a commonality in their employment practices. 
 
 A third possible explanation for the differences we observe between the two case study 
hotels may be the entrepreneurial nature of franchised operations.  Individuals become 
franchisees because they are interested in running their own business (Royle 2000).  While they 
may purchase a franchise rather than an independent operation because of the established 
business system and presumed lower risk that comes along with it17, at the heart of their decision 
to become a franchisee is often the desire to be their “own boss”.  Being your own boss, 
however, requires control and given that franchisors typically dictate so many aspects of 
franchise operations, franchisees may not welcome franchisor involvement in their human 
resource systems as well.  There are two primary reasons for this.  First, franchisees may not see 
how human resource practices connect to operational issues or corporate standards and thus, do 
not see the need for corporate involvement in this aspect of their business.  Second, given that 
labor costs are the single highest operating expense in many service operations where franchising 
is prevalent, including hotels18, franchisees are not likely to welcome corporate involvement that 
will increase their costs and decrease their residual profits.  This is perhaps best summarized by 
the GM at the franchisee-owned hotel: 
 
The whole entrepreneur, the spirit of things doesn’t necessarily, doesn’t like to be 
dictated to…You’ve got to have the BPs [British Petroleum] of the world,  they’re going 
to drill just the way they want to drill regardless of anything else and so it’s hard to 
dictate to them, so you’re always going to be fighting that…Most of it though is the 
bottom-line. The various owners just don’t want to spend the money.  There are just so 
                                                 
17 In support of this, research shows that franchising provides opportunities for business ownership to many who 
may not otherwise take the risk.  In one study, 52% of those surveyed indicated that they would not be self-
employed if it were not for franchising (Hunt 1972).  There is mixed evidence, however, on the degree to which 
franchises are “lower risk” than comparable independent operations.  While some report high franchise survival 
rates, e.g. a recent news report indicated that 97% of franchises started 10 years ago were still open today (Shively 
2010), others have indicated that success rates are much lower – around the 25% mark (Shane 1996).  Birkeland 
(2002) attributes this discrepancy to definitions of “survival” and “success” so that while franchises themselves may 
have high survival/success rates overall, franchisees may have much lower success rates and greater turnover.   
18 One estimate indicates that payroll and related expenses comprise 44% of hotel operating expenses (Mandelbaum 
2004). 
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many things that the franchisor dictates that you do that they just figure…we’ll let the 
employment practices go and they don’t recognize the importance of the employment 
practices. 
 
 While the entrepreneurial nature of franchise operations may in turn give rise to lower 
corporate involvement in the human resource systems of franchised operations, this is likely to 
have implications for both the franchised unit and the organization as a whole.  First, as is 
evident in the GM’s quote, since franchisees receive the profits from their hotel (and only their 
hotel), their primary objective is the bottom-line.  In contrast, since the franchisor is interested 
not only in the success of their units but also the chain as a whole, their primary objective is 
brand reputation (Ji and Weil 2009).  In this way, while franchisors often deal with what one 
director in the company-managed hotel called “OPM – Other People’s Money” and can thus 
afford to place brand as a top imperative, franchisees work with what might be referred to as 
“MPM – My Personal Money”.  Accordingly, the discretion afforded to franchisees with regards 
to their human resource systems may not only provide them with the ability to free-ride on the 
brand-name in an effort to increase profits but also, to the extent that the goals of the franchisee 
and the franchisor are at odds, the goals of the franchisee will prevail.  That is, to the extent that 
human resource practices cause costs to increase, and in turn reduce franchisee residual profits, 
they are likely to “let the employment practices go” – and this may come at the expense of the 
brand (and ultimately, the overall company).  This is especially true when we consider the fact 
that, as discussed earlier, HR practices have been shown to affect organizational outcomes such 
as customer satisfaction.   
 Second, corporate’s lack of involvement in franchisees’ human resource systems as a 
result of franchisees’ desires for control may lead to a disconnect between what franchisees want 
and what their management teams need.  That is, while franchisees may not welcome corporate 
involvement in matters of employment, their management teams, who are often responsible for 
managing operations on a day-to-day basis, particularly in those cases where franchisees exercise 
passive ownership, may require the information and guidance that corporate can provide to 
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successfully operate the hotel.  This was evident in the franchisee-owned case study hotel, where 
managers often (informally) looked to and modeled themselves after their larger, company-
owned and managed counterparts, and is reflected in the following quotes from the Director of 
HR:    
 
The thing about HR in these big hotels…they are all mandated by corporate because they 
are corporate run and managed, so they get all this information that I don’t get.  You 
know the HR directors, it’s just fed to them and then they have to comply. 
 
… [If we had more communication from corporate], it would be wonderful, it would be 
fantastic.  It would give me so much peace of mind all the time. 
 
 This section outlined three potential explanations, and their implications, for the observed 
differences in the management of human resource systems in the two case study hotels.  
Additional research is needed to validate these explanations for why we see low levels of 
corporate involvement in franchisee human resource systems and high levels of involvement in 
company-managed human resource systems. The next section outlines the limitations of this 
study and provides suggestions for future research. 
 
Limitations & Suggestions for Future Research 
 While this study finds significant differences in the management of human resource 
systems across ownership forms, there are some noteworthy limitations.  First, this study took 
place at the establishment level and interviews were only conducted with directors and managers 
at each hotel property.  While these interviews provide us with an adequate understanding of 
how human resource systems are managed in each hotel, it is difficult to ascertain the reasons 
why we observe the differences that we do between the two case study hotels without multi-level 
research that includes interviews with both corporate-level personnel and franchisee-owners.  
Accordingly, although this study provided some possible explanations for why we see low levels 
of corporate involvement in franchisee human resource systems, future research will need to 
validate and expand on these explanations through the use of multi-level, multi-source data. 
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 Second, this study examined how human resource systems are managed across franchise 
and company forms of ownership by comparing a franchisee-owned hotel to a company-
managed hotel rather than a company-owned hotel.  While company-managed hotels certainly 
have a lot in common with company-owned hotels, including the fact that corporate has full 
management control over operations, differences remain between the two forms of ownership.  
To be sure, the owner still has a role in the hotel, albeit a limited one, and retains financial and 
legal liability for the hotel.  This may, in turn, give rise to differences in how human resource 
systems are managed in company-managed vs. company-owned hotels.  In support of this, one 
director at the company-managed case study hotel noted: “Just from the outside looking in – I’ve 
never worked for a [company-owned hotel] – I think they get a lot more scrutiny than we would 
but then again, I think we get a lot more scrutiny than a franchised hotel.”  Consequently, future 
studies should compare franchisee-owned hotels to both company-managed hotels and company-
owned hotels to fully understand how, and why, ownership structure affects both the 
management and types of human resource systems adopted. 
 Third, while both hotels in this study operated under the same parent company and shared 
a number of other similarities (e.g. market segment, customer segment etc), they operated under 
different brand-names.  While it is unlikely that this would significantly affect how human 
resource systems are managed across ownership forms in the same parent company, this study 
does not allow us to control for any possible between-brand differences that may exist in the 
management of human resource systems across ownership forms.  Thus, future studies should 
also control for brand-specific effects.   
 Future research should also examine the extent to which the patterns observed in this 
study extend to other chains and industries.  This would provide us with an understanding of the 
extent to which the findings of this study apply to other chains and the conditions under which 
we may find different patterns of employment system governance in franchised and company 
units than those found in this study.  In line with this, there is some evidence from other 
industries that the management of franchised and company-owned units may differ across 
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chains.  For example, in the restaurant industry, it appears that some restaurant chains, like 
McDonald’s, exert much more control, even with regards to matters of employment, on their 
franchised units than other similar chains, including those operating within the company-
managed case study hotel.  While McDonald’s plays an integral role in decisions over staffing, 
training and even labor costs in its franchised units (Royle 2000), the franchisee of the two fast-
food restaurants in the company-managed hotel indicated that the franchisors took a much more 
hands-off approach – and in the case of one restaurant, had no involvement whatsoever.  
Additional research is therefore needed to understand the extent to which, and the reasons why, 
similarities and differences exist in the governance of human resource systems in franchised and 
company operations across chains as well as organizational implications of such governance. 
 In addition, there may factors, and thus management practices, that are unique to different 
industries. One such factor may be passive ownership.  While passive ownership is a common 
practice in hotels, as evident in the case of the franchisee-owned case study hotel, in other 
industries, such as restaurants, franchisees are often required to be involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the business.  This might give rise to different patterns of management and 
different reasons for such patterns than those found here.   
  Finally, while this study examined how human resource systems are managed in 
franchised and company-managed hotels, the next step will be to determine how these 
management practices translate to employee outcomes (i.e. job quality, satisfaction and turnover) 
and ultimately, organizational outcomes (i.e. operational and financial measures of performance).  
Although this study did not control for hotel size, age or union status, all of which are likely to 
have an impact on work organization and human resource practices, the two case study hotels do 
provide some idea of what we might expect to find, at least with regards to employee job quality.  
For example, as shown in Table 1.2, the human resource practices in the franchisee-owned hotel 
appear to be much less formal and less sophisticated than those in the company-managed hotel 
and there seems to be a higher emphasis on containing costs (i.e. through lean staffing, fewer 
benefits etc) in the franchisee-owned hotel than in the company-managed hotel.  On the one 
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hand, the differences between the two hotels may merely be reflecting differences in the size or 
union status of the two hotels, as larger firms are more likely to have formal and sophisticated 
HR practices than smaller firms and unionization results in a greater emphasis on seniority and 
higher wages and benefits.  On the other hand however, the fact that the smaller, second 
company-managed hotel displayed similarities to the company-managed case study hotel, for 
example in regards to the level of formality in HR practices, seems to suggest that some of the 
observed differences between the hotels are due to ownership rather than say, size or some other 
factor.  It is also worth keeping in mind that the human resource practices of the franchisee-
owned hotel in this study are likely to be a conservative representation of human resource 
practices in other franchised hotels.  The franchisee-owned hotel has not only won multiple 
service awards but also places a high degree of importance on “good” human resource practices, 
as is evident in the quotes from the GM presented earlier.  The relationship between ownership 
structure and employee (and ultimately organizational) outcomes therefore needs to be examined 
in future research.  Such research should control for relevant factors such as hotel brand, age, 
size and union status. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this study was to examine how franchise businesses manage their human 
resource systems across ownership forms and in particular, the level of corporate involvement in 
the management of these systems.  A matched-pair case study comparison of a franchisee-owned 
hotel and a company-managed hotel revealed significant differences in the management of 
human resource systems across ownership forms.  In particular, while the company-managed 
hotel was characterized by a high level of corporate involvement in all aspects of its human 
resource system, from staffing to employee relations, the franchisee-owned hotel was 
characterized by a high degree of franchisee independence and a much lower level of corporate 
involvement in every aspect of its human resource system, with the exception of training.  
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Moreover, corporate took a hands-off approach to employees of the franchisee and the cross-case 
analysis revealed a clear demarcation of franchisee employees and company employees.  
What explains these differences?  Three potential explanations, and their implications, 
were outlined: company fears over potential liability for the actions of its franchisees, the 
classification of employment decisions as “tactical” rather than “strategic” in nature, and the 
entrepreneurial nature of franchised operations.   
 This study makes an important contribution to our understanding of how franchise 
businesses are managed in general and to our understanding of the franchise relationship in 
particular, especially with regards to human resource management.  Future research should 
examine the extent to which the findings of this study generalize to other settings, both in and 
outside of the hotel industry.  Future research should also examine the extent to which observed 
differences in the management of human resource systems across ownership forms, in turn, 
affect the types of human resource systems adopted and ultimately, employee and organizational 
outcomes across franchised and company operations.  Such research is important not only for 
understanding how the increasing number of individuals employed in franchise businesses are 
affected by differences in ownership form but also for understanding the factors which may 
affect the success and long-term viability of businesses that are a significant and growing part of 
the US (and global) economy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES IN 
NETWORKED FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM A FRANCHISE SYSTEM 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the relationship between ownership form and human resource practices in 
a franchise system. Drawing on the franchising and family business literatures, I examine 
competing hypotheses regarding franchisee ownership incentives and behavior vis-à-vis their 
employees relative to the alternative, vertically integrated company form of ownership. Using 
data from a unique establishment level survey of a U.S.-based limited service hotel chain, I find 
significant differences in human resource practices across franchised and comparable company 
operations. Consistent with predictions of franchisee profit motives and free riding behavior, 
franchisee-owned establishments are associated with lower adoption of strategic human resource 
practices compared to company-owned establishments. The results of this study suggest that 
strategic choices over the organization and ownership of production can influence human capital 
investments in networked firms.  
Keywords: franchising, human resources, ownership, networked firms 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The production of goods and services has become increasingly fragmented as large firms 
vertically disintegrate and coordinate with other firms in networked forms of organization. In 
some cases, such as those commonly found in global value chains, this has been led by firm 
efforts to focus on core competencies and reduce ownership over “non-core” activities (the 
“make-or-buy” decision) (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon 2005). In others, such as tapered 
integration, firms have engaged in the simultaneous use of in-house production and outside 
suppliers for the same activities (the “make-and-buy” decision) (Porter 1980).  
Shifts in the ownership and coordination of production have also brought about shifts in 
the coordination of work and employment. Employment relationships have become increasingly 
fragmented, or “fissured”, as workers have moved from large firms to networks of smaller 
business units (Weil 2010). However, we still know very little about what it means to work under 
these arrangements (Batt & Banerjee 2012; Lakhani, Kuruvilla, & Avgar 2013). Moreover, the 
management of employees and the organization of work within these arrangements can have 
significant implications for the performance of networked organizations. Research in strategic 
human resource management has demonstrated a strong relationship between human resource 
(HR) practices, often referred to as high performance or high involvement work practices, and a 
range of organizational outcomes (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006). These practices, which 
typically involve some combination of comprehensive recruitment and selection procedures, 
formal training, incentive compensation, and employee participation in decision making, reflect 
investments in the human capital of the firm that result in sustained competitive advantage 
(Hatch & Dyer 2004; Liu, van Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost 2013; Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams 
1994). As firms progressively integrate with other firms, they rely more on the human capital of 
those firms to deliver value and achieve competitive advantages that were once created 
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exclusively within firm boundaries. As a result, variation in human capital investments, via 
human resource practices, could affect the success of networked firms.  
This paper examines work organization under a networked organizational form that has 
experienced significant growth over the last few decades: franchising. Franchise businesses 
directly and indirectly account for 11.8% of private sector employment and 9% of private sector 
output in the United States (IFA 2013). Over the period of 2007-2013, franchise businesses 
created jobs at a faster rate than other businesses in the U.S. economy, and such rapid growth is 
expected to continue in the future (IFA 2013).  
Most franchise businesses are “plural form” organizations – a form of tapered integration 
that includes both franchisee-owned and company-owned units (Bradach 1998; Michael 2000). 
In franchised units, the company (franchisor) grants an individual (franchisee) the right to sell its 
product or service using its brand name and business system. Although the franchisor provides 
the franchisee with ongoing guidance and support, the franchisee is responsible for operating the 
business and as the residual claimant, receives the profits of their efforts. Alongside franchised 
units, franchisors also operate their own units. Franchisors hire managers to run these units using 
the same business system provided to franchisees but in company-owned operations, the 
franchisor (rather than manager) is the residual claimant. The simultaneous operation of 
franchisee and company owned units raises questions about the nature of employment in these 
units: who sets the standards of work, and to what extent are there differences in the strategies 
and practices of franchisees versus company managers? 
Few studies have examined HR practices under the franchise form of ownership. Those 
that have done so have focused on a narrow range of practices or have examined HR practices in 
franchised operations relative to independently-owned operations, assuming that practices in 
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franchised and company units are identical given their common business system (Cappelli & 
Hamori 2008). There are, however, reasons to expect variation in HR practices across ownership 
forms in the same organization. To begin with, there is evidence that while franchisors provide 
franchisees with operating guidelines, they do not involve themselves in the employment matters 
of their franchisees. Concerns over vicarious liability appear to be a primary reason for this 
although recent research has illuminated other possible explanations as well (Lakhani 2013). 
Second, franchisee owners and company managers may experience very different incentives 
when it comes to their HR systems. On the one hand, the provision of residual claimancy may 
lead franchisees to act in the best interests of the brand through comparable investments in HR 
practices as company managers. On the other hand, since franchisees only receive the profits 
from the units they own, they may have an incentive to free ride on the brand name by cutting 
costs and investments in HR practices.  
To investigate these competing hypotheses, I draw on a unique establishment level 
survey of a limited service hotel chain to compare twelve key strategic HR practices across 
ownership forms1. The hotel industry is an appropriate context for this study because it is one of 
the most highly franchised industries in the U.S., with chains operating both franchisee and 
company owned units under the same business format and procedures. Given the limited data on 
franchises in general and their employment practices in particular, focusing on a single industry 
and chain also allows us to include rich controls to rule out alternative explanations for any 
observed variation in practices.  
This study makes several contributions. First, the study will contribute to the literature in 
strategic human resource management by examining how decisions over the production of goods 
                                                            
1 In line with the earlier discussion, “strategic” HR practices are practices that are “theoretically or empirically 
related to overall organizational performance” (Delery & Doty 1996: 805).  
65 
 
and services shape investments in human capital. Although understanding the determinants of 
HR practices is a fundamental aim of strategic human resource management theory (Wright & 
McMahan 1992), much of the empirical research in this area has focused on the outcomes of 
those practices (for a noteworthy recent exception, see Liu, van Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost 2013). 
By examining HR practices in a plural form franchise system, this study will illuminate how 
strategic choices over production and more specifically, the ownership structures that result from 
such choices affect strategic human resource investments.  
Second, this study will contribute to growing debates over job quality. Recent studies 
have documented the prevalence of low wage work in the U.S. and abroad, and the causes and 
consequences of such work (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, & Murnane 2003; Gautié & Schmitt 2010; 
Osterman & Shulman 2011). Since franchising is common in many low wage service industries, 
this study will provide an understanding of how the ownership structures of firms affect the 
quality of jobs for a growing proportion of the working population.  
Third, this study will contribute to the franchising literature by expanding our 
understanding of franchisee incentives and behavior. Research on franchising has predominantly 
focused on the franchisor perspective. As Dant (2008: 92) notes, this leads to questions about the 
“emic generalizability of our etic-oriented franchising theories…and the applicability of 
franchisor-based findings to the mindset of franchisees”. Since HR practices appear to be one 
domain where franchisees have considerable autonomy, examining variation in practices across 
ownership forms may provide important insights on franchisee motives. Additionally, given the 
replicated and interdependent nature of franchised and company operations that share a brand 
name, the results of this study may point to factors that have the potential to affect the success of 
franchise businesses more generally. 
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Finally, by examining the relationship between ownership and HR practices in a plural 
form franchise system, this study may provide insights on how production decisions and 
ownership structures shape work organization and outcomes in other types of networked firms, 
such as global value chains, strategic alliances, and other plural form organizations.   
The paper begins with a brief overview of prior research on employment practices in the 
franchise context. Next, drawing on theories of franchising and family owned businesses, I 
examine alternative hypotheses for the relationship between franchise ownership and 
investments in HR systems. I then describe my data, methods, and results. In the final section, I 
discuss the findings of the study and offer suggestions for future research.  
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
 The limited literature on employment in franchises reveals significant differences in HR 
practices across ownership forms. Studies in the restaurant and hotel industries have shown that 
employees in company-owned operations receive higher compensation and have a steeper 
tenure-earnings profile than employees in comparable franchisee-owned operations (Freedman & 
Kosová 2012; Krueger 1991). These differences have been attributed to agency problems and 
more specifically, variation in employee supervision which leads franchisors to adopt efficiency 
wages in their company-owned operations. 
 Research on labor standards compliance in fast food restaurant chains has also 
demonstrated that company-owned outlets have higher rates of compliance than franchised 
outlets (Ji & Weil 2010). On average, franchisee-owned restaurants owe 60% more in back 
wages than comparable company-owned restaurants. The authors argue that the compliance gap 
reflects differences in concerns over brand reputation. 
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 Few studies on HR systems (as opposed to individual practices) in franchises exist, but 
one study of a Dutch retail chain did find that company-owned units have higher HR intensity, 
measured in terms of the quantity of HR practices, than franchised units (Brand & Croonen 
2010). It is difficult to determine the source of these differences though, as company-owned units 
in the study are covered by a Collective Labour Agreement, which is likely to influence HR 
practices, and only establishment size is controlled for in the analysis.  
 In contrast, Cappelli and Hamori (2008) use a national probability sample of 
establishments to examine the relationship between franchise status and a series of HR practices 
for managerial and non-managerial employees. After controlling for relevant factors, they find 
that franchise operations have more sophisticated HR practices than similar independently-
owned operations. The authors, however, assume that HR practices are largely the same for all 
establishments in a plural form franchise system and do not differentiate between units that are 
franchisee-owned vs. company-owned. As a result, it is not clear whether the findings reflect 
differences between franchised establishments and independent establishments or between 
company establishments in a franchise system and independent establishments. Although it is 
worthwhile to examine how HR systems vary between franchised and independently-owned 
operations, it does not provide us with a clear understanding of how franchisee-owned 
establishments compare to other establishments operating under the same brand name. In light of 
the integrated nature of franchised and company operations, as well as recent findings that 
franchisees may have more discretion over their HR systems than first believed (Lakhani 2013), 
it is important to understand how HR practices under the franchise form of ownership compare 
to those under the alternative, vertically integrated company form of ownership. 
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 In this study, I extend previous work by developing hypotheses regarding franchisee 
incentives and behavior vis-à-vis their employees and investments in HR practices relative to 
company-owned operations. I test these hypotheses by investigating the effect of franchise 
ownership on a broader range of HR practices than has been examined in prior research while 
also controlling for factors that may be associated with the franchise form. Below, I elaborate 
these hypotheses, beginning with a discussion of the agency cost theory of franchising.     
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Traditionally, research on the franchise relationship has used agency cost theory to 
emphasize the agency benefits of franchising. Franchise scholars have found that providing 
franchisee agents with residual claims on the profits of their operations reduces two common 
problems in principal-agent relationships, namely adverse selection (incentives to misrepresent 
abilities) and moral hazard (incentives to shirk) (Brickley & Dark 1987; Rubin 1978). Thus, 
franchising is said to enhance performance by reducing the agency costs typically found in 
company-owned units where individuals are hired under fixed wage contracts to manage 
operations. 
 Franchising may not eliminate all agency costs, however, and may bring forth new costs, 
such as free riding. The agency cost explanation of franchising assumes that by turning 
franchisees into residual claimants, the interests of the principal (franchisor) and the agent 
(franchisee) are brought into alignment. Although this is true in that franchisees internalize the 
consequences of their behavior via their profits, the profit motive of franchisees may also lead to 
situations where the interests of the franchisor and the franchisee are not aligned. One area where 
this is likely to occur is employment. Labor costs make up a significant proportion of expenses in 
many service operations where franchising is prevalent. For example, payroll and related 
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expenses comprise almost 50% of operating expenses in the hotel industry (Mandelbaum 2004). 
Since franchisees benefit from the profits of their unit (and only their unit), they may have an 
incentive to free ride on the established brand name by reducing quality and labor costs in order 
to maximize profits. Reducing labor costs also allows franchisees to increase their take home pay 
without having to share the benefits with franchisors as they would if they were to increase 
profits through higher sales (Felstead 1993). Accordingly, franchisees may be less likely to adopt 
HR practices which are believed to increase costs and decrease residual profits, such as high 
performance or high involvement work practices, even though such practices may benefit the 
franchised operation and the larger organization over the long term. Indeed, research has shown 
that these practices consistently lead to higher performance across a range of industries, 
including services (Batt 2002; Delery & Doty 1996; Delery & Doty 1996; Hoque 1999; 
Macduffie 1995). In contrast, given the franchisor’s concern for the brand name and the 
performance of the franchise business as a whole, they may be much more likely to adopt such 
practices in their company-owned units. 
 A parallel line of reasoning can be found in research on family business ownership. This 
literature is relevant to the study of franchising not only because franchised establishments are 
often family owned and operated (Carney 2005), but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
because the structure of ownership is similar across franchised and family-owned operations. 
Specifically, family businesses, like franchised businesses, are characterized by the presence of 
owner managers. Also, family businesses often have outside investors or “owners” with an 
interest in the success of their operations, much like franchisors have a vested interest in the 
success of franchised operations. This may, in turn, give rise to “principal-principal” 
relationships with similar issues and incentives across family and franchise forms of ownership.  
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To date, research on family ownership has been divided into two main perspectives: 
agency and stewardship (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester 2011). The agency perspective, for 
the most part, echoes the arguments outlined above. Here, the family owner is viewed as a risk-
averse investor that favors family interests over the interests of other stakeholders and acts in 
ways that maximize short-term personal wealth. In contrast, the stewardship perspective views 
the family owner as a far-sighted investor that is willing to sacrifice short-term personal gains for 
the long run benefit of the organization and its stakeholders. In addition, family owners value 
their reputation so they are likely to behave in ways that enhance and preserve their family name. 
Applied to HR practices and employment relations, these perspectives paint opposing pictures of 
family owners – as employers who see employees as costs to be minimized on the one hand and 
as beneficent employers that value long-term relationships and investments in human capital on 
the other (Cobb 2013; Tsao, Chen, Lin, & Hyde 2009). 
A similar argument could be made for franchisee owners.  That is, franchisee owners may 
be viewed as short-term, individual profit-seeking maximizers, as discussed earlier, or as 
stewards who invest in their employees for the long run benefit of their operations and the 
franchise system as a whole. This leads to competing hypotheses regarding the franchisee 
employer in comparison with the company employer. Because HR practices such as formal 
selection, training, discretion, and competitive pay and benefits represent immediate costs with 
an uncertain longer term payoff, franchisees may be less likely to adopt these practices than 
franchisors and their managers who value brand reputation. Conversely, franchisees may be as or 
perhaps even more likely to adopt such HR practices as they represent investments in the brand 
that they have bought into and directly benefit from through higher long run profits. It is worth 
noting here that this perspective is consistent with arguments regarding the agency benefits of 
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franchising and in particular, the high powered incentives of franchisees as residual claimants. 
Also, franchisees may be less likely to adopt poor or cost cutting management practices as they 
can have a detrimental effect on the franchisee’s personal or family reputation if consumers are 
made aware of such practices. Although HR practices are often private and less subject to 
consumer scrutiny than other organizational practices, the recent strikes by restaurant workers in 
major cities across the U.S. provide an example of how such practices can be made public 
knowledge (Petroff & O'Toole 2013). Accordingly, the following hypotheses are set forth: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Franchisee-owned establishments will exhibit lower investment in HR practices 
compared to company-owned establishments. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Franchisee-owned establishments will exhibit equal or greater investment in HR 
practices compared to company-owned establishments.  
 
METHODS 
 
Industry Setting 
 
The setting for this study is the U.S. hotel industry.  The hotel industry provides an ideal 
context for examining the relationship between franchise ownership and HR practices for a 
number of reasons. To begin with, the hotel industry is one of the most highly franchised 
industries in the U.S., and franchising is expected to grow in importance in the industry in the 
years to come (Michael 2000). Almost two thirds of branded hotels in the U.S. are now 
franchised (Diaz-Bernardo 2010) and 65% of employment in franchise businesses is in the food 
and hospitality sector (IFA 2013). Second, focusing on a single industry will control for any 
between-industry differences that may exist in franchising and HR systems more generally 
(Cappelli & Hamori 2008). Finally, given the high cost of opening a hotel franchise and the 
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presence of long-term contracts2, the hotel industry provides a good context for testing 
hypotheses regarding franchisee incentives and behavior because, all other things equal, 
franchisees should have long-term orientations.  
 
Sample 
 
The data for this study come from an establishment level survey of HR practices in a 
U.S.-based limited service hotel chain. Limiting the sample to a single chain allows us to control 
for extraneous sources of variation, including brand and market segment effects. Since limited 
service hotel chains are typically unorganized, I am also able to control for union effects. 
Although union density remains low in the U.S. hotel industry, at approximately 7% overall 
(Hirsch & Macpherson 2013), previous research has shown that unions have significant effects 
on employment practices in general and in the hotel industry in particular (Bernhardt, Dresser, & 
Hatton 2003; Freeman & Medoff 1986; Zuberi 2006). Since company-owned units in other 
market segments are more likely to be unionized than franchised hotels, examining a primarily 
non-union limited service chain allows me to separate the effects of ownership from the effects 
of unionization, which has been difficult to do in previous research (Brand & Croonen 2010). 
An establishment is defined as a single hotel in the chain. Although it was not feasible to 
survey multiple respondents, establishment level surveys have generally been recognized as 
more reliable than firm level surveys since units are smaller and managers have the opportunity 
to observe the actual practices being implemented (Batt 2002; Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, & 
Snell 2000).The target respondent for the survey was the General Manager (GM) in each hotel. 
GMs are responsible for managing the entire hotel and are likely to be more aware of the 
practices, including those pertaining to HRM, in their hotels than other department managers.  
                                                            
2 For example, Lakhani (2013) reported that the total investment to open a newly constructed 250 room 3 Diamond 
hotel, excluding real property, ranges from $34 to $57 million, with a typical franchise term of 20 years. 
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Since HR practices vary by occupational group, even within the same workplace (Lepak 
& Snell 1999; Osterman 1987), I focused on HR practices for a specific group of workers in each 
hotel, namely non-managerial front-of-house (FOH) employees. While some studies have 
focused on the “core” workforce, defined as the largest group of non-managerial employees (Batt 
2002; Delery & Doty 1996), this study focuses on the group of employees with the highest 
“strategic value” – the human capital that is most responsible for creating the firm’s competitive 
advantage (Lepak & Snell 1999; McClean & Collins 2011). In interactive service work, the 
employees that have direct contact with the customer are responsible for service delivery. 
Furthermore, since these employees are the most visible to customers, their attitudes and 
behavior directly influence customer perceptions of service quality and the brand (Schneider & 
Bowen 1985). Variation in HR practices for FOH employees could therefore have a substantial 
impact on organizational outcomes.  
The survey was administered online to all of the hotels in the chain in Spring 2013, 
following a pilot test in Fall 2012. The survey was developed after conducting extensive 
qualitative research in the hotel industry. This included in-depth case studies of two hotels, one 
company-managed and the other franchised, as well as interviews with a wide range of industry 
professionals3. This provided me with a greater understanding of hotel operations and, in turn, 
allowed me to tailor questions to fit the language and nature of the hotel industry. Interviews 
were also conducted with the top management team in the hotel chain in this study and the 
survey was pre-tested by senior managers to ensure that questions were clear and applicable to 
hotels. This approach is consistent with recent calls to investigate context and service specific 
human resource systems and should lead to more reliable findings (Batt & Hermans 2012; 
Becker & Huselid 1998; Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006).  
                                                            
3 Note, the survey for this study was conducted in a different chain than my initial qualitative fieldwork/case studies.    
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After accounting for missing and duplicate responses, the overall response rate was 63% 
(n=483), with a company-owned hotel response rate of 82% (n=305) and a franchisee-owned 
hotel response rate of 46% (n=178). I also obtained establishment level data from corporate on 
hotel ownership, age, size, location, and performance for all of the hotels in the chain. 
To check for non-response bias, I conducted a series of t-Tests comparing responders to 
non-responders for each ownership subsample using corporate data4. Among franchisee-owned 
hotels, there were no significant differences in hotel age or size between responders and non-
responders. However, franchisee-owned hotels that responded to the survey had higher average 
performance, as measured by the most commonly used industry metric RevPAR5 (M=$46.90, 
SD=$17.81), than non-responders (M=$43.79, SD=$16.33), t(431)=1.87, p=0.062. A chi-square 
test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between responding and hotel 
location. The relationship between these variables was significant (χ2 (5, N =433) = 13.16, p 
<0.05). Responders in the franchisee-owned hotel subsample were less likely to be located in an 
urban area compared to non-responders. Among company-owned hotels, there were no 
significant differences in hotel size or performance but responders were, on average, younger, as 
measured by the number of years the hotel has been open, (M=19.25, SD=11.46) than non-
responders (M=21.56, SD=11.29), t(396)= -1.71, p=0.088. A chi-square test of independence 
revealed no apparent differences in hotel location for responders compared to non-responders in 
the company-owned hotel subsample. These differences were controlled for in the analyses 
below. 
                                                            
4 As will be discussed later on, since there are significant differences in the attributes under consideration between 
franchisee-owned hotels and company-owned hotels, it was important to examine non-response bias separately for 
each ownership subsample to obtain an accurate assessment of the differences between responders and non-
responders. 
5 RevPAR is “revenue per available room”. It is a financial performance metric that takes into account both room 
revenue and occupancy rates and is calculated as: total guestroom revenue/total number of available rooms or 
average daily rate x occupancy rate (for more information, see http://www.strglobal.com/Resources/Glossary.aspx).  
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Measures 
 
To investigate the effect of ownership on investments in HR practices, I examine 12 practices 
that have been identified in the literature as key elements of an HR system and that have the 
potential to affect organizational performance. Following Cappelli and Hamori (2008), each 
individual HR practice is treated as a dependent variable. This not only facilitates comparability 
with previous studies but also allows for the possibility that different HR practices may vary by 
ownership form, thus providing a more fine-grained analysis of the relationship between 
ownership and HR systems6. To further facilitate comparability, measures were adapted from 
published research in strategic human resource management, including Batt (2002), Way (2002), 
Cappelli and Hamori (2008), and Batt and Colvin (2011) among others. The variables used in 
this study are presented below7.  
 
Dependent Variables. Annual salary is the annual salary for the typical FOH employee. This 
measure excludes tips, bonuses, and other forms of performance-related pay as respondents in 
the survey indicated that only a very small percentage of gross annual pay comes from these 
sources8. Benefits is a count of how many of 6 benefits the hotel provides to its FOH employees: 
paid vacation/holidays, sick leave, other paid leaves, health insurance, pension, and meals. 
Education is the average number of years of completed schooling for FOH employees in the 
hotel. Although this is not an HR practice per se, it may be an indicator of selectivity and has 
been used in previous studies as a measure of the general skill level of the workforce (Batt 2002). 
Percent full time is the proportion of the workforce that is full time and has typically been used 
                                                            
6 It is conceivable that franchisees invest in some practices but not others. Given that different HR practices can be 
complements or substitutes (Becker, Huselid, Pickus, & Spratt 1997; Delery 1998), examining individual practices 
can provide a better understanding of how ownership affects the structure of HR systems as well as the potential 
implications for organizational outcomes. 
7 Detailed definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. 
8 The mean reported performance-related pay for the typical FOH employee in the sample was 7% of gross pay and 
the median was 0%. 
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as a measure of employment security. Three measures were included to examine high 
involvement work design. Information sharing is the percentage of FOH employees that 
regularly receive information regarding hotel goals, objectives and performance. Meetings is the 
percentage of FOH employees that are involved in regularly scheduled meetings to discuss work 
related issues. Discretion is a four-item scale adapted from Batt and Colvin (2011) and is the 
average extent to which FOH employees have discretion (using 1-5 Likert response scales where 
1 is “not at all” and 5 is “a great deal”) over work methods, what they say to customers, handling 
customer requests, and handling customer complaints (alpha = 0.79). Two measures were 
included to examine training. Initial training is the number of hours of initial training that FOH 
employees receive in their first year, including orientation and job-related training. Time to 
proficiency is the number of days it takes for a new hire to become fully proficient on the job. 
While the first measure reflects formal training, the latter is likely to include both formal and 
informal or on-the-job training. Internal mobility is the percentage of front of house employees 
typically promoted to higher positions. Two final measures were included to examine the extent 
to which establishments invest in selecting a high quality workforce.  Cost to recruit, screen, and 
train new employees is the approximate cost to recruit, screen, and train a new FOH employee, 
including direct costs and management time. Formal selection is the extent to which the 
establishment relies on formal assessment methods such as ability or personality testing and 
structured interviews to determine the suitability of job candidates (on a 1-4 scale, from “not at 
all” to “to a great extent”). In line with previous research in strategic human resource 
management (Batt 2002; Becker & Huselid 1998), the 12 individual practices were also 
standardized and combined into an additive mean index called high performance work system to 
examine the effect of ownership on HR systems as a whole.  
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Independent Variable. The primary independent variable in this study is ownership. Franchise is 
a dichotomous variable where 1=franchisee-owned hotel and 0=company-owned hotel. The 
ownership form of the hotel was reported by each respondent and confirmed using data from 
corporate.  A very small percentage of hotels in the sample (2.7%) are company-managed but not 
owned. Since company-owned and company-managed hotels are managed in the same way and 
there were no significant differences in practices between company-owned hotels and company-
managed hotels in this study, both are included under the category “company-owned hotels”. 
Previous studies have taken a similar approach (Freedman & Kosová 2012; Weil 2012).  
 
Control Variables. Several variables are included as controls. To control for establishment 
characteristics, I include establishment size, the number of rooms in the hotel, and establishment 
age, the number of years since the hotel opened, as larger and older establishments may have 
more sophisticated and mature employment systems (Jackson and Schuler 1995; Kaufman 2008). 
I also control for the location of the hotel using a series of dummy variables: airport, city center, 
resort, suburban, and highway (omitted category). To control for labor market characteristics, 
three variables are included. Following previous studies, the local unemployment rate and the 
median wage for the main occupational group (hotel desk clerks in this study) control for 
variation in job availability and cost of living respectively (Batt 2001; Batt and Colvin 2011). I 
also control for private sector union density to account for the effects of union representation in 
the local area where the establishment is located. Finally, the performance metric RevPAR, 
obtained from corporate, is included for each hotel to control for differences in performance as 
higher performing establishments may have a greater ability to invest in HR practices than lower 
performing establishments (Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen 2005).  
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RESULTS 
 
Table 2.1 provides the means, standard deviations, and bi-variate correlations for the 
variables. Table 2.2 compares establishment and labor market characteristics by ownership form. 
To examine the effect of ownership on HR practices, I perform difference-of-means tests for 
each of the dependent variables in this study. This is followed by multivariate analyses that 
control for factors that may be associated with franchise ownership.   
Beginning with the characteristics of franchisee-owned hotels and company-owned 
hotels, Table 2.2 shows that franchised hotels in this sample are, on average, younger (5.2 vs. 
19.2 years old, p<0.001) and smaller (78 vs. 125 rooms, p<0.001) than their company-owned 
counterparts. Franchisee-owned hotels also appear to perform better, in terms of RevPAR, than 
company-owned hotels ($46.90 vs. $40.00, p<0.001), consistent with the agency cost 
explanation of franchising. There are no apparent differences in the unemployment or union 
density rates of the local labor markets where franchised and company hotels operate but the 
median hourly wage for hotel desk clerks appears to be slightly higher in locations where 
company-owned hotels operate ($9.40 vs. $9.54, p<0.10). Such differences underscore the 
importance of including these variables as controls in the analysis. 
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of Franchisee-Owned and Company-Owned Establishments:  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Difference of Means t-Tests 
 
 Franchisee-Owned  Company-Owned   
Characteristic Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  t-Test 
Establishment Age 5.16 2.81  19.25 11.46  *** 
Establishment Size 78.04 22.46  124.82 29.99  *** 
RevPAR 46.90 17.81  40.01 13.19  *** 
Unemployment Rate 7.22 2.08  7.39 1.49  n.s. 
Union Density 4.30 2.88  4.26 3.06  n.s. 
Median Wage 9.40 0.90  9.54 0.78  † 
N = 483; *** at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, † at the 0.10 level 
 
 
Table 2.3 presents the difference-of-means tests for the HR practices examined in this 
study. There are significant differences in the types of HR practices adopted by franchised and 
company hotels. Franchisee-owned hotels pay 10% less ($15,588 vs. $17,262, p<0.001) and 
offer fewer benefits than company-owned hotels (1.23 vs. 4.28 benefits out of a possible 6, 
p<0.001). Franchisee-owned hotels also employ workers with fewer years of education (13.28 
vs. 13.49 years, p<0.05) and provide employees with less employment security, measured in 
terms of the percentage of full time employees (58.24% vs. 73.31%, p<0.001). Franchised hotels 
also appear to make less use of a high involvement work design. They engage in less information 
sharing with their frontline employees (87.88% vs. 95.83% of employees regularly receive 
information on hotel goals and objectives, p<0.001) and provide employees with less discretion 
over work methods and customer service than company hotels (3.65 vs. 4.06 on a 5 point scale, 
p<0.001). Franchisees also appear to offer less training, in terms of initial training hours (73.23 
vs. 89.50 hours, p<0.01), and the number of days it takes for a new hire to become proficient on 
the job (33.47 vs. 41.88 days, p<0.05). Finally, franchisees spend less than company managers 
on recruiting, selecting and training new employees ($934.87 vs. $1741.61 per new hire, 
p<0.001) and are less likely to employ systematic selection procedures (2.80 vs. 3.61 on a 4 point 
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scale, p<0.001). Combined, franchisees have, on average, lower adoption of a high performance 
work system than their company owned counterparts (-0.30 vs. 0.17, p<0.001).  
 
Table 2.3: Human Resource Practices of Franchisee-Owned and Company-Owned 
Establishments: Means, Standard Deviations and Difference of Means t-Tests 
 
 Franchisee-Owned  Company-Owned   
Employment Practices Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  t-Test 
Annual Salary 15587.61 2494.91  17261.60 2479.15  *** 
Benefits (/6) 1.23 1.23  4.28 1.05  *** 
Education Years 13.28 0.94  13.49 0.83  * 
Percent Full Time 58.24 28.91  73.31 25.48  *** 
Information Sharing (%) 87.88 24.32  95.83 13.01  *** 
Meetings (%) 83.43 28.65  84.75 27.04  n.s. 
Discretion Scale 3.65 0.91  4.06 0.68  *** 
Initial Training Hours 73.23 65.46  89.50 64.78  ** 
Time to Proficiency (Days) 33.47 36.42  41.88 39.05  * 
Internal Mobility (%) 13.59 16.84  14.02 16.82  n.s. 
Cost to Recruit, Screen and Train New 
Employees 934.87 1145.96 
 
1741.61 1685.22 
 
*** 
Formal Selection  2.80 0.84  3.61 0.52  *** 
High Performance Work System -0.30 0.42  0.17 0.30  *** 
N = 483; *** at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, † at the 0.10 level 
  
 Since the difference-of-means tests do not control for factors that may be associated with 
franchise ownership, it is not clear whether the results in Table 2.3 reflect actual differences in 
practices due to ownership form. As noted earlier, franchised and company hotels differ on a 
number of characteristics (see Table 2.2), which could potentially account for the observed 
differences in HR practices. A series of multivariate regressions were therefore estimated to 
examine the effects of ownership on HR practices, controlling for various hotel and labor market 
characteristics. These regressions are presented in Table 2.4. The results are largely consistent 
with the difference-of-means tests.  Controlling for hotel age, size, location, performance, and 
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local labor market factors9, there are statistically significant differences in HR practices between 
franchised operations and comparable company operations10.  
 The analyses provide strong support for Hypothesis 1a: franchisee-owned hotels display 
lower investment in HR practices than company-owned hotels. Specifically, franchisee-owned 
hotels pay their frontline employees less (β = -1671.87, p <0.001) and offer fewer benefits (β = -
2.63 , p <0.001). They also hire less educated (β = -0.33, p <0.01) and less full time workers (β = 
-8.55, p <0.05). Franchisees also engage in less information sharing (β = -9.05, p <0.001) and 
provide their employees with lower discretion (β = -0.41, p <0.001). They spend less to recruit, 
screen and train new employees (β = -615.36, p <0.01) and are less likely to use formal 
assessment methods in selecting new workers (β = -0.83, p <0.001). Overall, franchise 
ownership is associated with significantly lower adoption of a high performance work system (β 
= -0.43, p <0.001). 
 Notably, when the controls are added, there are no statistically significant differences for 
initial training. Franchisees do, however, appear to provide less informal or on-the-job training, 
as measured by time to proficiency (β = -0.23, p <0.10). These findings are consistent with the 
idea of high franchisor involvement in formal training over areas such as brand standards and 
service skills (Lakhani 2013; Truss 2004), which is likely to be reflected in similar levels of 
initial training hours across franchised and company operations.   
There are no statistically significant differences with regards to work-related meetings 
and opportunities for internal mobility. The former may be reflecting the fact that hotels usually 
                                                            
9 In separate analyses, available on request, respondent characteristics such as the respondent’s main role and years 
of experience were also included as controls. The findings did not change so these variables are excluded for the 
sake of parsimony.   
10 Although ownership is correlated with some of the control variables in these models (see Table 2.1), 
multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue as the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all of the variables are well 
under acceptable limits (Robert O’brien 2007).  
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engage in daily pre-shift meetings where work-related issues are discussed. The latter is perhaps 
more surprising since we would expect opportunities for internal mobility, particularly cross-
property mobility, to be greater in company-owned hotels compared to franchisee-owned 
hotels11. Conversely, these opportunities may not be realized since the organizational structure of 
limited service hotels is relatively flat so upward internal mobility is likely to require physical 
mobility (i.e. moving to another city or even state to work in a different hotel), which low wage 
hotel workers would find difficult to do. So while there may theoretically be more opportunities 
for mobility in company-owned operations, the percentage of employees that actually move to 
higher positions either inside the hotel or within the larger company will be comparably low 
across franchised and company operations.  
The results also indicate some noteworthy relationships between the control variables and 
HR practices. In line with the notion that larger establishments have better, or more 
sophisticated, HR practices, establishment size was positively related to annual pay, benefits, 
initial training, time to proficiency, and opportunities for internal mobility. Establishment age 
was positively related to benefits and employment security but negatively related to education, 
indicating that older establishments tend to employ less educated workers. The location variable 
that seemed to have the strongest impact on HR practices was resort. Resort establishments were 
associated with higher pay and promotion opportunities but less information sharing, meetings to 
discuss work-related issues, and days to become fully proficient on the job. This suggests that 
there may be differences in the nature of work performed in resort locations compared to other 
locations.  
                                                            
11 As Lakhani (2013) details, internal mobility opportunities for employees in franchised hotels are limited to 
openings in the hotel(s) directly owned by the franchisee. In contrast, employees in company-owned hotels have 
more opportunities for mobility because they can move to any other company-owned hotel.   
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Of the local labor market controls, unemployment rate was negatively related to annual 
pay and to the cost of recruiting, screening, and training new employees, which suggests that 
employers are able to pay employees less in loose labor markets (i.e. when unemployment is 
high) and can easily hire new workers since there is a large supply of qualified candidates. As 
expected, hotels in labor markets with higher median wages for desk clerks have significantly 
higher annual pay. Interestingly, higher median wages are also associated with lower use of 
formal selection methods, perhaps reflecting higher employee skill levels in those markets which 
make the use of formal assessment methods less necessary. 
It is worth noting that private sector union density did not appear to have a significant 
effect on the HR practices examined in this study, except for training. This is somewhat 
surprising given qualitative case study evidence indicating that local labor market union density 
is positively related to worker outcomes, such as wages (Bernhardt, Dresser, & Hatton 2003). 
One reason for the discrepancy might be that this study used private sector union density as a 
proxy for hotel industry union density, with the assumption that higher private sector union 
density in a given metropolitan area would be associated with higher hotel industry union density 
in that area as well12. Future research should examine the effects of union representation more 
carefully, with better measures of local industry union membership/density. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
12 At present, there is no publicly available data on hotel industry union density by city, metropolitan area, or state. 
Union density data are typically compiled from the Current Population Survey, with sample sizes too small to 
reliably estimate density by location and industry (for more information on union density estimates, see 
www.unionstats.com).  
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Additional Analyses 
 
 Previous research has suggested that variation in practices across franchised and 
comparable company operations could be due to differences in underlying worker characteristics, 
such as demographic variables or job tenure (Freedman & Kosová 2012). To address this issue, I 
also estimated models using key worker attributes as predictors of a high performance work 
system13. The results are shown in Appendix 2.2. The first model, model 1, includes workforce 
controls alone: the average age of FOH employees, the percentage of FOH employees in the 
establishment that are women, and the average tenure (i.e. years of service) for FOH employees 
in the hotel. The second model, model 2, adds establishment and market controls, and finally, 
model 3 includes ownership form. The relationships for the worker attributes are statistically 
significant. The age of FOH workers and the percentage of the workforce that is female are 
negatively related to the adoption of a high performance work system (p<0.05 and p<0.01 
respectively, model 1). In contrast, job tenure is positively related to the adoption of a high 
performance work system (p<0.05, model 1). Notably, however, controlling for workforce, 
organizational, and market variables, franchise ownership has a statistically significant negative 
relationship with high performance work systems (p<0.001, model 3). Hence, the observed 
differences between franchised and company operations do not appear to be resulting from 
differences in underlying worker characteristics. The franchise form of ownership has a strong 
direct relationship with investments in HR practices.  
                                                            
13 Whether this is a concern is up for debate. On the one hand, worker attributes may be spuriously associated with 
ownership. On the other hand, as Freedman and Kosova also acknowledge, worker attributes may themselves be a 
product of franchisee behavior as franchisees can free ride on the brand name by actively hiring lower quality 
workers. This may, in turn, be related to the types of HR practices they adopt. In line with this, Cappelli and Hamori 
(2008) argue that the ownership variable should capture both the direct and indirect effects of franchise status on HR 
practices. The models estimated here may help to shed light on this and in particular, the extent to which franchise 
ownership affects HR practices indirectly through other variables.  
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 Although this study examined HR practices individually and altogether as a system, 
scholars have suggested that the components of HR systems should also be examined separately 
since they may have distinct effects (Batt & Colvin 2011). Furthermore, since practices can be 
substituted for one another to achieve similar outcomes (Batt 2002), for example high skilled 
workers can be obtained from outside the workplace through higher selectivity or through in-
house training, it is important to examine sets of related HR practices in addition to individual 
practices. Using the ability-motivation-opportunity (AMO) framework (Appelbaum, Bailey, 
Berg, & Kalleberg 2000; Delery & Shaw 2001), the twelve HR practices in this study can be 
separated into three main components that reflect different investments in human capital (Liu, 
van Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost 2013): those pertaining to the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) 
of the workforce (skills index), those that provide opportunities for employees to use those KSAs 
through discretion and opportunities for substantive involvement (work design index), and those 
that motivate employees to put forth discretionary effort (incentives index)14. Models estimated 
using these three indices can be found in Appendix 2.3. The relationships between franchise 
ownership and all three indices are in line with the results for the individual practices and the HR 
system as a whole: negative and statistically significant. Franchisee-owned hotels make lower 
investments in workforce skills, high involvement work designs, and incentives than company-
owned hotels.  
DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, I examine the relationship between ownership and work organization in a 
plural form franchise system. I find significant differences in HR practices across ownership 
forms. Franchisee-owned hotels make lower investments in HR practices than comparable 
                                                            
14 The specific practices in each index are as follows. Skills index: education, initial training, time to proficiency, 
cost to recruit, screen and train a new employee, and formal selection. Work design index: information sharing, 
meetings, and discretion. Incentives index: annual pay, benefits, percent full time, and internal mobility. 
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company-owned hotels. They are less selective, provide lower pay and benefits, have lower 
employment security, and offer employees less discretion. Overall, franchisee-owned hotels are 
less likely to use a high performance work system than company-owned hotels.  
These findings are consistent with the notion of free riding behavior. Although the 
agency cost theory of franchising suggests that franchisees have high powered incentives to act 
in the best interests of their establishments (and the brand) because they directly benefit through 
their residual claimant status, I find the opposite in relation to the management of their 
employees. In particular, franchisees make lower investments in strategic HR practices – 
practices that have been linked to the development of human capital resources and sustained 
competitive advantage. Since franchisees benefit from the profits of their operations, they have 
an incentive to free ride on the brand name by cutting costs and quality. Because HR practices 
entail high costs with little immediate payoff, franchisees reduce investments in these practices. 
In contrast, because franchisors are more concerned with brand reputation and the (long-run) 
success of their operations and the chain as whole (Ji & Weil 2010), company-owned operations 
make greater investments in HR practices.  
The findings of this study paint a picture of franchisees as short-term profit seeking 
maximizers. However, an alternative explanation for the observed differences relates to the idea 
of efficiency wages. As noted earlier, scholars have argued that differences in monitoring affect 
the compensation of employees in franchisee-owned and company-owned operations. Since 
managers of company-owned operations have less of an incentive to monitor and supervise 
employees than franchisee owner-managers who receive the profits of their operations, 
franchisors are said to provide employees in company-owned operations with higher (“above-
market”) wages and benefits than those found in comparable franchised operations to improve 
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productivity and reduce shirking (Freedman & Kosová 2012; Krueger 1991). As a result, the 
variation in HR practices observed in this study could very well be reflecting efficiency wages in 
company operations (recall that both wages and benefits are higher in these operations, see Table 
2.4), as part of a larger set of complementary HR practices. This is consistent with early 
efficiency-based explanations of internal labor markets (cf. Osterman 1987) as well as theory and 
research in strategic human resource management, which suggests that HR practices are most 
effective when implemented as part of an internally coherent system (Wright & McMahan 1992). 
The concept and predicted effects of efficiency wages also correspond with those of high 
performance work systems (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006). 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the differences we observe in this study are in fact due 
to efficiency wages. Efficiency wage theory addresses one set of agency problems – namely 
those that arise due to the more limited monitoring of employees in company-owned hotels and 
incentives to shirk because income is not tied to the pay of company managers (the vertical 
agency problem). It does not, however, address the agency problems that arise in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship and in particular, issues of free riding (the horizontal agency problem). In 
fact, studies on efficiency wages in the franchise context have all but ignored the role that free 
riding behavior may play in producing variation in compensation and other HR practices across 
ownership forms.  Nonetheless, it is possible that differences in practices are driven by 
franchisee behavior, efficiency wages, or both. 
 One way to examine whether variation in HR practices is due to efficiency wages or free 
riding on the part of franchisees would be to compare practices of actively owned franchised 
hotels to those in passively owned franchised hotels.  Accounts of efficiency wages are based on 
the assumption that franchisees both own and manage their establishments (e.g. see Krueger 
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1991: 79). Incentives to shirk are said to be minimized under active ownership because 
franchisee efforts are reflected in profits. In contrast, since hired managers are usually paid a 
fixed wage and franchisees cannot perfectly observe and monitor their actions, passive 
ownership recreates the vertical agency problems that franchising is intended to overcome 
(Shane 1998). To the extent that variation in practices reflects differences in monitoring ability 
then (as opposed to free riding behavior), we should expect greater adoption of efficiency wages 
and related HR practices in passively owned franchised operations compared to actively owned 
franchised operations.  
To investigate this, I examined the effect of management type (active vs. passive) on the 
adoption of a high performance work system in the subsample of franchisee-owned hotels 
(n=178), controlling for relevant establishment and labor market characteristics. Since franchisee 
owner-operators and hired managers may have different levels of experience that could also 
explain variation in HR practices, respondent (GM) experience in the hotel industry is also 
included as a control variable15. The results are presented in Appendix 2.4 (Table A) and provide 
preliminary support for the efficiency wage argument: there is a negative relationship between 
active ownership and high performance work practices (β = -0.13, p <0.10). Or put differently, 
compared to actively owned franchised operations, passively owned franchised operations are 
associated with greater adoption of a high performance work system.  
Given the modest level of significance, the above results should be interpreted with 
caution. To be sure, the HR practices of passively owned operations are in no way equivalent to 
those of company operations, despite the presence of theoretically similar monitoring problems. 
In fact, the results presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicate that franchised operations (across 
                                                            
15 As noted earlier, the primary respondent was the GM. Of the 178 responses from franchisee-owned hotels, only 
11 were by someone other than the “Owner” or “General Manager”. As a result, respondent experience is a good 
measure of GM (franchisee owner-operator or hired manager) experience in this study. 
94 
 
management types) are fairly homogenous in their practices and significantly different from 
company operations. As further evidence, a one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences in 
HR practices among the three ownership types (company, active, and passive). The results are 
presented in Appendix 2.4 (Table B). Adoption of a high performance work system differed 
significantly across the three ownership forms. Post hoc comparisons indicate that company 
owned operations have significantly higher adoption of a high performance work system than 
both actively owned and passively owned franchised operations. Likewise, when the high 
performance work system is broken down into the components of skills, work design, and 
incentives, company-owned operations are significantly different from both types of franchisee-
owned hotels on all three indices. Comparisons between actively owned and passively owned 
franchised operations also reveal that the two types of hotels differ with regards to the work 
design index and the skills index (the latter at a moderate level of significance, p <0.10; not 
shown in table), but not on the incentives index, contrary to the efficiency wage explanation.  
The failure to find significant differences in the incentives index between active and 
passively owned franchised units provides strong support for the free riding hypothesis because 
the practices associated with this index are those that are likely to have the greatest explicit costs 
to franchisees (e.g. wages, benefits, employment security) and as such, actively resisted. Support 
for this can be found in the case study of a franchisee-owned hotel conducted by the author. 
Although the hotel was passively owned, management indicated that compensation was an area 
where the owners exercised decision-making authority:  
There are three areas of this hotel that are not competitive and we’ve discussed it since 
we opened the hotel…where the owners basically made the decision that no, we’re not 
going to go there and those areas are the 401(k) employer match,…offering the 
employees an employee meal free every day, and picking up a percentage of dependent 
coverage in healthcare [emphasis added].  – Director of Human Resources  
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In contrast, other practices may face less resistance from owners because the costs are less clear 
and/or because they may be easier for management to adopt without necessarily requiring 
approval from owners. However, the fact that passively owned operations also significantly 
differ from company operations with regards to the work design index and the skills index seems 
to indicate that franchisees exercise some degree of control here too16.  
Another way to examine whether variation in practices is due to free riding versus 
monitoring differences would be to examine the effects of multiunit ownership. As Ji and Weil 
(2010) argue, a multi-unit franchisee faces the same monitoring problems as company-owned 
operations. Consequently, we should expect to see the adoption of efficiency wages as multi-unit 
ownership increases. In contrast, if free-riding behavior is driving differences in practices, we 
should not see differences in the adoption of HR practices as franchisees operate more units, 
unless the franchisee becomes sufficiently large in scale that free riding behavior negatively 
affects sales in their own units17. In separate analyses (not shown), I estimate the effects of 
franchisee multiunit ownership on the high performance work system dependent variable, 
controlling for establishment and labor market characteristics. The relationship between 
                                                            
16 In light of these results, the negative effect of active ownership (relative to passive ownership) on HR systems in 
Appendix 2.4, Table A may actually be reflecting differences in control as opposed to efficiency wages. Since 
franchisees are motivated by the profits of their unit, their incentives to cut costs and reduce quality (i.e. free ride on 
the brand name) should be greatest, or most visible, in those operations where franchisees have the ability to directly 
influence day-to-day operations. This includes the management of employees and the specific HR practices used. In 
contrast, the franchisee’s profit motive (although present) is likely to be attenuated by the presence of hired 
managers because passive franchisees are unable to exert control over all aspects of operations. 
17 This rests on the assumption that franchisees own multiple units within the same brand so that when they become 
large enough in scale, they begin to operate under similar incentives as company-owned operations that are 
concerned with brand image and the success of the chain as a whole. While multiunit ownership within the same 
brand is common in some industries and chains, such as McDonald’s, it may be less prevalent in the hotel industry. 
One reason for this is the high cost of owning and operating hotels relative to other types of franchises. Also, unlike 
restaurants, there are a limited number of hotels of the same brand in each city/region, so to the extent that 
franchisees own multiple hotels, especially in the same area, these hotels likely belong to different brands. It is 
worth noting that ownership of multiple units in different brand does not change the monitoring problem. As 
franchisees own more units, regardless of brand, monitoring becomes more difficult. If monitoring problems explain 
variation in practices, we should expect franchisee multiunit ownership of any kind to be positively associated with 
the adoption of efficiency wages and high performance work practices more generally. 
96 
 
multiunit ownership and high performance work systems is not significant, again consistent with 
the free riding explanation. 
These findings suggest that variation in HR practices across ownership forms is due, at 
least in part, to franchisee free riding behavior. This is not to say that franchisees do not also 
have a greater ability to monitor their employees than managers in company operations, as those 
adopting an efficiency wage perspective have suggested. One way to tease out free riding and 
monitoring explanations would be to examine the effects of both franchise ownership and HR 
practices on employee behaviors and organizational outcomes. Efficiency wage theory predicts 
that monitoring differences lead to the adoption of efficiency wages because of their (positive) 
effects on outcomes such as productivity and shirking. Thus, examining the extent to which HR 
practices actually influence outcomes such as turnover and extra-role behaviors and how this 
may differ across ownership forms can provide us with greater insights into the causes and 
consequences of franchisee and franchisor/company manager behavior, including the reasons 
why franchisors allow franchisees to make lower investments in HR practices. This approach is 
also consistent with research in strategic human resource management that aims to examine how 
HR practices affect outcomes, and can provide much needed insights on the HR-performance 
relationship in different organizational contexts.  
This study contributes to our understanding of the determinants of HR practices and job 
quality in the service sector. Divergent ownership incentives lead to significant differences in HR 
practices across franchised and company-owned operations. This study extends our knowledge 
of franchisee behavior vis-à-vis their employees by demonstrating that differential concerns over 
brand reputation and the propensity of franchisees to free ride on the brand name not only affect 
compliance with labor and workplace policies (Ji & Weil 2010) but also willingness to make 
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human resource investments more generally. Revisiting the question of whether franchisees are 
“bad employers”, the evidence presented here contrasts with that found by Cappelli and Hamori 
(2008). Compared to company operations, franchisees make fewer investments in their 
employees. The question remains however, are franchisees truly bad employers?   
One consideration is whether franchisees are profit maximizing agents as a product of 
circumstance. First, to the extent that franchisors distance themselves from the employment 
matters of their franchisees, franchisees may be left with little guidance as to how HR systems 
should be structured in their operations to achieve optimal performance. In support of this, 
research indicates that franchisees are inexperienced with business and human resources (Davlin 
2007; Royle 2000), and this inexperience may be one of the factors driving the decision to 
purchase a franchise in the first place. Recognizing the importance of HR practices in franchises 
(Castrogiovanni & Kidwell 2010), some hotel chains have recently started to provide franchisees 
with tools and suggestions for effective human resource management (Zappone 2011). Future 
research should examine whether the provision of such tools leads franchisees to make greater 
investments in strategic HR practices.  
Second, a common complaint among franchisees concerns their profit margins. For 
example, franchisees and their proponents have argued that franchisees operate in highly 
competitive industries with low profit margins (Sherman 2013). On the one hand, this might 
suggest that franchisees operate in more competitive markets than company-owned operations. 
But even controlling for any such differences – as this study does through careful sample 
selection and the inclusion of key establishment and market characteristics – franchisees may 
require higher profit margins in order to make purchasing a franchise a worthwhile endeavor. As 
Krueger (1991) argues, franchisees bear inefficient risk because they invest a considerable 
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proportion of their wealth and income in the franchised operation. This may lead franchisees to 
require a higher rate of return on their investment than similar company operations. One way to 
achieve this might be to cut costs by economizing on HR practices. Just how high rates of return 
must be, though, is unclear. For example, Shelton (1967) found that the profit margin in 
restaurants under franchise ownership was 9.5% compared to 1.5% under company ownership. 
In addition, while investments in HR practices increase costs in the short term, they have been 
linked to higher financial performance over the long term, including sales growth (Batt 2002) 
and profitability (Huselid 1995). Finally, as Ji and Weil (2010) aptly note, budget constraints 
(and arguably, required rates of return) should decline as multi-unit ownership increases, in turn 
allowing for greater investments in HR practices. As discussed earlier however, multiunit 
ownership was not found to be significantly related to HR practices in this study. Further 
investigation is therefore needed to better understand how profit margins may affect franchisee 
behavior in relation to the management of their employees.  
There are several limitations to this study. First, the findings of the hotel industry may not 
generalize to all industries. Although the hotel industry shares many characteristics with other 
industries that engage in franchising, there may be unique attributes of franchising in other 
industries that moderate the relationships between ownership form and HR practices found here. 
For example, the restaurant industry is characterized by the presence of more active ownership 
and within-brand multi-unit ownership. While active ownership and multi-unit ownership did not 
significantly affect investments in HR practices relative to company ownership in the present 
study, future research should examine their effects in other industries.  
Second, the focus on a limited service hotel chain may limit generalizability to other 
chains. Examining HR practices in a limited service hotel chain is valuable because franchising 
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is a common strategy in this market segment. Establishments in this type of chain are also 
smaller, which increases the reliability of findings, and are typically unorganized, which allows 
for the separation of union and ownership effects. Future research should examine whether the 
findings here extend to chains in other market segments. In addition, research should examine 
whether the findings apply to chains that vary in the degree of franchisor involvement in 
franchised operations. Although legal liability concerns similarly affect all franchise businesses, 
there is evidence that some franchisors, such as McDonald’s, exert much more control over their 
franchisees (Royle 2000). As noted above, some chains have also begun to influence personnel 
practices in their franchised operations through the provision of optional tools and suggestions. 
Additional research is needed to understand how differences in chain-level governance affect the 
structure of HR systems across ownership forms.   
Third, while this study focused on investments in HR practices for the group of 
employees that are responsible for the intangible aspects of service delivery, namely front of 
house workers, future research could also valuably extend the current analyses to other 
occupational groups, such as back of house workers who are responsible for delivering the more 
tangible aspects of service production (e.g. room cleanliness in hotels or meals in restaurants).  
Finally, as is common with other cross-sectional studies, we must be cautious about 
drawing conclusions regarding causality. While this study included rich controls to rule out 
alternative explanations, longitudinal research designs that control for unobserved establishment 
characteristics and include analyses of management practices as establishments change 
ownership forms would provide greater confidence in causal inferences (e.g. Freedman & 
Kosová 2012).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper examined the relationship between ownership form and investments in HR 
practices in a plural form franchise system. The analysis builds on past research and theory on 
comparative ownership incentives and management practices by investigating variation in a 
collection of strategic HR practices in a limited service hotel chain. The evidence points to 
significant differences in practices across franchised and company-owned operations, and 
suggests that franchisees free ride on the brand name by cutting costs and investments in human 
capital.  
 The findings of this study shed light on how strategic choices regarding the organization 
and ownership of production can affect the management of employees and work organization in 
networked firms. Differential investments in human capital may, in turn, have important 
consequences for the quality of jobs that workers experience and the success of interconnected 
operations. Further empirical work is needed to fully comprehend the causes and implications of 
the findings presented here. Future work should also extend the analyses to other industry, 
organizational, and network contexts. 
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APPENDIX 2.1
Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables 
Annual Salary The base hourly wage for most FOH employees times the number of hours the typical FOH employee works per week times 52 weeks. 
Benefits 
The number of benefits provided to FOH employees (maximum of 6): paid vacation/holidays, paid 
sick leave, other paid leaves of absence, employer subsidized health insurance, defined benefit or 
defined contribution pension plan with employer contribution, and free/discounted meals. 
Education The average number of years of completed schooling for FOH employees in the hotel.  
Percent Full Time The proportion of the workforce that is full-time. 
Information Sharing The percentage of FOH employees that regularly receive information regarding hotel goals, objectives, and performance. 
Meetings The percentage of FOH employees that are involved in regularly scheduled meetings to discuss work-related issues. 
Discretion  
A 4-item index of discretion over work methods/procedures, what to say to customers, handling 
additional customer requests, handling customer complaints (each item was measured with a 1 to 5 
Likert-scale type question with anchors “not at all” and “a great deal”; the mean response  for the 4 
questions was 3.91) (alpha = 0.79). 
Initial Training The number of hours of initial training that FOH employees receive in their first year, including orientation and job-related training. 
Time to Proficiency  
The number of days it takes for a new hire with little or no experience to become fully proficient 
on the job, meaning they are thoroughly competent in all aspects of the job and able to work 
independently during busy periods with little or no supervision. 
Internal Mobility The percentage of FOH employees typically promoted to higher positions in the hotel or promoted or transferred to other hotels within the company. 
Cost to Recruit, Screen 
and Train New 
Employees 
The approximate cost to recruit, screen and train a new FOH employee, including direct costs as 
well as management time. 
Formal Selection  The extent to which the establishment relies on formal assessment methods to determine the suitability of job candidates (on a 1-4 scale, with anchors “not at all” and “to a great extent”).  
High Performance 
Work System An index of the 12 HR practices listed above, standardized and averaged. 
Independent Variables 
Ownership: Franchise Whether the hotel is owned by a franchisee (1) or owned/managed by corporate (0). 
Control Variables 
Establishment Age Number of years since establishment opened. 
Establishment Size Number of rooms in the hotel. 
Location A series of indicators for the hotel’s location: Airport, city center, resort, suburban or highway (omitted category). 
RevPAR The average annual revenue per available room (RevPAR) for each hotel in the prior year.  
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate in the county where the hotel is located (drawn from 2012 Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BLS 2013a).    
Union Density 
Private sector union density in the metropolitan area where the hotel is located (drawn from 2012 
Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, Hirsch and Macpherson 
2013).  
Median Wage Median hourly wage for hotel desk clerks in the metropolitan area where the hotel is located (drawn from Occupational Employment Statistics Survey, SOC code 434081, BLS 2013b).  
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APPENDIX 2.2 
The Effect of Franchise Ownership on High Performance Work Systema  
[Including Workforce Controls] 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Franchise     -0.45*** 0.05 
Est. Age   0.01*** 0.00 0.001 0.002 
Est. Size   0.003*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Airport   -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.06 
City Center   0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Resort   -0.13 0.11 -0.05 0.10 
Suburb   0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05 
RevPAR   0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Unemployment    -0.001 0.011 -0.004 0.010 
Union Density   -0.005 0.007 -0.005 0.006 
Median Wage   0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 
FOH Age -0.01* 0.00 -0.003 0.003 -0.01* 0.00 
FOH Female -0.002** 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
FOH Tenure 0.01* 0.01 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 
(Constant) 0.33** 0.11 -0.55* 0.25 0.18 0.25 
 F = 4.87** F = 7.97*** F = 13.73*** 
 R2 = 0.04 R2 = 0.21 R2 =0.33 
N = 483; *** at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, † at the 0.10 level 
a Two decimal places are reported for each statistic. Small coefficients (< 0.004) have been rounded to three places 
to aid interpretability.     
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APPENDIX 2.3 
The Effect of Franchise Ownership on Components of the HR Systema 
[Skills Index, Work Design Index, and Incentives Index] 
 
 Skills Index Work Design Index Incentives Index 
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Franchise -0.37*** 0.06 -0.40*** 0.10 -0.55*** 0.08 
Est. Age -0.001 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.01† 0.00 
Est. Size 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.002* 0.001 
Airport 0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.08 
City Center 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.16* 0.08 
Resort -0.04 0.12 -0.38* 0.19 0.21 0.15 
Suburb 0.06 0.05 -0.11 0.08 0.04 0.07 
RevPAR 0.000 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.002 0.002 
Unemployment  -0.01 0.01 0.03† 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Union Density 0.003 0.007 -0.01 0.01 -0.005 0.009 
Median Wage -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.11*** 0.03 
(Constant) 0.32 0.25 -0.15 0.40 -1.16*** 0.31 
 F = 8.65*** F = 3.42*** F = 21.88*** 
 R2 = 0.19 R2 = 0.08 R2 =0.35 
N = 483; *** at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, † at the 0.10 level 
a Two decimal places are reported for each statistic. Small coefficients (< 0.004) have been rounded to three places 
to aid interpretability.     
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APPENDIX 2.4 
 
Table A: The Effect of Franchise Management on High Performance Work Systema 
  High Performance Work System 
Variable  Coeff. S.E. 
Active Managementb  -0.13† 0.07 
Est. Age  0.02† 0.01 
Est. Size  0.004** 0.001 
Airport  -0.01 0.12 
City Center  0.23* 0.10 
Resort  -0.08 0.15 
Suburb  -0.03 0.10 
RevPAR  0.003 0.002 
Unemployment   -0.02 0.02 
Union Density  -0.004 0.012 
Median Wage  0.02 0.04 
GM Experience  0.003 0.004 
(Constant)  -0.84* 0.35 
  F = 2.64** 
  R2 = 0.20 
N = 178; *** at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, † at the 0.10 level 
a Two decimal places are reported for each statistic. Small coefficients (< 0.004) have been rounded to three places 
to aid interpretability.     
b Active Management = 1 if franchised establishment managed by owner; = 0 if managed by hired manager. 
 
 
Table B: One-Way ANOVA of High Performance Work System (HPWS) and Components 
by Ownership Type  
  
Company-Owned 
Active  
Franchisee-Owned 
Passive  
Franchisee-Owned 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. F 
HPWS 0.17a 0.30 -0.39b 0.41 -0.25c 0.36 98.772*** 
Skills Index 0.13a 0.38 -0.34b 0.36 -0.19b 0.43 47.416*** 
Work Design Index 0.12a 0.56 -0.41b 0.97 -0.08c 0.73 17.577*** 
Incentives Index 0.26a 0.50 -0.48b 0.60 -0.44b 0.56 97.165*** 
N = 483; *** = p<0.001. Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p<0.05 level 
using Tukey HSD post hoc paired comparisons. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OWNERSHIP MATTERS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE, HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES, AND PERFORMANCE IN A 
FRANCHISE SYSTEM 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationship between ownership form, human resource practices, and 
employee and organizational outcomes in a franchise system. Integrating strategic human 
resource management theory and agency theory, I develop and test a theoretical model of how 
differences between franchise and company forms of ownership affect the HR-performance 
relationship. Based on survey and objective customer satisfaction data from 483 establishments 
in a limited service hotel chain, I find that investments in human resource practices are positively 
related to employee service-oriented organizational citizenship behaviors and customer 
satisfaction in both franchised and company-owned hotels. I also find that franchise ownership is 
associated with lower investments in human resource practices compared to company ownership, 
but the negative effects of these lower investments are offset by the positive direct effects of 
franchise ownership on both employee behavior and customer outcomes. The results suggest that 
agency theory is valuable for examining how differences in ownership form influence 
management practices and outcomes, and highlight the importance of examining the 
organizational context within which HR practices influence performance. 
Keywords: ownership, franchise, human resources, service-oriented OCBs, customer 
satisfaction, agency theory 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The field of strategic human resource management (SHRM) has made considerable 
progress in understanding the relationship between investments in human resource (HR) 
practices and their effects on organizational performance. Practices such as comprehensive 
recruitment and selection procedures, formal training, incentive compensation, and employee 
participation in decision making have been linked to employee outcomes such as human capital, 
commitment, and turnover, which in turn positively influence organizational outcomes (Combs, 
Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006). 
 However, this research has not paid much attention to the larger context within which HR 
practices influence performance. To the extent that context has been examined, it has taken the 
form of control variables or at best, moderators such as business strategy or industry (Batt & 
Hermans 2012). Nevertheless, understanding the organizational context within which firms 
operate is vital because HR practices do not operate in isolation. They are implemented along 
with other management policies and in the presence of organizational variables that may affect 
not only the propensity to invest in HR practices but also organizational performance (Becker & 
Huselid 2006). Accounting for these factors can help avoid omitted variable biases and provide 
insight regarding the conditions under which investments in HR practices are most likely to 
occur and be worthwhile (Batt & Banerjee 2012). This is also necessary for the theoretical 
development of the field as it can help build contingencies into SHRM theory as well as help 
resolve longstanding questions of causality by providing a greater theoretical basis for examining 
the HR-performance relationship (Becker & Huselid 2006; Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006). 
This paper contributes to the SHRM literature by examining how a key element of 
organizational context, ownership structure, affects the HR-performance relationship. I focus on 
a particular form of ownership that has witnessed significant growth in recent decades, 
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franchising, and examine how strategic decisions to own or franchise units affect investments in 
HR practices and organizational outcomes.  
Franchising is a strategy for growth in many service-related industries and typically 
entails the simultaneous operation of replicated units that are either owned and operated by the 
company or by an independent franchisee (Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni 2004). Under the 
franchise form of ownership, a company (franchisor) grants an entrepreneur (franchisee) the 
right to sell its product or service using its brand name and business practices in an exchange for 
an upfront lump sum and ongoing royalties. A number of explanations have been put forward to 
understand why firms decide to franchise. The most commonly accepted explanation is 
minimizing agency costs. According to agency theory, franchising reduces the agency costs of 
adverse selection and moral hazard commonly associated with managers in the company form of 
ownership by turning franchisees into residual claimants (Shane 1998). Franchisees are highly 
motivated by their investments and the profits of their operations and are therefore less likely to 
shirk and more likely to closely monitor employees than company managers. Although the 
franchise form of ownership helps to resolve vertical agency problems, it also brings forth its 
own set of costs, or horizontal agency problems, through the potential to free ride on the efforts 
of other units (Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short 2011). Since franchisees only receive the profits 
from their own operations, they have an incentive to cut costs and quality while still benefiting, 
at least in the short-term, from the shared brand name and the investments of the franchisor and 
other franchisees. 
Integrating SHRM theory with agency theory, I develop and test a theoretical model of 
how ownership form influences investments in HR practices, employee behavior, and ultimately, 
customer satisfaction. Specifically, I develop the following arguments: 1) investments in HR 
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practices will be positively related to employee service-oriented organizational citizenship 
behaviors because they provide employees with the skills, motivation, and opportunities to 
engage in discretionary customer service behaviors that benefit operations; 2) these discretionary 
behaviors will create external service value for customers and as a result, have a positive effect 
on customer satisfaction; 3) the agency costs of franchising and in particular, the propensity of 
franchisees to free ride on the efforts of other units will result in lower investments in strategic 
HR practices in franchised operations compared to company-owned operations. Franchise 
ownership will therefore have an indirect negative relationship with service-oriented employee 
behaviors and customer satisfaction; 4) at the same time, the agency benefits of franchising and 
in particular, the incentives of franchisees to closely supervise employees and put forth maximal 
effort given their residual claimant status will lead franchise ownership to have direct positive 
effects on both employee service-oriented behaviors and customer satisfaction.  
Figure 3.1 depicts this model and highlights the importance of examining how 
organizational context affects the HR-performance relationship. On the one hand, the model 
suggests that HR practices influence employee and organizational outcomes, consistent with 
extant theory and evidence in SHRM. On the other hand, drawing on agency theory, the model 
suggests that ownership structure directly influences both investments in HR practices and 
employee and organizational outcomes. As a result, investments in HR practices may not have 
the expected effect on organizational performance. In the case of franchised operations, lower 
investments in HR practices may not lead to lower organizational performance overall because 
the negative indirect effects of lower HR investments may be offset by the positive direct effects 
of franchise ownership on both employee behaviors and customer satisfaction. 
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To test this model, I draw on a unique establishment level survey of HR practices in a 
limited service hotel chain. I also link this data to objective customer satisfaction data from 
corporate records and TripAdvisor.com. Hotels are an appropriate context for this study because 
the hotel industry is one of the most highly franchised industries in the U.S., and investments in 
HR practices have been shown to affect performance outcomes in this industry (Hoque 1999; 
Sun, Aryee, & Law 2007). I focus on customer satisfaction because it is a strategically important 
outcome for franchise businesses and the service sector more generally. Moreover, given the 
active role of the customer in the service production process (Batt 2002), HR investments and 
employee behaviors are likely to have a clear and immediate impact on customer satisfaction, 
which has in turn been linked to more distal outcomes such as financial performance (Heskett, 
Jones, Loveman, Sasser, & Schlesinger 1994).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Theoretical Model Linking Ownership to HR Practices, Service-Oriented 
OCBs, and Customer Satisfaction 
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performance. Researchers in strategic human resource management have often used the ability-
motivation-opportunity (AMO) model of HRM to understand how the different dimensions of 
HR systems relate to employee and organizational performance (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & 
Kalleberg 2000; Delery & Shaw 2001). According to the AMO model, performance-enhancing 
HR practices fall along three complementary dimensions: practices that invest in the skills and 
training of the workforce (the “ability” or skills dimension), practices that motivate employees to 
make long-term commitments to their organizations and encourage discretionary effort (the 
“motivation” or incentives dimension), and practices that provide employees with opportunities 
to use their skills and substantively contribute (the “opportunity” or work design dimension). 
Investments in HR practices therefore not only enhance employees’ knowledge, skills and 
abilities (KSAs), but also motivate and empower employees to leverage those KSAs to achieve 
organizational objectives. In the service context, the result is improved organizational 
performance, such as customer satisfaction, because skilled employees who have discretion and 
are rewarded for their behaviors are better able and more likely to interact with customers in 
ways that enhance the overall service experience (Batt 2002). This includes, for example, 
effectively responding to customer needs and inquiries and immediately resolving problems.  
One way that investments in HR practices may improve customer satisfaction is through 
their effects on employees’ positive, discretionary behavior. Discretionary or “extra-role” 
behavior is particularly important in dynamic environments where desired employee behaviors 
cannot be specified or predicted in advance (Van Dyne & LePine 1998). Interactive service work 
provides an example of such an environment. The intangible nature and the coproduction of 
services by employees and customers results in complexity and uncertainty, and often requires 
firms to rely on their direct contact employees to act in ways that will benefit their organization 
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(Morrison 1996). This may include a range of activities from more general emotion management 
to specific behaviors that go above and beyond formal job descriptions to satisfy customers at the 
time of service delivery. As a result, investments in HR practices can provide employees in 
service organizations with the requisite KSAs, motivation, and opportunities to engage in 
customer service enhancing extra-role behavior (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006). 
The relationship between HR practices and extra-role behaviors, often conceptualized as 
organizational citizenship behaviors, has also been theorized in SHRM research using social 
exchange theory (McClean & Collins 2011; Morrison 1996; Sun, Aryee, & Law 2007). 
Investments in HR practices are said to foster high-quality relationships with employees based 
on the norm of reciprocity. In line with the inducement-contribution model (March & Simon 
1958), HR practices are viewed as an inducement, signaling the employer’s long-term 
commitment to employees. This creates a sense of obligation on the part of employees, who 
reciprocate and express their commitment to employers by contributing behaviors (i.e. increased 
effort and citizenship behaviors) that benefit the organization.   
Therefore, investments in HR practices such as comprehensive recruitment and selection 
procedures, formal training, job security, incentive compensation, and employee participation in 
decision making, should, all other things equal, lead to higher organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCBs). The specific OCBs that are important for employees are likely to vary by 
context ((Borman & Motowidlo 1993). In the case of services, scholars have identified service-
oriented OCBs that are likely to be appropriate for customer contact employees. This includes 
behaviors that focus on loyalty (e.g. saying good things about the organization), participation 
(e.g. offering suggestions for service improvement), and service delivery (e.g. helping customers 
beyond what is expected) (Bettencourt 1997; Bettencourt, Gwinner, & Meuter 2001). 
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Accordingly, we should expect investments in HR practices to be positively related to 
customer satisfaction and service-oriented OCBs in hotels. Moreover, since franchisee-owned 
and company-owned units are replicated service operations, this should hold across ownership 
forms. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investments in HR practices will be positively related to customer satisfaction and 
employee service-oriented OCBs. 
 
Employee behavior plays an important role in shaping the customer’s experience of 
service quality and overall satisfaction (Schneider, Ehrhart, Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-Jolly 2005). 
Customer contact employees are responsible for delivering external service value and their 
interactions with customers can influence future purchasing behavior (Borucki & Burke 1999; 
Heskett, Jones, Loveman, Sasser, & Schlesinger 1994). Positive interactions can result in repeat 
patronage and increased sales while negative interactions can lead customers to switch service 
providers (Morrison 1996). This, in turn, can have significant implications for the profitability 
and growth of firms (Heskett, Jones, Loveman, Sasser, & Schlesinger 1994). 
In support of this, research has revealed a strong positive relationship between employee 
behavior, in the form of OCBs, and organizational outcomes in service organizations (Podsakoff 
& MacKenzie 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach 2000). For example, Walz and 
Niehoff (1996) found that OCBs were related to a variety of performance measures in limited 
service restaurants, including customer satisfaction and customer complaints. Likewise, Koys 
(2001) found a positive relationship between employee outcomes, namely employee satisfaction 
and OCBs, and organizational effectiveness, measured as customer satisfaction and profitability, 
in a longitudinal study of a restaurant chain. Customer and service-oriented OCBs are especially 
likely to influence organizational performance in service organizations because these employee 
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behaviors are targeted at improving the overall service experience (Podsakoff & MacKenzie 
1997). In support of this, Bettencourt and Brown (1997) found a positive relationship between 
customer service OCBs and customer satisfaction in their sample of bank branches. Similarly, 
Schneider et al (2005) found that customer focused OCBs were positively related to customer 
satisfaction and ultimately, sales in their sample of departments in a supermarket chain. Also 
noteworthy given the focus on HR practices in this study as a predictor of customer satisfaction 
and service-oriented OCBs (Hypothesis 1), Sun et al (2007) demonstrated a positive relationship 
between high performance HR practices, service-oriented OCBs, and turnover and productivity, 
which have been theoretically linked to customer satisfaction and loyalty (Heskett, Jones, 
Loveman, Sasser, & Schlesinger 1994).  
Therefore, to the extent that investments in HR practices lead to greater service-oriented 
OCBs, we should expect improvements in customer satisfaction across franchised and company 
hotels in this study. This suggests the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Employee service-oriented OCBs will be positively related to customer 
satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Employee service-oriented OCBs will mediate the relationship between 
investments in HR practices and customer satisfaction. 
 
 
Agency Theory: Franchisee and Company Manager Incentives  
 
 Although the above hypotheses suggest that investments in HR practices will have 
similar effects across franchised and company operations, there may be reasons to expect 
differences in the extent to which franchisee-owned and company-owned units actually invest in 
HR practices. In addition, ownership structure may directly affect employee behavior and 
customer satisfaction. Agency theory provides a basis for examining these assertions. 
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 Beginning with investments in HR practices, agency theory suggests that franchisees may 
have an incentive to free ride on the brand name by reducing quality and therefore costs in order 
to maximize their bottom line (Kidwell, Nygaard, & Silkoset 2007). Since franchisees only 
receive the profits from their own operations, they directly benefit from reducing costs. In 
addition, since franchisees share their revenues with franchisors through royalties, reducing costs 
allows franchisees to increase their take home pay without having to share the benefits with 
franchisors as they would if they were to increase sales (Felstead 1993). This may, in turn, lead 
franchisees to focus on cost savings (Ji & Weil 2010).  
 One way to cut costs in franchised operations may be to reduce labor quality (Michael 
2000). Although labor is an important resource in service operations, as discussed above, it also 
constitutes the highest expense, accounting for almost 50% of operating expenses in some 
industries (Mandelbaum 2004). In addition, while franchisors retain strict control over most 
aspects of franchise operations, there is increasing evidence that decisions over the staffing and 
management of employees are decentralized to franchisees because of franchisor concerns over 
liability (Lakhani 2013). As a result, the desire to maximize profits could lead franchisees to 
free-ride on labor quality by underinvesting in HR practices. Although this would have negative 
consequences for franchised operations (and the chain as a whole) in the long-term, franchisees 
are likely to benefit, at least financially, from such actions in the short-term (Kidwell & Nygaard 
2010).  
 Free riding behavior may not be the only reason to expect variation in HR investments 
across ownership forms, however. An alternative perspective is provided by Krueger (1991) and 
more recently, Freedman and Kosova (2012). These scholars argue that agency problems 
associated with company ownership, as opposed to franchise ownership, may lead to variation in 
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HR practices. Since company managers do not receive the residual profits from their units, they 
have a stronger incentive to shirk. This includes the monitoring and supervision of employees. In 
contrast, the residual claimant status of franchisees provides them with much stronger incentives 
to closely supervise employees and output. To address this agency problem, franchisors may 
provide employees in company operations with efficiency, or above market, wages to improve 
productivity and discourage shirking (Freedman & Kosová 2012). Efficiency wages work in 
much the same way as other investments in HR practices, that is by improving human capital and 
employee motivation (Jiang, Lepak, Jia, & Baer 2012). Since HR practices have additive effects 
(Batt 2002) and are most effective when adopted as a bundle or system of practices (MacDuffie 
1995), franchisors who adopt efficiency wages may also be more likely to invest in other HR 
practices such as formal training, job security, and participative work designs.   
 Both the free riding and efficiency wage explanations lead to the same prediction 
regarding investments in HR practices across ownership forms, albeit for different reasons. 
Specifically, all other things equal, franchisees will be associated with lower investments in HR 
practices compared to company owned operations. In light of Hypothesis 1, which suggests a 
positive relationship between investments in HR practices and employee service-oriented OCBs, 
lower investments in HR practices by franchisees will, in turn, have a negative effect on 
employee service-oriented OCBs1. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Franchise ownership (compared to company ownership) will be negatively related 
to investments in HR practices. 
 
                                                 
1 This is true even though franchisees are likely to benefit financially from their free riding behavior in the short-
term. As noted above, although franchisees will experience cost savings from their lower investments in HR 
practices, these lower investments are likely to have a more immediate (negative) impact on employee behaviors and 
in turn customer satisfaction. In the long-term, lower customer satisfaction is expected to also negatively affect 
financial performance (Heskett et al 1994).  
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Hypothesis 5: Franchise ownership will have an indirect negative relationship with employee 
service-oriented OCBs via lower investments in HR practices2. 
 
Although the above indicates that franchise ownership has an indirect, negative 
relationship with employee behavior and ultimately, customer satisfaction, via lower investments 
in HR practices, agency theory provides us with the basis for also expecting independent, direct 
positive relationships between franchise ownership and both of these outcomes. 
Specifically, the argument about efficiency wages rests on the assumption that 
franchisees have stronger incentives than company managers to closely supervise their 
employees because they directly benefit from their efforts to do so (Krueger 1991). Greater 
monitoring of employees can result in higher output or at the very least, ensure that employees 
are effectively performing their prescribed duties. Supporting this assertion, research suggests 
that perceived task visibility is negatively related to employee propensity to withhold effort 
because employees perceive that managers are aware of their individual contributions (Kidwell 
& Bennett 1993). As monitoring increases, perceived task visibility and thus, employee effort 
should also increase. Detert et al (2007) also provide support for the relationship between 
monitoring and employee behavior. In their study of restaurants, the authors find that managerial 
oversight is negatively related to counterproductive behavior in the form of food loss. 
It is worth noting that these examples refer to negative employee behaviors, such as 
withholding effort and counterproductivity, as opposed to the positive, discretionary employee 
behaviors (i.e. OCBs), discussed earlier (Kidwell & Bennett 1993). Some could argue that 
monitoring will not have the same effect on such positive behaviors. Indeed, Niehoff and 
Moorman (1993) argue that monitoring can have negative effects on OCBs because close 
                                                 
2 This hypothesis is equivalent to a mediation hypothesis where investments in HR practices mediate the relationship 
between franchise ownership and employee service-oriented OCBs. 
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supervision may prevent employees from performing duties that are not rewarded as part of their 
job description. At the same time, they also find that monitoring increases employee perceptions 
of justice and fairness, which are positively related to citizenship behavior.  
Research on the effects of performance monitoring on employee well-being and behavior 
also provides noteworthy insights on the likely outcomes of higher supervision in franchisee-
owned operations. On the one hand, performance monitoring has been linked to increased job 
stress and over time, higher turnover (Carayon 1993; Shaw et al 1998). The intensity of 
performance monitoring has also been linked to lower employee well-being, measured as 
depression, anxiety, emotional exhaustion, and job satisfaction (Holman et al 2002). On the other 
hand, scholars have found that some aspects of performance monitoring, such as the 
performance-related content of monitoring and the extent to which monitoring is used for 
developmental purposes, are related to increased employee well-being, including lower 
depression and higher job satisfaction (Chalykoff and Kochan 1993; Holman et al 2002). 
Moreover, Holman et al (2002) found that higher perceived intensity of monitoring leads to 
increased employee attention to tasks and efforts to regulate behavior through surface acting. The 
authors suggest that this may result in greater depletion of cognitive resource over time, which 
may explain the negative relationship between the intensity of monitoring and employee well-
being. Together, these findings suggest that performance monitoring can have positive and 
negative effects. Further, while greater monitoring and managerial oversight may lead to 
negative employee outcomes in the long-term, such as higher stress and turnover, they are likely 
to have positive effects on visible employee behaviors, such as service-oriented OCBs, in the 
short-term. The latter is especially true in franchised operations where the perceived intensity of 
performance monitoring, via direct supervision, will be high. 
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In addition, although OCBs are defined as “extra-role” behaviors and differentiated from 
“in-role” behaviors, which are required and rewarded as part of one’s job duties (Van Dyne & 
LePine 1998), in some cases, it may be difficult for employees to differentiate between extra-role 
and in-role behaviors (Morrison 1994). This may occur, for instance, when job descriptions are 
broad and open-ended. Recent research on franchisee and company HR systems reveals that 
franchised operations are less likely than company-owned operations to have standardized and 
narrow job descriptions (Lakhani 2013). This may lead employees to define their job 
responsibilities more broadly (Morrison 1994), and in turn, engage in OCBs under franchise 
ownership due to greater monitoring. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Franchise ownership (compared to company ownership) will have a direct 
positive relationship with employee service-oriented OCBs. 
 
Combined, Hypothesis 5 and 6 suggest that the net effect of franchise ownership on employee 
service-oriented OCBs will be close to zero. Put differently, the indirect or mediated negative 
effect of franchise ownership on employee service-oriented OCBs via lower investments in HR 
practices, and the positive direct effect of franchise ownership on employee service-oriented 
OCBs will cancel each other out so that the total effect of franchise ownership (i.e. the direct 
effect + the indirect effect) is small and non-significant. This is referred to as “inconsistent 
mediation” because the mediator, in this case investments in HR practices, acts as a suppressor 
variable (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz 2007). Thus, the following hypothesis is also set 
forward. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The total effect of franchise ownership on employee service-oriented OCBs will be 
small and not significant. 
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 Just as franchisees have a strong incentive to monitor employee behavior, they also have 
a strong incentive to maximize output, such as sales and customer service, because doing so 
directly impacts their bottom line. Franchisees internalize the consequences of their behavior 
through the profits of their operations (Bradach 1998). Agency theory suggests that these high-
powered ownership incentives lead to greater operational efficiency in franchisee-owned 
operations compared to company-owned operations (Michael 2009). There is some empirical 
support for the positive effect of franchise ownership on operational outcomes. For example, 
Shelton (1967) found that restaurants were more profitable under franchise ownership compared 
to company ownership. 
 On the other hand, there is also evidence that the incentive for franchisees to free ride on 
the brand name, discussed earlier, will lead to lower quality in franchised operations compared to 
company operations. Michael (2000) provides support for this by demonstrating that quality, as 
measured by customer reports, is negatively related to the percent of franchising in restaurant 
and hotel chains. Although this is likely to occur indirectly through labor cost reducing strategies 
that increase short-term profits, such as lower investments in HR practices as hypothesized 
above, franchisees are also likely to exert significant direct effort in providing superior customer 
service in their own units since unit level income is inherently tied to their efforts. Such superior 
customer service by franchisees may be achieved, for example, through greater responsiveness to 
customer needs and/or the personal interactions between franchisee owners and customers. 
Consistent with this, Schneider et al (2005) note that leaders can sometimes interact with 
customers, directly impacting customer satisfaction and sales. This is especially likely in 
franchised operations since these operations tend to be small and active ownership is often a 
requirement for franchisees (Combs & Ketchen 2003; Michael & Combs 2008).  
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Accordingly, we should expect a direct, positive relationship between franchise 
ownership and customer satisfaction. Moreover, given the hypothesized small total effect of 
franchise ownership on employee service-oriented OCBs (Hypothesis 7), the indirect effect of 
franchise ownership on customer satisfaction via employee service-oriented OCBs should also 
be small3. The total effect of franchise ownership on customer satisfaction will therefore 
primarily reflect the direct effect and is expected to be positive and significant. The following 
final hypotheses are proposed.   
 
Hypothesis 8: Franchise ownership will have a direct positive relationship with customer 
satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 9: The total effect of franchise ownership on customer satisfaction will be positive 
and significant. 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
 The data for this study come from an establishment level survey in a U.S.-based limited 
service hotel chain. Hotels are an appropriate context for this study because franchising is a 
significant and growing strategy in this industry (Michael 2000). Hotels have also been used as 
the context in previous SHRM research (Hoque 1999; Sun, Aryee, & Law 2007), suggesting that 
hotels are a relevant setting for examining the HR-performance linkage in the low-wage, 
interactive service sector. 
The survey covered questions regarding organizational characteristics, human resource 
practices, and employee behavior. The respondent, the general manager in each hotel, answered 
                                                 
3 Recall that the total effect of franchise ownership on employee service-oriented OCBs encompasses the direct 
effect of franchise ownership on employee service-oriented OCBs as well as the indirect effect of franchise 
ownership on employee service-oriented OCBs via investments in HR practices. As a result, the indirect effect of 
franchise ownership on customer satisfaction via employee service-oriented OCBs includes the effect of franchise 
ownership on investments in HR practices. 
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questions about their front-of-house (FOH) employees, the group of workers with the most 
customer contact and thus, strategic value in these establishments (Lepak & Snell 1999). 
After accounting for missing and duplicate responses, the overall response rate was 63% 
(n=483), with a company-owned hotel response rate of 82% (n=305) and a franchisee-owned 
hotel response rate of 46% (n=178).  
Additional establishment characteristics, such as hotel ownership, age, size, and location, 
as well as performance data were obtained from corporate records for all of the hotels in the 
chain. This includes the occupancy rate, average daily room rate, revenue per available room (an 
industry metric that combines occupancy and room rates, RevPAR), and the net promoter score 
(NPS), an industry metric for customer satisfaction. 
To gather external, independent customer satisfaction data, TripAdvisor® ratings were 
researched and linked to each hotel establishment from www.tripadvisor.com, the largest online 
travel review site. Each of these measures is discussed in detail below4.  
 
Measures 
Human Resource Practices. Investments in HR practices were measured by three indices 
reflecting the different dimensions of HR systems, discussed earlier: skills, incentives, and work 
design and a full HR index, with all of the HR practices across these dimensions combined. 
Following previous research in SHRM, all four indices are treated as additive rather than as 
latent factors because practices can act as substitutes to achieve the same effects (Batt 2002). 
Indices were created by calculating the mean of the standardized values of the practices in each 
index. The specific measures of HR practices were adapted and developed from published 
research in strategic human resource management (Batt 2002; Batt & Colvin 2011; Way 2002).  
                                                 
4 A summary of these measures can also be found in Appendix 3.1. 
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Skills index is an additive index of four variables: the extent to which formal selection 
practices are used, the average education level of FOH employees, hours of initial training, and 
time to proficiency. The first two measures reflect the extent to which the establishment invests 
in selecting a high quality workforce. Formal selection is the extent to which the establishment 
relies on formal assessment methods such as ability or personality testing and structured 
interviews to determine the suitability of job candidates (on a 1-4 scale, from “not at all” to “to a 
great extent”). Education is the average number of years of completed schooling for FOH 
employees in the hotel and reflects the general skill level of the workforce. The last two 
measures reflect establishment investments in firm-specific training. Initial training is the 
number of hours of initial training that FOH employees receive in their first year, including 
orientation and job-related training. Time to proficiency is the number of days it takes for a new 
hire to become fully proficient on the job. While initial training captures formal training, time to 
proficiency is likely to capture both formal and informal or on-the-job training. 
Incentives index is an additive index of 4 variables: annual pay, benefits, employment 
security, and opportunities for internal mobility. Annual salary is the annual salary for the typical 
FOH employee. Benefits is a count of how many of 6 benefits the hotel provides to its FOH 
employees: paid vacation/holidays, sick leave, other paid leaves, health insurance, pension, and 
meals. Employment security is measured as the proportion of the workforce that is full time. Full 
time employment can signal the employer’s commitment to employees and provides a stable 
alternative to the kind of contingent (e.g. part-time and temporary) work that characterizes many 
low wage workplaces (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, & Murnane 2003). Internal mobility is the 
percentage of FOH employees typically promoted to higher positions in the hotel or in the larger 
company. 
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Work design index is an additive index of 3 variables: the percentage of employees who 
participate in information sharing and meetings, and the extent of employee discretion. These 
variables measure the extent to which the establishment utilizes high involvement or 
participatory work practices. Information sharing is the percentage of FOH employees that 
regularly receive information regarding hotel goals, objectives and performance. Meetings is the 
percentage of FOH employees that are involved in regularly scheduled meetings to discuss work 
related issues. Discretion is a four-item scale adapted from Batt and Colvin (2011) and is the 
average extent to which FOH employees have discretion over work methods, what they say to 
customers, handling customer requests, and handling customer complaints, measured on 5-point 
Likert scales from “not at all” to “a great deal” (alpha = 0.79). 
In addition to the three separate HR system indices, the 11 HR practice variables 
described above were combined into an additive mean HR index as an overall measure of 
investments in HR practices. 
Service-Oriented OCBs. Four items measured employee service-oriented OCBs on a 5-point 
scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The items were chosen based on the literature 
and one item was included for each of the three dimensions of service-oriented OCBs: loyalty, 
service delivery, and participation (Bettencourt 1997; Bettencourt, Gwinner, & Meuter 2001). 
Loyalty is measured using one item: “says good things about the hotel to others”. Service 
delivery is measured using one item: “helps customers with problems beyond what is expected or 
required”. Participation is measured using one item: “makes constructive suggestions for service 
improvement”. One additional item was included to reflect what Bettencourt and Brown (1997) 
refer to as Cooperation: “helps workers with heavy workloads”. This is an important service-
oriented OCB as assisting coworkers can help to improve overall service delivery. Following 
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other studies (Koys 2001; Schneider, Ehrhart, Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-Jolly 2005; Sun, Aryee, & 
Law 2007), service-oriented OCB was treated as an aggregate, unit-level variable. The mean 
score of the four items was used as the measure of service-oriented OCB. The internal 
consistency of this scale was acceptable and comparable to previous studies, with an alpha 
reliability of 0.86.  
Customer Satisfaction. Customer satisfaction was measured with two variables: the net promoter 
score (NPS) for each hotel, obtained from corporate records, and the overall TripAdvisor® rating 
for each hotel. NPS measures customer loyalty and is based on the question “how likely are you 
to recommend our company [hotel] to your friends and colleagues?” (Reichheld 2003). Customer 
responses are measured on a 0 to 10 point rating scale where 0 is “not likely at all” and 10 is 
“extremely likely”. The NPS is then calculated by subtracting the percentage of detractors (those 
who respond with a 0-6) from the percentage of promoters (those who respond with a 9-10). The 
score can range from -100 to +100. The mean NPS score in the sample is 42.65, with a minimum 
of -31.0 and a maximum of 89.8.  
 The TripAdvisor® rating for each hotel is a composite measure of customer satisfaction 
based on consumer reviews of hotel experiences. The overall rating (out of 5) takes into account 
a number of factors, including the tangible and intangible elements of service delivery5. The 
latter is particularly relevant to the current study as frontline employees do not typically have the 
ability to change or influence the more tangible elements of hotel experiences, aside from hotel 
cleanliness. Although we do not have the ability to distinguish between the different aspects of 
TripAdvisor® ratings, since we are examining establishments within a single brand name chain 
                                                 
5 In some cases, TripAdvisor® breaks down the overall rating into different categories (i.e. sleep quality, location, 
rooms, service, value, and cleanliness). Although examining the relationship between our variables and these 
individual categories would be useful, this breakdown is only available for a negligible number of hotels in the 
sample. As a result, the overall rating, which is a composite score out of 5, is used in this study. 
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operating in the same limited service market segment, the tangible elements of service delivery, 
such as the type and quality of amenities, should be roughly equivalent across hotels in the 
sample6. The control variables used in this study, noted below, will also help to account for any 
differences in tangible elements of customer satisfaction ratings due to variation, for example, in 
the age, size, or location of establishments. This suggests that any residual differences in 
TripAdvisor® ratings across establishments in this study are likely to reflect intangible factors 
that can be influenced by differences in ownership, HR practices, and employee behaviors.  
It is also worth noting here that while some have suggested that TripAdvisor® ratings 
may be skewed by false reviews, recent evidence suggests that these ratings are largely reliable 
(Chua & Banerjee 2013; O'Connor 2010)7. The mean TripAdvisor® rating in the sample was 
3.81, with a minimum of 2.23 and a maximum of 4.878. Moreover, the mean number of customer 
reviews was 90 (minimum of 14 and maximum of 563), which provides us with additional 
confidence that these ratings are unlikely to be biased by a small number of false or misleading 
reviews. 
 To address the shortcomings of a single measure of customer satisfaction, a customer 
satisfaction index, measured as the mean value of the standardized net promoter score and 
TripAdvisor® rating for each hotel, is used as a dependent variable in this study.  
 
                                                 
6 This is especially true since franchisors dictate and closely monitor such aspects of operations via franchise 
agreements, operating manuals, and quality assurance inspections. 
7 TripAdvisor® also takes steps to ensure the reliability of its ratings through community policing measures (Chua 
& Banerjee 2013) and automated screening tools that help detect questionable reviews (for more information, see 
http://www.tripadvisor.com/vpages/review_mod_fraud_detect.html). 
8 To calculate the precise TripAdvisor® rating for each hotel, which is the mean of all customer reviews, the total 
number of customer reviews in each rating category (1-5) was collected (where 1 = “Terrible” and 5 = “Excellent”). 
The total number of reviews in each category was multiplied by the value for each category and added together. The 
sum was then divided by the total number of reviews to obtain the overall rating out of 5. For example, a hotel with 
100 total customer reviews, 40 reviews in the 5 category, 30 reviews in the 4 category, 20 reviews in the 3 category 
and 5 reviews in the 2 and 1 categories would have an overall TripAdvisor® rating of: 
(40x5)+(30x4)+(20x3)+(5x2)+(5x1)/100 = 3.95.  
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Franchise Ownership. Ownership was measured as a dichotomous variable where 1=franchisee-
owned hotel and 0=company-owned hotel. The ownership form of the hotel was reported by 
each respondent and confirmed using data from corporate records.  A very small percentage of 
hotels in the sample (2.7%) are company-managed but not owned. Since company-owned and 
company-managed hotels are managed in the same way and there were no significant differences 
in practices between company-owned hotels and company-managed hotels in this study, both are 
included under the category “company-owned hotels”. Previous studies have taken a similar 
approach (Freedman & Kosová 2012; Weil 2012).  
Control Variables. Several variables are included as controls. To control for establishment 
characteristics, I include establishment size, the number of rooms in the hotel, and establishment 
age, the number of years since the hotel opened, as larger and older establishments may have 
more sophisticated and mature employment systems (Jackson & Schuler 1995; Kaufman 2010). 
Further, since franchising is a relatively new strategy, hotel age is likely to be related to 
ownership status, and may also be directly related to customer satisfaction as newer hotels are 
likely to be in better condition than older hotels. I also control for the location of the hotel using 
a series of dummy variables: airport, city center, resort, suburban, and highway (omitted 
category). To control for labor market characteristics, three variables are included. Following 
previous studies, the local unemployment rate and the median wage for the main occupational 
group (hotel desk clerks in this study) control for variation in job availability and cost of living 
respectively (Batt 2001; Batt & Colvin 2011). I also control for private sector union density to 
account for the effects of union representation in the local area where the establishment is 
located. Finally, the financial performance metric RevPAR, obtained from corporate, is included 
for each hotel to control for differences in performance as higher performing establishments may 
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have a greater ability to invest in HR practices than lower performing establishments (Wright, 
Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen 2005). Higher performing establishments are also likely to have 
more resources available for maintaining and updating amenities, which can influence customer 
satisfaction. RevPAR also takes into account hotel room rates, which may affect customer 
satisfaction. 
 
Data Analysis 
 Multivariate regression analyses are first conducted. Specifically, an equation is 
estimated for each dependent (endogenous) variable in Figure 3.1. A structural equation model 
of the hypothesized relationships between franchise ownership, HR practices, employee service-
oriented OCBs, and overall customer satisfaction is then tested, controlling for relevant market 
and establishment characteristics. A structural equation model without latent variables (i.e. path 
model) is tested as most of the variables in this study, with the exception of the service-oriented 
OCB scale, are additive indices that do not require confirmatory factor analysis (Liu, van 
Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost 2013). The advantage of path analysis over traditional multivariate 
regression analyses is that it allows us to capture the direct, indirect, and total effects of the 
independent variables and simultaneously test all of the relationships in the hypothesized model 
(Lleras 2005).  
RESULTS 
Table 3.1 provides the means, standard deviations, and bi-variate correlations for the 
variables. Table 3.2 reports the results of the multivariate regressions for each of the dependent 
variables. This includes the three separate HR indices (Models 1-3), the full HR index (Model 4), 
service-oriented OCBs (Models 5a and 5b), and customer satisfaction (Models 6a and 6b). 
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Models 1-4 show the relationship between franchise ownership and investments in HR 
practices. These models indicate that franchise ownership is significantly and negatively related 
to the skills index (β = -0.35, p <0.001), incentives index (β = -0.43, p <0.001), and the work 
design index (β = -0.28, p <0.001). Furthermore, franchise ownership is significantly and 
negatively related to the full HR index (β = -0.51, p <0.001). In unstandardized terms, 
franchisee-owned establishments, on average, have a skills index that is 0.41 units lower, an 
incentives index that is 0.55 units lower, a work design index that is 0.40 units lower, and an 
overall HR index that is 0.46 units lower than comparable company-owned establishments 
(p<0.001)9. 
Models 5a and 5b show that investments in HR practices significantly increase service-
oriented OCBs. Model 5a shows that investments in incentives (β = 0.11, p <0.05) and work 
design (β = 0.20, p <0.001) significantly increase service oriented OCBs, but investments in 
skills do not have a statistically significant effect on service-oriented OCBs. Model 5b shows 
that investments in HR practices overall, as reflected in the HR index, have a positive and 
significant effect on service-oriented OCBs (β = 0.24, p <0.001). Models 5a and 5b also show 
that controlling for investments in HR practices, franchise ownership has a direct, positive effect 
on service-oriented OCBs (β = 0.19, p <0.01; Model 5b). In unstandardized terms, franchisee-
owned establishments, on average, have a 0.25 higher score on the service-oriented OCB scale 
compared to company-owned establishments (p<0.01). 
Finally, Models 6a and 6b reveal a positive relationship between service-oriented OCBs 
and customer satisfaction. A one standard deviation increase in the service-oriented OCB scale is 
                                                 
9 Standardized coefficients are reported in the tables. However, standardized coefficients for dichotomous variables 
do not have substantive interpretation because dichotomous variables cannot be increased by one standard deviation, 
which is the usual interpretation of standardized coefficients. To ease interpretation, I present both the standardized 
coefficients (β) as well as the unstandardized coefficients for the franchise ownership variable in this section. 
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associated with a 0.12 standard deviation increase in the customer satisfaction index (p<0.001; 
Model 6b). In addition, Model 6a and 6b show that controlling for investments in HR practices, 
there is a strong and statistically significant relationship between franchise ownership and 
customer satisfaction (β = 0.28, p <0.001; Model 6b). In unstandardized terms, franchisee-owned 
establishments have a customer satisfaction index that is 0.56 units higher, on average, than 
company-owned establishments (p<0.001).  
Models 1-6 provide preliminary support for the hypotheses in this study. The multivariate 
regressions are particularly useful for examining the direct effects of the independent and control 
variables on our dependent variables of interest. However, Figure 3.1 indicates that some of our 
independent variables also have indirect effects on the dependent variables. Specifically, franchise 
ownership has an indirect effect on employee service-oriented OCBs through investments in HR 
practices, and an indirect effect on customer satisfaction through service-oriented OCBs. Similarly, 
HR practices also have an indirect effect on customer satisfaction through service-oriented OCBs. To 
decompose the direct and indirect effects of the independent variables and simultaneously examine 
all of the hypotheses in this study, a structural equation model was tested.  
First, I tested the model in Figure 3.1, with all of the control variables included. The 
model fit the data well (χ2(1)=1.06, p=0.30, CFI=1.00, RMR=0.001, RMSEA=0.01, 
AGFI=0.97)10, providing overall support for the theoretical model. Figure 3.2 shows this model, 
with path coefficients11. I then examined the direct, indirect, and total effects of the independent 
                                                 
10 For the sake of parsimony, the full HR index was used as the measure of investments in HR practices. A model 
using the three separate indices of HR practices was also tested, and demonstrated adequate fit and consistent 
estimates. Results for this model are available upon request. 
11 The initial model tested representing Figure 3.1 did not include a direct path from investments in HR practices to 
customer satisfaction. However, in order to explicitly test Hypothesis 3 (service-oriented OCBs as a mediator 
between HR practices and customer satisfaction), a direct path was included in the estimated model shown in Figure 
3.2. When the direct path from HR practices to customer satisfaction is included, the model is just identified. 
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variables on service-oriented OCBs and customer satisfaction, with all of the control variables 
included. The results are presented in Table 3.3. The direct effects reported in Table 3.3 are 
identical to the effects reported in Models 5b and 6b of Table 3.2. The total effect is the 
combination of the direct effect and the indirect effect (if any) of each independent variable on 
the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
N = 483; *** at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, † at the 0.10 level 
Notes: Standardized coefficients reported. Direct effects in bold, indirect effects in parentheses. Total effect = direct 
effect + indirect effect. 
a Ownership Structure = 1 if franchisee-owned, 0 if company-owned 
b Investments in HR Practices = HR Index 
c The estimated model includes a direct path from investments in HR practices to customer satisfaction and an 
indirect path from investments in HR practices to customer satisfaction through service-oriented organizational 
citizenship behaviors. The theoretical model in Figure 3.1 does not include the direct path. When the direct path is 
excluded, the model goes from just identified to over-identified and goodness-of-fit tests reveal good model fit 
(χ2(1)=1.06, p=0.30, CFI=1.0, RMR=0.001, RMSEA=0.01, AGFI=0.97). 
 
Figure 3.2: Estimated Path Coefficients for Theoretical Model 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Although goodness-of-fit tests are not available for this model, path coefficients for all variables are still available 
for hypothesis testing. 
Ownership 
Structurea 
Investments in 
HR Practicesbc 
Employee  
Service-
Oriented 
Organizational 
Citizenship 
Behaviors 
Customer  
Satisfaction 
0.28** (-0.01) 
0.19** (-0.12**) 
 -0.51** 0.24** 0.12** 
0.04 (0.03**)
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Table 3.3: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Independent Variables on Service-Oriented 
OCBs and Customer Satisfaction 
 
 
Variable 
Service-Oriented OCBs  Customer Satisfaction 
Direct 
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Total 
Effects 
 Direct 
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Total 
Effects 
Franchise 0.19** -0.12** 0.07  0.28** -0.01 0.27** 
HR Index 0.24** -- 0.24**  0.04 0.03** 0.07† 
Service-
Oriented OCBs 
-- -- --  0.12** -- 0.12** 
Controls 
Included 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N = 483; *** at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level, † at the 0.10 level 
Notes: Structural equation model includes same control variables as multivariate regressions (see Table 3.2). 
Standardized effects reported. Total effect = direct effect + indirect effect. Bias-corrected and percentile bootstrap 
analyses on 1000 samples were conducted to determine the significance of effects (Preacher & Hayes 2004; Shrout 
& Bolger 2002). Results were robust across both analyses so the percentile bootstrap significance is reported here. 
 
 
Beginning with ownership structure, Figure 3.2 shows a direct negative relationship 
between franchise ownership and investments in HR practices (β = -0.51, p <0.01), a direct 
positive relationship between HR practices and employee service-oriented OCBs (β = 0.24, p 
<0.01), and a direct positive relationship between employee service-oriented OCBs and customer 
satisfaction (β = 0.12, p <0.01). In addition, Figure 3.2 reveals an indirect positive relationship 
between investments in HR practices and customer satisfaction via employee service-oriented 
OCBs (β = 0.03, p <0.01). As shown in Table 3.3, the total effect of HR practices on customer 
satisfaction is marginally significant (β = 0.07, p <0.10), and the direct effect is not significant (β 
= 0.04, p = 0.30), which suggests that employee service-oriented OCBs mediate the relationship 
between investments in HR practices and customer satisfaction12. The significant positive 
                                                 
12 This approach is analogous to the traditional causal-steps approach outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
According to the causal-steps approach, mediation occurs if 1) the independent variable X significantly predicts the 
dependent variable Y; 2) X significantly predicts the mediator M; and 3) if M significantly predicts Y, controlling 
for X. In the relationship between the HR index, service-oriented OCBs, and customer satisfaction, we see that all 
three steps are satisfied. As discussed in the text and shown in Table 3.3, Step 1, which is the total effect of the HR 
index on customer satisfaction (X on Y), is positive and marginally significant. Step 2, the direct effect of the HR 
index on service-oriented OCBs (X on M), is also positive and significant. Finally, Step 3 is also satisfied as the 
direct effect between service-oriented OCBs and customer satisfaction (M on Y) is positive and significant while the 
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relationships between investments in HR practices, employee service-oriented OCBs, and 
customer satisfaction provide support for Hypotheses 1-3. The significant negative relationship 
between franchise ownership and investments in HR practices also provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 4.  
Turning to the effects of ownership structure on employee service-oriented OCBs and 
customer satisfaction, Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3 show that franchise ownership has a significant 
indirect negative relationship with employee service-oriented OCBs (β = -0.12, p <0.01), via the 
negative effects of franchise ownership on investments in HR practices noted above. This 
supports Hypothesis 5. At the same time, franchise ownership has a significant and positive 
direct effect on employee service-oriented OCBs (β = 0.19, p <0.01). Hypothesis 6 is therefore 
also supported. Hypothesis 7 predicts that the direct and indirect effects of franchise ownership 
on employee service-oriented OCBs will cancel each other out, leading to a total effect that is 
small and not significant. As shown in Table 3.3, the total effect of franchise ownership on 
employee service-oriented OCBs is positive but not significant (β = 0.07, p =0.23). The results 
support Hypothesis 7.  
Finally, Hypotheses 8 and 9 predict positive direct and total effects between franchise 
ownership and customer satisfaction. As shown in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3, there is a positive 
and significant direct effect between franchise ownership and customer satisfaction (β = 0.28, p 
<0.01). Moreover, given the small and non-significant total effect of franchise ownership on 
employee service-oriented OCBs, the indirect effect of franchise ownership on customer 
satisfaction via employee service-oriented OCBs is also small and not significant (β = -0.01, 
                                                                                                                                                             
direct effect between the HR index and customer satisfaction is not significant (X on Y, when M is included in the 
model). Support for mediation is also found when the direct path from HR index to customer satisfaction is removed 
in the model as the unsaturated model suggests good fit. See text above and Figure 3.2 for the fit statistics of this 
model. For a similar approach to testing mediation in structural equation/path models, see Schneider et al (2005). 
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p=0.58). Therefore, the total effect of franchise ownership on customer satisfaction primarily 
represents the direct effect and is positive and significant (β = 0.27, p<0.01). Hypotheses 8 and 9 
are thus fully supported. 
The results of the multivariate analyses and the structural equation model confirm the 
theoretical model presented in Figure 3.1. All hypothesized links between the variables in the 
model proved significant: franchise ownership was significantly related to investments in HR 
practices, employee service-oriented OCBs, and customer satisfaction. Investments in HR 
practices were also significantly related to employee service-oriented OCBs and, in turn, 
customer satisfaction. Although the latter is consistent with extant theory and research in SHRM, 
the results highlight the significant and offsetting effects of franchise ownership on both HR 
practices and outcomes. 
DISCUSSION 
 This study examined how differences in ownership structure shape the HR-performance 
relationship. I focused on an economically and strategically important form of ownership that has 
not received much attention in SHRM research, namely franchising. The findings suggest that 
franchise ownership is associated with lower investments in strategic human resource practices, 
but that franchisee owners are able to offset the negative consequences of these lower 
investments through comparative ownership incentives that lead franchised operations to have 
higher overall performance (namely, customer satisfaction) than company-owned operations, 
which make greater investments in performance-enhancing HR practices. 
The results of this study suggest that agency theory is particularly valuable for examining 
how differences in ownership form influence HR practices and outcomes. The study also 
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contributes to the franchising literature and agency theory more generally by providing some of 
the first research to simultaneously test multiple agency theory predictions regarding 
comparative ownership incentives. In particular, this study tests and finds support for differences 
in both free riding and effort incentives across ownership forms.  
 The findings have important implications for the SHRM and franchising literatures. To 
begin with, the results of this study suggest that investments in HR practices may be more 
important for some types of firms than others that are able to effectively mitigate the negative 
effects of lower investments. In the case of franchises, it appears that franchisee incentives to 
supervise employees and output result in higher performance, in the form of customer 
satisfaction, in franchised operations relative to company-owned operations, despite lower 
investments in HR practices. In contrast, greater investments in HR practices may be an 
important way for franchisors to balance the agency costs of company ownership since company 
managers do not have the same incentives to closely monitor employees and output. 
At the same time, the findings of this study also indicate that while franchisees have 
higher customer satisfaction than company-owned operations, they are not capitalizing on what 
may be one of the most sustainable sources of competitive advantage in service operations: 
human capital. Theory and empirical research in the field of strategic human resource 
management have relied on the resource-based view of the firm to argue that human capital can 
serve as a source of competitive advantage to the extent that it is valuable, rare, and difficult to 
imitate (Barney 1991; Wright & McMahan 1992). Investments in employment practices can help 
to develop this kind of human capital by investing in employee KSAs, and providing incentives 
and opportunities for employees to use those KSAs for the benefit of the firm (Liu, van 
Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost 2013). Firms that do not invest in such practices, however, will find it 
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difficult to develop the kind of strategic human capital that results in long-term performance 
gains and survival.  
This is evident in the current study. Although franchisees are able to effectively monitor 
employees, their lower investments in HR practices suppress the positive effects of monitoring 
on customer service improving employee behaviors, and as a result, franchisees do not benefit 
from their human capital resources. In agency theory terms, the agency benefits of franchising, in 
the form of reduced incentives to shirk and greater monitoring, are offset by the agency costs of 
franchising, in the form of free riding on investments in human capital or more simply, labor 
quality. Although customer satisfaction remained high in these operations, some have suggested 
that free riding on labor quality can be a source of variation in service quality (Michael 2000). 
Moreover, Michael (2000) shows that service quality at the chain level (as opposed to the unit 
level, as examined here), is much lower in chains that have a higher percentage of franchising. 
Accordingly, franchisee free riding on labor quality may have long-term negative consequences 
for both franchisees and perhaps more importantly, the larger organizations/chains to which they 
belong.  
Further research is therefore needed to understand a) the mechanisms through which 
franchise ownership directly relates to unit-level customer satisfaction, and whether these 
mechanisms represent sustainable sources of competitive advantage, and b) the long run 
implications of differential investments in strategic human capital across ownership forms. 
Longitudinal and multi-level data would be especially useful here as it would provide a greater 
understanding of how unit-level decisions and outcomes affect chain-level performance. A 
longitudinal research design would also provide a more rigorous test of the causal model 
examined in this study (i.e. Figure 3.1). 
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The results of this study and the preceding discussion also suggest that investments in HR 
practices for managers are just as important as investments in HR practices for frontline 
employees. More specifically, this study examined the extent and outcomes of investments in 
HR practices for non-managerial, line level employees, which has been the primary focus of 
SHRM research. However, the results also show that franchisee managers and company 
managers have different incentives to invest in performance-enhancing HR practices for frontline 
employees, and to monitor employee behavior and customer satisfaction. As a result, if 
franchisors also invested in HR practices for company managers, such as performance incentives 
that encourage managers to more closely monitor employee and customer output, then the 
combined effects of investments in HR practices for managers and frontline employees might 
lead to higher overall performance in company-owned operations. Likewise, practices to 
encourage franchisee managers to invest in HR practices for their frontline staff may allow 
franchised operations to effectively capitalize on their human capital resources and result in even 
higher (and perhaps more sustainable) performance. Given the interconnected nature of 
franchised and company-owned operations, performance improvements brought about through 
investments in HR practices for managers may have noteworthy implications for the success of 
franchise businesses (i.e. chains) as a whole. 
In general, the findings of this study underscore the importance of examining the 
conditions and more specifically, organizational context under which HR practices influence 
performance (Batt & Hermans 2012). The findings of this study also contribute to our 
understanding of the “black box” in the HR-performance relationship, particularly in the service 
context. Building on recent work that seeks to identify the employee behaviors mediating the 
relationship between HR practices and performance (Batt & Colvin 2011; McClean & Collins 
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2011; Sun, Aryee, & Law 2007), this study examines the relationship between HR practices, 
service-oriented OCBs, and customer satisfaction, a strategically important performance 
outcome in interactive service work. In line with the service-profit-chain framework (Heskett, 
Jones, Loveman, Sasser, & Schlesinger 1994), internal service quality, in the form of 
investments in HR practices, is positively related to employee service-oriented organizational 
citizenship behaviors, which in turn create external service value and positively influence 
customer satisfaction.  
The results of this study also provide support for the argument that the dimensions of HR 
systems can have differential effects on outcomes (Batt & Colvin 2011). Although investments 
in incentives and work design positively influenced service-oriented OCBs and, in turn, customer 
satisfaction, investments in skills did not have a significant effect on these outcomes. Moreover, 
the work design index demonstrated a stronger effect on both service-oriented OCBs and 
customer satisfaction than the incentives index13.  
The importance of a high involvement work design for improving performance has been 
highlighted in other studies of service organizations as well. For example, Batt (2002) found that 
a participatory work design was particularly important in explaining the relationship between 
investments in HR practices, turnover, and sales growth in call centers. Similarly, Batt and 
Colvin (2011) also found that the use of a high involvement work design was positively and 
significantly related to turnover and customer satisfaction in call centers. This may be suggesting 
that practices associated with the “opportunities for participation” dimension of HR systems are 
especially important for performance in the service context and warrants additional attention in 
                                                 
13 As shown in Table 3.2, the effect of the incentives index on service-oriented OCBs is 0.11 while the effect of the 
work design index is 0.20 (Table 3.2, Model 5a). Although all three indices do not have significant direct effects on 
customer satisfaction when service-oriented OCBs are included in the model (Table 3.2, Model 6a), separate 
analyses (available upon request) reveal that the work design index has a stronger indirect effect on customer 
satisfaction via employee service-oriented OCBs (β = 0.02, p<0.01) than the incentive index (β = 0.01, p<0.05). 
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future research. This is also consistent with Combs et al’s (2006: 521) call to investigate the 
specific types of HR practices that are important for service work.  
On a practical note, the relative importance of the work design index suggests that 
franchisees and other service employers concerned about budgets may still be able to benefit 
from their human capital resources through low cost investments in high involvement work 
design practices. Practices such as increased employee discretion and information sharing may 
provide employees with opportunities for collaboration and innovation that lead to sustained 
competitive advantages (Liu, van Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost 2013). Further research is needed 
however to understand whether and to what extent these practices can be effectively 
implemented without complementary investments in the other HR system dimensions, as posited 
in SHRM theory (i.e. “horizontal fit”; Appelbaum et al 2000; Delery & Shaw 2001). 
There are several limitations to this study. First, this study used cross-sectional data to 
test the causal model of the relationship between ownership, HR practices, and outcomes. 
Although I find significant relationships between these variables and carefully control for 
organizational and labor market characteristics that could influence the hypothesized 
relationships, longitudinal data would provide a more rigorous test of the causal model and 
provide greater confidence in the results.  
A second limitation is that this study focused on establishments within a single company 
and industry. Although focusing on a single chain allowed us to control for extraneous sources of 
variation, such as industry, brand, and market segment effects, the findings of this study may not 
generalize to other industries and organizations. Additional research is therefore needed to 
understand whether the causal model presented in this study extends to franchise chains in other 
settings.  
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Finally, it is worth noting that this study only focused on two specific outcomes of 
variation in HR investments: service-oriented OCBs and customer satisfaction. While these are 
important outcomes in the service sector, and have been tied to more distal outcomes such as a 
financial performance (Heskett, Jones, Loveman, Sasser, & Schlesinger 1994), it is possible that 
differences in ownership structure and HR investments have differential effects on other 
employee behaviors and organizational outcomes that were not examined here. For example, 
higher monitoring under franchise ownership may increase employee stress and turnover as 
previously mentioned (Carayon 1993; Shaw et al 1998), which may, in turn, negatively influence 
financial outcomes such as sales or profitability. Future research should therefore incorporate 
other employee and organizational outcomes to gain a better understanding of how ownership 
structure influences the HR-performance relationship, particularly over time.   
  
CONCLUSION 
 This paper examined the relationship between ownership form, investments in HR 
practices, and employee and organizational outcomes in the context of franchising in the hotel 
industry. Integrating SHRM theory with agency theory, a theoretical model was developed and 
tested to examine how differences in ownership form affect the HR-performance relationship. 
The evidence indicates that while HR practices positively influence performance, ownership 
structure can affect both the propensity to invest in these practices and organizational 
performance. As a result, lower investments in HR practices may not necessarily translate into 
lower overall performance. 
The findings of this study highlight the importance of examining the conditions under 
which HR practices influence performance. This task is especially important if SHRM 
researchers aim to develop research that is of practical significance. This study also contributes 
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to the SHRM literature by examining the HR-performance relationship in a sector that has 
received little attention but is of significant economic importance: low-skilled services. The 
findings provide support for the intermediate elements of the service profit chain, that is the 
relationship between internal service quality, employee external service behavior, and customer 
satisfaction, and suggest that high involvement work design practices may be especially 
important for performance in the service sector. Future research should examine these and other 
practices that are important in service work (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006). Future research 
should also examine the extent to which the findings of this study generalize to other 
organizations and industries.  
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APPENDIX 3.1
Variable Definitions 
Skills Index 
An index based on 4 items, standardized and averaged. 
 Formal Selection: The extent to which the establishment relies on formal assessment methods to 
determine the suitability of job candidates (on a 1-4 scale, with anchors “not at all” and “to a 
great extent”). 
 Education: The average number of years of completed schooling for FOH employees.  
 Initial Training: The number of hours of initial training that FOH employees receive in their 
first year, including orientation and job-related training. 
 Time to Proficiency: The number of days it takes for a new hire with little or no experience to 
become fully proficient on the job. 
Incentives Index 
An index based on 4 items, standardized and averaged. 
 Annual Salary: The base hourly wage for most FOH employees times the number of hours the 
typical FOH employee works per week times 52 weeks. 
 Benefits: The number of benefits provided to FOH employees (maximum of 6): paid 
vacation/holidays, paid sick leave, other paid leaves of absence, employer subsidized health 
insurance, defined benefit or defined contribution pension plan with employer contribution, and 
free/discounted meals. 
 Employment Security: The proportion of the workforce that is full-time. 
 Internal Mobility: The percentage of FOH employees typically promoted to higher positions in 
the hotel or promoted or transferred to other hotels within the company. 
Work Design Index 
An index based on 3 items, standardized and averaged. 
 Information Sharing: The percentage of FOH employees that regularly receive information 
regarding hotel goals, objectives, and performance. 
 Meetings: The percentage of FOH employees that are involved in regularly scheduled meetings 
to discuss work-related issues. 
 Discretion: A 4-item scale of discretion over work methods/procedures, what to say to 
customers, handling additional customer requests, handling customer complaints (each item was 
measured with a 1 to 5 Likert-scale type question with anchors “not at all” and “a great deal”; 
the mean response  for the 4 questions was 3.91) (alpha = 0.79). 
HR Index An index of the 11 HR practice items listed above, standardized and averaged. 
Service-Oriented 
OCBs 
A 4-item scale with items: says good things about the hotel to others, helps customers with problems 
beyond what is expected or required, helps other workers who have heavy workloads, and makes 
constructive suggestions for service improvement. Each item was measured with a 1 to 5 Likert-
scale type question with the anchors “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”; the mean response for 
the 4 questions was 4.28 (alpha = 0.86).  
Customer Satisfaction 
An index based on 2 items, standardized and averaged. 
 Net Promoter Score for each hotel; calculated as the percentage of promoters – percentage of 
detractors. 
 TripAdvisor® rating for each hotel; mean of customer reviews (on a 5 point scale, where 1 = 
“Terrible” and 5 = “Excellent”). 
Franchise Ownership Whether the hotel is owned by a franchisee (1) or owned/managed by corporate (0). 
Establishment Age Number of years since establishment opened. 
Establishment Size Number of rooms in the hotel. 
Location A series of indicators for the hotel’s location: Airport, city center, resort, suburban or highway (omitted category). 
RevPAR The average annual revenue per available room (RevPAR) for each hotel in the prior year.  
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate in the county where the hotel is located (drawn from 2012 Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BLS 2013a).    
Union Density Private sector union density in the metropolitan area where the hotel is located (drawn from 2012 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, Hirsch and Macpherson 2013).  
Median Wage Median hourly wage for hotel desk clerks in the metropolitan area where the hotel is located (drawn from Occupational Employment Statistics Survey, SOC code 434081, BLS 2013b).  
